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Chapter 1
On Investor Preferences and Mutual
Fund Separation1
This chapter extends Cass and Stiglitzs analysis of preference-based mutual fund separation.
We show that high degrees of fund separation can be constructed by adding inverse marginal
utility functions exhibiting lower degrees of separation. However, this method does not allow
us to nd all utility functions satisfying fund separation. In general, we do not know how
to write the primal utility functions in these models in closed form, but we can do so in
the special case of SAHARA utility dened by Chen et al. and for a new class of GOBI
preferences introduced here. We show that there is money separation (in which the riskless
asset can be one of the funds) if and only if there is a fund (which may not be the riskless
asset) with a constant allocation as wealth changes.
1.1 Introduction
Mutual fund separation is an important concept in portfolio selection. It means that all
investorsoptimal portfolio choice can be constructed as the linear combination of a set of
mutual funds regardless of the initial wealth level, where a mutual fund can be any portfolio
of tradable assets in the market. In other words, under mutual fund separation investors
should be able to achieve the same level of utility from the individual assets as if they were
1This chapter is joint work with Philip Dybvig.
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only o¤ered a set of mutual funds. The term separationcomes from the fact that every
investor can separate his portfolio choice into two steps. First, the investor chooses a
small set of funds that spans optimal portfolios of all wealth levels. Second, the investor
determines the optimal mixture of the separating funds based on his current wealth level.
Mutual fund separation has been studied in the literature from two perspectives, the dis-
tribution perspective and the preference perspective. In particular, Cass and Stiglitz (1970)
characterizes the class of investor preferences exhibiting mutual fund separation for all
distributions of asset returns, and Ross (1978) studies the distributions of asset returns that
support mutual fund separation for allutility functions. While Cass and Stiglitz (1970)
focus on preference-based separation, they mostly restrict attention to one- and two-fund
separation, and claim there is nothing intrinsically interesting in the generalization (K-fund
separation) not already contained in the argument previously given (two-fund separation).
We disagree!
In this paper, we extend Cass and Stiglitzs analysis of preference-based mutual fund
separation, with a special focus on high-degree separation. We show that high-degree sepa-
rating preferences can be constructed by adding inverse marginal utility functions exhibiting
lower degrees of separation. However, this method does not allow us to nd all utility func-
tions satisfying fund separation. In general, we do not know how to write the primal utility
function of a separating preference in closed form, but we show that this can be achieved
for two special classes of preferences, both of which exhibit three-fund separation. We also
study money separation in which the riskless asset can be chosen as one of the separating
funds, and show that money separation holds if and only if there is a fund (which may not
be the riskless asset) with a constant allocation as wealth changes.
The study of mutual fund separation has important implications. In practice, there are a
huge number of assets in the market available for trading, and it is impossible for individual
investors to examine each and every asset before setting up their portfolios. Even if a
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complete analysis of all assets is possible, it would involve a large amount of time and e¤ort,
let alone the substantial transaction costs that need to be incurred to trade these assets. If
we have reasons to believe that K-fund separation holds, where K is much smaller than the
number of assets, then instead of having to consider all available assets, it su¢ ces to restrict
attention to the K separating funds. The resulting optimal portfolio would deliver exactly
the same level of utility as the one constructed from the individual assets. In particular, this
suggests that we can set up the K separating funds as index funds, and that these funds are
all that an investor would ever need to trade.
It is useful to study mutual fund separation especially with high degrees also because it
helps motivate new preferences with tractable functional forms. In many important nance
problems such as portfolio selection and pricing, a nice feature that ensures tractability
is fund separation. Traditionally, the only preferences with fund separation that are well
studied are restricted to the one- and two-fund separating classes. In fact, in an economy
with the presence of a risk-free asset, two-fund separation implies that there must a unique
portfolio of risky assets held by all investors in equilibrium. In other words, all investors
optimal consumption bundles are homogeneous up to leverage. In comparison, with a higher
degree of separation, di¤erent investors can hold di¤erent portfolios of risky assets. This
allows for a larger extent of heterogeneity among investors when modeling an economy with
fund separation and analytical tractability.
We start with a one-period setting, where investors invest at the beginning of the period
and consume at the end. If a utility function exhibits K-fund separation, then its inverse
marginal utility can be spanned by K mutual funds, with the associated weights being
function of the initial wealth. Solving this equation then allows us to characterize the class
of separating preferences in terms of the inverse marginal utility. This characterization shows
that one can construct high-degree separating preferences by adding low-degree ones in the
inverse marginal utility. However, this method does not allow us to nd all utility functions
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satisfying fund separation, because high-degree separation may feature separating funds that
never show up in low-degree separation.
We then ask whether we are able to recover the primal utility functions of separating
preferences from the inverse marginal utility characterization. A natural way to do this is to
rst invert the inverse marginal utility to obtain the marginal utility, and then to integrate
the marginal utility to obtain the primal utility. Unfortunately, this generally does not yield
a closed-form expression, but there are a few cases for which a closed-form primal utility
can be analytically obtained. One such case is the SAHARA preferences recently proposed
by Chen, Pelsser and Vellekoop (2011), and another case is the GOBI preferences to be
introduced in this paper. We will show that both classes exhibit three-fund separation, and
they have not only a simple form in the inverse marginal utility, but a closed-form expression
in the primal utility.
We then turn to a special case of fund separation, in which the risk-free asset can be
chosen as one of the separating funds. We follow Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and call this
case money separation. We show that money separating holds if and only if we can choose
a separating fund whose optimal investment weight is constant and in particular does not
depend on the initial wealth level. Interestingly, the constant weight can be assigned to
either the risk-free asset (e.g., quadratic utility) or a risky fund (e.g., CARA utility). In
addition, we also show that money separation is closely related to shifts in the utility. In
particular, starting with a non-money separating preference, we can easily construct money
separation by introducing a non-zero shift in the utility function.
Finally, concavity imposes additional constraints on our separation characterization. We
show that strict concavity is maintained if and only if the inverse marginal utility is monoton-
ically decreasing. This enables us to check strict concavity by directly looking at the inverse
marginal utility. It is intrinsically very hard to derive the necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for strict concavity in terms of the parameter values. But, this condition does allow us to
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rene the class of separating preferences by ruling out parameter values and forms of the
inverse marginal utility that cannot exist.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature. Section 1.3
denes mutual fund separation and characterizes the class of separating preferences in terms
of the inverse marginal utility. We also demonstrate how low-degree separation can be used
to construct high-degree separating preferences. Section 1.4 derives the primal utility for
the SAHARA and GOBI preferences, both of which exhibit three-fund separation. Section
1.5 studies the special case of money separation. Section 1.6 examines conditions for strict
concavity and discuss how they can be used to rene the separating class. Section 1.7
concludes the paper.
1.2 Literature Review
The rst results of mutual fund separation are developed under the mean-variance framework.
Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958) show that when investors only care about the mean and
variance of the return distribution and in the presence of a risk-free asset, the optimal
portfolio can be constructed in two stages. The rst stage is to set up a risky portfolio by
nding the right weight assigned to each risky asset, and the second stage is to determine
the division of the entire wealth between the risky portfolio and the risk-free asset. Using
an equilibrium approach, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965a) later show that this benchmark
risky portfolio is in fact the market portfolio. Black (1972) then suggests that even in
the absence of the risk-free asset, similar two-fund separation results still hold with both
separating funds being risky portfolios. In addition, Merton (1972) analytically solves the
portfolio selection problem.
While the mean-variance framework nicely supports two-fund separation, its appropri-
ateness in describing investor preferences has been increasingly challenged by subsequent
studies. In particular, research in asset pricing shows that investors have preferences over
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high distribution moments of the portfolio returns. For instance, it is suggested that in-
vestors favor right skewness (e.g., Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), Jean (1971), Kane (1982),
and Harvey and Siddique (2000)), but are averse to tail-risk and rare disasters (e.g., Barro
(2009) and Gabaix (2008, 2012)). When the mean-variance preference does not hold, ad-
ditional conditions are needed to support mutual fund separation. Such conditions can be
roughly classied into two types: those in terms of investor preferences and those in terms
of the distributions of asset returns.
In terms of investor preferences, Pye (1967) and Hakansson (1969) nd that the HARA
class exhibits two-fund separation with one of the separating funds being the risk-free asset.
Cass and Stiglitz (1970) further characterize the class of preferences that permits mutual
fund separation, regardless of the distributions of asset returns. More recently, Rockafellar,
Uryasev, and Zabarankin (2006b) and Kadan, Liu, and Liu (2015) extend the mean-variance
preference into a mean-risk framework to capture a wide variety of risk attributes, and
they provide su¢ cient conditions on the risk measure that guarantee two-fund separation.
On the other side of the research, e¤orts have been made to delineate the class of stochastic
processes that supports separation for all utility functions (see Fama (1965), Feldstein (1969),
and Merton (1971)). In particular, Ross (1978) derives necessary and su¢ cient conditions on
the stochastic structure of asset returns such that mutual fund separation can be sustained,
independent of investor preferences. Further, Russell (1980) presents a unied approach to
the two-fund separation problem that incorporates both Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and Ross
(1978).
More recently, people have turned to separability under the dynamic portfolio optimiza-
tion framework (see Schmedders (2007) and Canakoglu and Ozekici (2010)) and portfolio
separation with heterogeneous beliefs and attitudes towards risk (see Chabi-Yo, Ghysels and
Renault (2008)). All of this contributes to the theory of mutual fund separation.
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1.3 Mutual Fund Separation
In this section, we study necessary and su¢ cient conditions for preference-based K-fund
separation.
1.3.1 Setup
A group of investors exhibits K-fund separation if the optimal portfolio choice of all of them
can be constructed as the linear combination of the same set of K mutual funds, regardless
of the initial wealth level.
Following Cass and Stiglitz (1970)s analysis, we consider a one-period model, in which
investors invest at the beginning of the period and consume at the end. Assume that there
exists a unique stochastic discount factor (also known as the state-price density)  > 0 that
takes all positive values with E () < 1.2 As an informality, we also use  to represent
realizations of the random stochastic discount factor throughout the paper. Also assume
that all investors have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u () dened on any open interval
D  R, which is twice di¤erentiable with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0: We allow for both positive and
negative consumption levels.3 We denote the set of utility functions of all investors by U .
Then, an investor with utility function u 2 U and initial wealth w0 2 R solves the following
utility maximization problem.
Problem 1 Choose consumption x to
max
x
E [u (x)]
subject to the budget constraint
E [x]  w0:
2One way to guarantee the existence of a unique stochastic discount factor is by assuming that the market
is complete enough such that all assets needed to produce optimal risk sharing are available and that all
investors agree on pricing.
3While negative consumption may seem absurd on its face, what we call consumption might be the net
trade or it can be justied by a promise to do work to cover any negative amount. Also, even if consumption
is not literally negative, it can be a useful modelling device.
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We denote the set of solutions to Problem 1 by S (u;w0) : By the strict concavity of u;
S (u;w0) is either an empty set or a singleton. Assume that for all utility functions under
consideration, there exists an open interval for the initial wealth such that an optimum to
Problem 1 exists, i.e., S (u;w0) 6= ?: Now we dene K-fund separation if there are no fewer
than K mutual funds whose random payo¤s span the optimal consumptions of all investors
whenever an optimum exists, regardless of the initial wealth level.
Denition 2 We have K-fund separation if K is the smallest positive integer such that
there exists K mutual funds ffk ()gk=1;:::;K, which satises that for all u 2 U and w0 2 R, if
S (u;w0) 6= ?; then we can nd fk (u;w0)gk=1;:::;K such that
KX
k=1
k (u;w0) fk () 2 S (u;w0).
Several comments are worth pointing out. First, the optimal consumptions and the
separating funds are both identied in terms of payo¤, whereas the associated portfolio
compositions may not be uniquely determined in the presence of redundant assets. Second,
whenever K-fund separation holds for K  2, the set of separating funds is not unique.
Indeed, having one set of separating funds, we can easily construct another by taking linear
combinations of the original set of funds, and the resulting investment weights are also linear
combinations of the original weights. Finally, while K-fund separation is dened for a set of
utility functions, we are often interested in K-fund separation for a single utility as a special
case, which is obtained when U contains one utility function only.
One special form of mutual fund separation obtains when we can choose the risk-free
asset as one of the separating funds. We follow Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and refers to this
special case as money separation. In other words, money separation holds as long as the
risk-free asset is in the linear span of the separating funds. Formally, we have the following
denition.
Denition 3 We have K-fund money separation if K-fund separation holds and we can
8
choose f1 () = 1:4
To characterize utility functions exhibiting mutual fund separation, we start by solving
Problem 1. Suppose that a solution exists, then the rst order condition implies that the
optimal consumption portfolio is given by
x = I () ; (1.1)
where  > 0 is the shadow price whose value depends on the initial wealth level w0, and
I = (u0) 1 is the inverse marginal utility function. Since u00 < 0; it is apparent that I exists
and is unique.
If the utility function u satises K-fund separation, then the optimal consumption (1.1)
can be written as the weighted sum ofK mutual funds, with the associated weights depending
on the initial wealth w0 and thus on the shadow price ; i.e.,
I () =
KX
k=1
k () fk () : (1.2)
Notice that to ensure non-degeneracy, we must have that the separating funds fk ()s are
linearly independent, and that the associated investment weights k ()s are also linearly
independent. Otherwise, the degree of separation can always be reduced by combining two
or more funds to form a larger separating fund. In addition, for tractability, we only consider
the case in which the k ()s are locally analytical.
1.3.2 Some Examples
Before we formally characterize the set of separating preferences, let us rst look at a few
examples. Some of the following examples involve very well-known preferences, while others
are less so. One might wonder how we come up with these examples. In fact, these examples
4The payo¤ to the risk-free asset can take any constant value. Without loss of generality, we normalize
it to be equal to 1.
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can be easily constructed from the general characterization of separating preferences to be
introduced in the next section.
Example 4 (CRRA Utility) Consider the CRRA utility function
u (x) =

x1 a
1 a ; a > 0 and a 6= 1
log x; a = 1
dened on all x 2 (0;+1) ; where a is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. It is easy to
verify that the inverse marginal utility can be written as
I () =  
1
a :
Since
I () = () 
1
a =  
1
a 
1
a ;
by (1.2) we have that the CRRA utility function exhibits one-fund separation with the sepa-
rating fund
f () =  
1
a ;
and the corresponding investment weight given by
 () =  
1
a :
This indicates that an investor with CRRA utility would always nd it optimal to invest
his entire wealth into a single mutual fund  
1
a ; regardless of the initial wealth level.
Example 5 (Quadratic Utility) Suppose we have the following quadratic utility function
u (x) =  x2 + 2bx;
where x < b: We can easily verify that the inverse marginal utility is given by
I () = b  1
2
:
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Since
I () = b  1
2
;
the quadratic utility function exhibits two-fund separation with one of the separating funds
being the risk-free asset
f1 () = 1;
and the other a risky portfolio
f2 () = :
The corresponding investment weights are given by
1 () = b;
2 () =  1
2
:
This implies that an investor with quadratic utility would optimally invest a xed amount
b into the risk-free asset and take a wealth-dependent short position in the risky fund .
Example 6 (SAHARA Utility) The SAHARA preferences are introduced in Chen, Pelsser
and Vellekoop (2011). They show that the inverse marginal utility of a SAHARA utility
function with scale parameter b > 0 and risk aversion parameter a > 0 can be written as
I () =
1
2

 
1
a   b2 1a

:
Since
I () =
1
2

() 
1
a   b2 () 1a

=
1
2
 
1
a 
1
a   1
2
b2
1
a
1
a ;
this suggests that the SAHARA utility function exhibits two-fund separation with the two
separating funds dened as
f1 () = 
  1
a ;
f2 () = 
1
a :
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The corresponding wealth dependent investment weights are given by
1 () =
1
2
 
1
a ;
2 () =  1
2
b2
1
a :
Namely, it is optimal for an investor with a SAHARA utility function to take a long
position in fund  
1
a and a short position in fund 
1
a .
Up to this point, one may notice that a common feature of the above three examples
is that their inverse marginal utility functions can all be viewed as linear combinations of
power terms : Specically, in the CRRA example there is only one power term  
1
a with
 =   1
a
; in the quadratic case we have two power terms 1 and  corresponding to  = 0; 1;
and for the SAHARA utility we again have two power terms 
1
a and  
1
a where  =  1
a
:
While one may suspect that the power terms are the only form permitted in a separating
preference, the following example demonstrates that it is actually not the case.
Example 7 (CARA Utility) Consider the CARA utility function
u (x) =  e ax;
with the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion a > 0: The inverse marginal utility can be
expressed as
I () =
1
a
(log a  log ) :
Since
I () =
1
a
(log a  log ()) = 1
a
(log a  log )  1
a
log ;
the CARA utility function exhibits two-fund separation with one of the separating funds being
a risk-free asset
f1 () = 1;
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and the other a risky portfolio
f2 () = log :
The corresponding investment weights are given by
1 () =
1
a
(log a  log ) ;
2 () =  1
a
:
This suggests that an investor with CARA utility would always nd it optimal to invest
a wealth-dependent amount into the risk-free asset and take a constant short position in the
risky fund log .
Notice that in the above example, the inverse marginal utility consists of two terms: a
degenerate power term 0 = 1 and an additional term log : This suggests that log  may
also show up in a separating preference.
In all four examples above, the power terms  in the inverse marginal utility feature
real power values. However, this does not have to be the case. In particular, when we
have a pair of complex power values   bi, bi can be transformed into cos (b log ) 
and sin (b log ) : The following example illustrates that these terms can also appear in a
separating preference.
Example 8 Consider a utility function u, whose inverse marginal utility is given by
I () = [cos (log ) + sin (log ) + b]  a;
where a > 1 and b > 2: It can be veried that
I () = [cos (log ()) + sin (log ()) + b] () a
= [cos (log ) + sin (log )] a cos (log )  a
+ [cos (log )  sin (log )] a sin (log )  a + b a a:
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Hence, we have three-fund separation with the following separating funds
f1 () = cos (log ) 
 a;
f2 () = sin (log ) 
 a;
f3 () = 
 a:
The corresponding investment weights are given by
1 () = [cos (log ) + sin (log )]
 a;
2 () = [cos (log )  sin (log )] a;
3 () = b
 a:
1.3.3 General Characterization of K-Fund Separation
In this section, we provide a general characterization of preferences exhibiting K-fund sep-
aration. Our characterization is stated in terms of the inverse marginal utility function
I: We show that a separating preference can only have the following terms in its inverse
marginal utility function: C (constant), , (log )l,  (log )l, cos (b log ), sin (b log ),
 cos (b log ),  sin (b log ), (log )l cos (b log ), (log )l sin (b log ),  (log )l cos (b log ),
and  (log )l sin (b log ) : Indeed, we have seen many of these terms in the examples above.
The following theorem provides the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for K-fund sepa-
ration, where K  1 can be any positive integer. This characterization is similar to Theorem
7.1 in Cass and Stiglitz (1970), although it is di¢ cult to see whether that characterization
is equivalent to ours. Theorem 7.1 of Cass and Stiglitz (1970) is stated without proof and
contains terms that should not be there. However, the remark to the theorem describes an
additional restriction which rules out at least some of the extra terms and may make their
result equivalent to ours.
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Theorem 9 A utility function u (with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0) exhibits K-fund separation if and
only if the inverse marginal utility function I = (u0) 1 can be expressed as
I () =
JX
k=1
kPk;1 (log ) cos (bk log ) +
JX
k=1
kPk;2 (log ) sin (bk log ) ; (1.3)
where
(1) The ordered pairs (k; bk) are distinct for each k with bk  0;
(2) For i = 1; 2; Pk;i (log ) is a polynomial function of log  of degree dk;i  0, i.e.
Pk;i (log ) =
Pdk;i
l=0 Ck;i;l (log )
l ; where the leading coe¢ cient Ck;i;dk;i 6= 0;
(3) If bk = 0 (the sin terms disappear, but the cos terms do not), then dk;2 = 0; and
(4)
JX
k=1
(dk + 1) (1 + 1bk 6=0) = K; where dk = maxi=1;2 (dk;i) ; and 1bk 6=0 is an indicator
function that takes a value of 1 when bk 6= 0 and 0 otherwise.
The separating funds can be chosen as follows: 8k = 1; 2;    ; J and 8l = 0; 1;    ; dk;
fk;l () = 
k (log )l ; (1.4)
when bk = 0; and
f
k;1;l
() = k cos (bk log ) (log )
l ; (1.5)
f
k;2;l
() = k sin (bk log ) (log )
l ; (1.6)
when bk 6= 0:
The associated investment weights are given by
k;l () = 
k
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l ; (1.7)
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when bk = 0; and

k;1;l
() = 1ldk;1
k cos (bk log )
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l (1.8)
+1ldk;2
k sin (bk log )
dk;2X
j=l
Ck;2;j

j
l

(log )j l ;

k;2;l
() = 1ldk;2
k cos (bk log )
dk;2X
j=l
Ck;2;j

j
l

(log )j l (1.9)
 1ldk;1k sin (bk log )
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l ;
when bk 6= 0:
Proof of Theorem 9 (sketch): Here is a sketch of the proof. The formal proof is delegated
to the Appendix.
Utility function u exhibitsK-fund separation if and only if (1.2) holds whenever a solution
to Problem 1 exists. Taking derivatives of (1.2) with respect to  yields0B@ I
0 ()
...
KI(K) ()
1CA = M0 ()
0B@ f1 ()...
fK ()
1CA ;
where I(k) denotes the kth derivative of I; and M0 () is dened as
M0 () =
0B@ 
0
1 ()    0K ()
...
...

(K)
1 ()    (K)K ()
1CA : (1.10)
Assume for now that M0 () is non-singular for some ; i.e., 9 such that (M0 ()) 1
exists. We show in the appendix that a simple trick allows us to tackle the singularity case
for which similar results obtain. When M0 () is not singular, we have0B@ f1 ()...
fK ()
1CA = (M0 ()) 1
0B@ I
0 ()
...
KI(K) ()
1CA : (1.11)
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Plugging (1.11) back into (1.2) gives us
I () =
0B@ 1 ()...
K ()
1CA
T
(M0 ())
 1
0B@ I
0 ()
...
KI(K) ()
1CA : (1.12)
Without loss of generality, assume that (M0 ())
 1 exists when  = 1: Evaluating (1.12) at
 = 1 and rearranging yield a di¤erential equation of the form
AKI
(K) () K +   + A1I 0 ()  + I () = 0; (1.13)
where A1; A2;    ; AK are constants. To ensure non-degenerate K-fund separation, we must
have AK 6= 0. Then, (1.13) is a Kth-order homogeneous Eulers equation.
To solve this di¤erential equation, we conjecture I () =  and plug this into (1.13).
This gives us the following Kth-order polynomial equation
AK (   1)    (  K + 1) +   + A2 (   1) + A1 + 1 = 0; (1.14)
with K roots. Some of these K roots may be repeated, thus reducing to J  K distinct
roots fk + bkigJk=1, each of which can be either real (bk = 0) or complex (bk 6= 0). If a
real root k is not repeated, then it yields a power term 
k in the solution of I () : If k
is repeated for dk + 1 times, then it gives rise to dk + 1 terms
n
k (log )l
odk
l=0
in I () ;
which can be combined as kPk;1 (log ) : Similarly, if a pair of complex roots k  bki is
not repeated, it gives rise to two terms k cos (bk log ) and 
k sin (bk log ) in I () : If the
pair k  bki is repeated for dk + 1 times, then it generates kPk;1 (log ) cos (bk log ) and
kPk;2 (log ) sin (bk log ) : To ensure that the total number of roots is equal to K; we must
have
K =
JX
k=1
(dk + 1) (1 + 1bk 6=0) :
Combining all the above terms, it then follows that the solution to (1.14) is given by (1.3).
By the theory of ordinary di¤erential equations (see, for example, Birkho¤ and Rota
(1962), Lemma IV.3.2 and the discussion after Theorem IV.2.2 on how to convert Eulers
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Terms in I k bk dk
C (constant) 0 0 0
  0 0n
(log )l
o
l
0 0  0n
 (log )l
o
l
 0  0
cos (b log ) ; sin (b log ) 0 b 0
 cos (b log ) ;  sin (b log )  b 0n
(log )l cos (b log ) ; (log )l sin (b log )
o
l
0 b  0n
 (log )l cos (b log ) ;  (log )l sin (b log )
o
l
 b  0
Figure 1.1: Possible Terms in I of a Separating Preference
di¤erential equation to an equation with xed coe¢ cients), we know that (1.4)-(1.6) are
linearly independent and they together form a solution basis for the Eulers equation (1.13).
Thus, they can be chosen as a set of separating funds.
While the expression of (1.3) seems complicated, it is indeed a concise way to incorpo-
rate all possible terms listed at the beginning of this section. Figure 1.1 summarizes the
correspondence of various parameter values in (1.3) to di¤erent possible terms in I:
The characterization of K-fund separation for a class of preferences U follows almost
immediately from Theorem 9. The inverse marginal utility of each u 2 U must be the sum
of terms as in (1.3), and each of these terms must appear with non-zero coe¢ cient for some
utility function u^ 2 U to ensure non-degeneracy. Formally, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 10 A class of preferences U exhibits K-fund separation if and only if there exist
J distinct ordered pairs f(k; bk)gJk=1 with bk  0 and non-negative integers fDkgJk=1 that
satisfy
JX
k=1
(Dk + 1) (1 + 1bk 6=0) = K such that 8u 2 U , the inverse marginal utility function
I = (u0) 1 can be expressed as (1.3), where
(1) For i = 1; 2; Pk;i (log ()) is a polynomial function of log () of degree dk;i   1:
When dk;i =  1; Pk;i (log ()) is an empty sum, which we take to be uniformly equal to zero;
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(2) If bk = 0 (the sin terms disappear, but the cos terms do not), then dk;2 =  1;
(3) 8k = 1; 2;    ; J; maxi=1;2 dk;i  Dk;
(4) 8k = 1; 2;    ; J; 9u^ 2 U such that maxi=1;2 d^k;i = Dk:
The separating funds can be chosen to be (1.4)-(1.6).
According to the above corollary, mutual fund separation for a class of preferences is
very similar in spirit to that for a single utility function. Hence, we do not make formal
distinctions between these two cases in the analyses below.
1.3.4 One-Fund Separation
It is immediate from Theorem (9) that a utility function u exhibits one-fund separation if
and only if its inverse marginal utility can be written as
I () = C; (1.15)
for some constant C: This corresponds to the case where (1.14) has a single real root. We
will show in Section 1.6 that strict concavity entails
C < 0:
The unique separating fund (up to multiplication by a scalar) and the associated investment
weight are given by
f () = ;
and
 () = C:
One can verify that the primal utility function for the one-fund separating preferences is
u (x) =
(
C
+1
 
x
C
 1

+1
;  6=  1 and  6= 0
C log
 
x
C

;  =  1 ; (1.16)
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where x 2 (0;+1) when  < 0 and x 2 ( 1; 0) when  > 0: Notice that when C > 0
and  < 0; this corresponds to the CRRA utility function, which is dened on positive
consumption levels. In fact, setting C = 1 and  =   1
a
; we obtain the standard form as
given in Example 4.
When C < 0 and  > 0; we dene this utility function as a mirror version of the CRRA
preference. Without loss of generality, let C =  1 and  = 1
a
with a > 0, and then (1.16) is
reduced to
u (x) =  ( x)
1+a
1 + a
;
for all x 2 ( 1; 0) : Note that the mirror CRRA utility has a very similar form to that of
the standard CRRA utility with a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion a; except that now it
is dened on negative wealth levels.
1.3.5 Two-Fund Separation
If a utility function u exhibits two-fund separation, then Theorem (9) suggests that three
di¤erent cases are possible. These three cases correspond to the scenarios in which (1.14)
have two distinct real roots, two repeated real roots, and a pair of complex roots, respectively.
We now discuss each of these cases separately.
Case 1: When (1.14) has two distinct real roots, (1.3) is reduced to
I () = C1
1 + C2
2 ;
where 1 6= 2 and C1, C2 are arbitrary constants. It can be easily verify that the two
separating funds and the associated investment weights are given by
fk () = 
k ;
and
k () = Ck
k ;
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for k = 1; 2:
Examples of this case include the quadratic utility function obtained when 1 = 0 and
2 = 1 (see Example 5), and the SAHARA utility function obtained when 1 =   1a and
2 =
1
a
(see Example 6). Another example, which will later be introduced in Section 1.4.2,
is the GOBI preference, whose inverse marginal utility takes the form
I () = C1
 + C2
2;
with  6= 0:
An interesting observation is that in this case, the inverse marginal utility of a two-fund
separating preference can be viewed as the linear combination of that of two di¤erent one-
fund separating preferences. In fact, we will soon discuss that taking the linear combination
of distinct separating preferences in the inverse marginal utility leads to another separating
preference with a higher degree.
Case 2: When (1.14) has two repeated real roots, (1.3) can be written as
I () = C1
 + C2
 log ;
for some constants C1 and C2:We will show in Section 1.6 that strict concavity entails  = 0;
so we must have
I () = C1 + C2 log ;
which is exactly the CARA utility (see Example 7).
In this case, the two separating funds are
f1 () = 1;
f2 () = log ;
with associated investment weights
1 () = C1 + C2 log ;
2 () = C2:
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While the previous case with two distinct real roots can be constructed by taking linear
combinations of two one-fund separating preferences in the inverse marginal utility, it is
obvious that the case with repeated real roots does not obtain this way. This is because
the log  term, which yields one separating fund in a two-fund separating preference, does
not show up in one-fund separation. Indeed, we will see later that the log terms are not the
only ones that cannot be constructed from low-degree separations. Also absent in low-degree
separations are the cos and sin terms.
Case 3: When (1.14) has a pair of complex roots, the inverse marginal utility takes the
form of
I () = C1
 cos (b log ) + C2
 sin (b log ) ;
with constants C1 and C2: We will show in Section 1.6 that this form cannot exist under
strict concavity.
1.3.6 From Low-Degree to High-Degree Separation
As have been discussed in Section 1.3.5, taking linear combinations of two distinct one-fund
separating preferences in the inverse marginal utility allows us to construct a large class of
two-fund separating preferences, such as the SAHARA and GOBI utility. More generally,
this approach can be used broadly to generate higher-degree separating preferences from
those with lower degrees. We now formalize this idea in the following theorem.
Theorem 11 Consider N utility functions fungNn=1 with corresponding inverse marginal
utility given by fIngNn=1 : Suppose that each un exhibits Kn-fund separation. If we have
another utility function u; whose inverse marginal utility is given by
I () =
NX
n=1
tnIn () ; (1.17)
22
for some non-zero constants a1; a2;    ; an; then u satises K-fund separation with
K 
NX
n=1
Kn;
where the equality holds when the separating funds of the N utility functions are linearly
independent.
Proof of Theorem 11: Since un exhibits Kn-fund separation, we must have
In () =
KnX
k=1
n;k () fn;k () :
By (1.17), we obtain
I () =
NX
n=1
tnIn () =
NX
n=1
KnX
k=1
tnn;k () fn;k () ;
which is a linear combination of the fn;k ()s with corresponding weights depending on 
only. This suggests that u satises mutual fund separation.
The degree of separation depends on whether the fn;k ()s are linearly independent. If so,
then u satises K-fund separation with K =
PN
n=1 Kn: Otherwise, K <
PN
n=1 Kn; because
multiple funds can be cancelled against each other or combined to form a larger fund, which
lowers the degree of separation.
Theorem 11 proposes a simple way of constructing high-degree separating preferences by
taking linear combinations of low-degree ones in the inverse marginal utility. For example,
if we start with K distinct one-fund separating preferences, taking the linear combination in
the inverse marginal utility generates a K-fund separating utility with
I () =
KX
k=1
Ck
k ;
for some constants C1; C2;    ; CK .
It is tempting to think that this approach allows us to construct any high-degree separat-
ing preference from low-degree ones, but it is actually not the case. In fact, we have already
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seen a counterexample in Section 1.3.5. Specically, we are not able to construct the CARA
utility, which exhibits two-fund separation, from one-fund separating preferences. This is
because the CARA class has a log  term in the inverse marginal utility, which only shows
up when (1.14) has repeated roots and thus never exists in one-fund separation. Similarly,
separation of even higher degrees can involve (log )2 ; (log )3 and so forth, implying that we
can always obtain new terms when the degree of separation becomes larger. Hence, it is im-
possible to nd a set of separating preferences that can be used to construct all higher-degree
separation.
Notice that also absent from one- and two-fund separation are the cos and sin terms,
which obtain when (1.14) has complex roots. As will be shown later in the paper, while the
condition of strict concavity prevents these terms from showing up in two-fund separation,
they do appear in separating preferences of higher degrees. One such case is given in Example
8.
1.3.7 Range of Optimal Consumption
This section examines the range of optimal consumptions for separating preferences. Previ-
ous research typically denes utility functions on positive wealth only, implicitly assuming
that consumptions cannot be negative. In this paper, we take a more general view and allow
consumptions to be either positive or negative. It would then be interesting to ask under
what conditions an investors optimally consumes a positive amount in all states of the world.
The following theorem addresses this issue.
Theorem 12 Consider a utility function u exhibiting mutual fund separation. The following
statements are equivalent:
1. For all initial wealth levels such that an optimum exists, an investor with utility function
u optimally consumes a positive amount of wealth in all states of the world.
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2. For all  > 0; we have I () > 0:
3. The equation I () = 0 has no positive solution and I () > 0 for some :
Proof of Theorem 12: Since the optimal consumption is I () ; the investor consumes a
positive amount in all states at all wealth levels if and only if I () > 0 for all  > 0 and
 > 0: This is equivalent to I () > 0 for all  > 0: Hence, statements 1 and 2 are equivalent.
On the other hand, if u satises mutual fund separation, its inverse marginal utility
function takes the form of (1.3), which is clearly a continuous function in : It is then
immediate that statements 2 and 3 are equivalent.
The following theorem characterizes the range of optimal consumptions for all utility
functions exhibiting mutual fund separation.
Theorem 13 For a utility function u satisfying mutual fund separation, the range of optimal
consumptions fI () :  > 0g is
1. ( 1; 0) or (0;+1) when K = 1;
2. an open unbounded interval, and it can be any open unbounded interval when K  2.
Notice that Theorem 13 equips us with a simple way of identifying some of the utility
functions that do not satisfy mutual fund separation by examining the range of optimal
consumptions without having to know the exact form of the utility. In particular, if we have
a utility function with a bounded range of optimal consumptions, then we know for sure
that such a preference cannot exhibit mutual fund separation.
1.3.8 Machina Preferences
Our analyses so far have focused on von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. More
generally, investor preferences may not take the expected utility form, in which case our
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previous results do not necessarily apply. Machina (1982) shows that expected utility can be
viewed as a special case of a larger class of preferences, which we call Machina preferences
hereafter, and many properties and results in expected utility theory obtain similarly for
Machina preferences. In this section, we ask whether our fund separation results for von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility can be extended to the Machina preferences. As in the case
of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, Machina assumes that investor preferences depend
on the distribution of consumptions only and thus are not state-dependent. Unlike von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility, Machina preferences do not assume the form of expected
utility. Indeed, Machina (1982) shows that when the utility function is smooth in the sense
of Fréchet di¤erentiability, preferences can be modeled locally as expected utility.5
Consider a Fréchet di¤erentiable utility function V () dened over distributions of con-
sumption portfolios. Let x and x denote two random consumption portfolios with the
corresponding distribution functions given by F  and F: Suppose that F  and F lies very
close to each other. We then have
V (F )  V (F ) 
Z
U (z;F ) (dF   dF ) = E [U (x;F )]  E [U (x;F )] ;
or equivalently,
V (F )  V (F ) + E [U (x;F )]  E [U (x;F )] ; (1.18)
where U (z;F ) is the local utility function over consumption level z evaluated at distribution
F: Assume that U (;F ) is strictly concave for all F:
With the Machina preferences, investors face the following utility maximization problem.
Problem 14 Choose consumption x to
max
x
V (F )
5We are being informal about the topology used to dene the Fréchet derivative if 
 is not bounded. In
Machinas original work (as in many derivations of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences), it was assumed
that consumption is bounded. To formalized what we are doing for unbounded random variables, we would
have to specify the topology over distribution functions to dene the sense of approximation.
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subject to the budget constraint
E [x]  w0:
Since U (;F ) is strictly concave for all F , if an optimum exists, it must be unique.
Suppose that x solves Problem 14. Then, it must maximize (1.18) for local utility function
U (;F ) evaluated at F : Notice that once we x F ; both V (F ) and E [U (x;F )] are
constants. Therefore, x must maximize E [U (x;F )] : Formally, the optimal consumption
portfolio x must be the solution to the following problem.
Problem 15 Choose consumption x to
max
x
E [U (x;F )]
subject to the budget constraint
E [x]  w0:
It seems that we are faced with a similar problem as in the baseline case of von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility. Apparently, if the local utility function U (;F ) satises mutual fund
separation with the same separation funds at all F; then V () exhibits mutual fund separation
globally. In fact, this condition is much stronger than what is needed. The only thing we
need is for the all optimal consumption portfolios corresponding to di¤erent initial wealth
levels to be spanned by the same set of separating funds. Since di¤erent initial wealth gives
rise to di¤erent optimal consumption portfolios, which in turn feature di¤erent local utility
functions, for each local utility function U (;F ) we only need fund separation to hold at the
particular wealth level supporting F as the optimal consumption portfolio.
Theorem 16 Consider a Machina utility function V () ; whose associated local utility func-
tion at any consumption distribution F is given by U (;F ) : If U (;F ) satises mutual fund
separation at all F with respect to the same set of separation funds, then V () exhibits mutual
fund separation.
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To illustrate mutual fund separation for Machina preferences, we now provide two ex-
amples. The rst example is the mean-variance preference, which has been shown to satisfy
two-fund money separation in Tobin (1958).
Example 17 Consider the mean-variance preference
V (F ) = E (x)  a
2
Var (x) = E (x)  a
2

E
 
x2
  (E (x))2 ;
where a > 0 represents the level of risk aversion. The rst order condition is given by
1  a [x   E (x)] = ; (1.19)
which yields
x = E (x) +
1
a
  
a
: (1.20)
This implies that V (F ) exhibits two-fund money separation with separating funds
f1 () = 1;
f2 () = :
The corresponding investment weights for the two separating funds are given by
1 (w0) = E (x
) +
1
a
;
2 (w0) =  
a
:6
To determine the value of ; taking the expectation of (1.20) and rearranging lead to
E [x   E (x)] = E

1  
a

:
The left hand side is apparently equal to 0, which implies
E

1  
a

= 0;
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and hence
 =
1
E ()
: (1.21)
This suggests that xing the distribution of ;  is a constant and does not change with wealth.
This is di¤erent from the case of Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, where the initial wealth
level and  has a one-to-one map.
On the other hand, the budget constraint implies
w0 = E (x
)
= E

E (x) +
1  
a



= E

E (x) +
1
a

1  
E ()



= E (x) E () +
1
a
E ()  1
a
E (2)
E ()
;
where the second and third equalities follow (1.20) and (1.21), respectively. Solving for E (x)
leads to
E (x) =
E (2)
a [E ()]2
+
w0
E ()
  1
a
;
which varies with the wealth level.
Therefore, investors with the mean-variance preferences nd it optimal to short a xed
amount in the risky fund  and to invest the rest of their wealth in the risk-free asset.
The mean-variance preferences essentially assume that the only risk that investors are
concerned with is the variance of consumptions. As another example, we incorporate another
dimension of risk into the utility function, which is the downside risk E
h 
[x  E (x)] 2i,
where []  = min (0; ) : This downside risk measure is originally introduced in Bawa and
Lindenberg (1977).
Example 18 Consider a utility function
V (F ) = E (x)  a
2
E

(x  E (x))2  b
2
E
h 
[x  E (x)] 2i ;
29
with a; b > 0:7 The rst order condition is given by
1  a [x   E (x)]  b [x   E (x)]  = : (1.22)
This implies that when   1

;
x = E (x) +
1  
a
 E (x) ;
and when  > 1

;
x = E (x) +
1  
a+ b
< E (x) : (1.23)
These can be combined and expressed as
x = E (x) + max

1  
a
;
1  
a+ b

:
As in Example 17, one can show that xing the distribution of ;  is a constant, whereas
E (x) depends on the value of the initial wealth w0: Therefore, V (F ) satises two-fund
money separation with separating funds
f1 () = 1;
f2 () = max

1  
a
;
1  
a+ b

:
The corresponding investment weight for the risk-free asset is a wealth-dependent amount
1 (w0) = E (x
) ;
and the risky fund is always assigned a constant weight
2 (w0) = 1:
7Kadan, Liu and Liu (2014) use another approach to show that this class of preferences exhibits two-fund
money separation.
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1.4 Primal Utility Function
So far we have characterized the set of separating preferences in terms of the inverse marginal
utility function. We then ask whether we are able to derive the associated primal utility
functions. The most natural way to do this is to rst invert I to obtain u0; and then integrate
u0 to get u: However, this does not yield a closed form solution in most cases. Examples
for which the primal utility exists in closed form are mostly limited to one- and two-fund
separation (CARA, CRRA, quadratic, etc.). In this section, we introduce two classes of
three-fund separating preferences (SAHARA and GOBI), for which we are able to obtain a
closed form expression in the primal utility.
1.4.1 SAHARA Utility
The SAHARA class is proposed by Chen, Pelsser and Vellekoop (2011). The standard
SAHARA utility has an inverse marginal utility function of the form
I () =
1
2

 
1
a   b2 1a

; (1.24)
with a; b > 0: As mentioned in Example 6, the standard form exhibits two-fund separation,
for which an investor would optimally take a long position in one risky fund and a short
position in another.
More generally, one could introduce a shift into the SAHARA utility, which is obtained
by adding a constant term to the inverse marginal utility, i.e.,
I () =
1
2

 
1
a   b2 1a

+ C0: (1.25)
The constant C0 is referred to as the default point in Chen, Pelsser and Vellekoop (2011),
and we can easily obtain the standard form by setting C0 = 0: When C0 6= 0; the shifted
SAHARA utility exhibits three-fund money separation with a long position
1 () =
1
2
 
1
a
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in the rst risky fund
f1 () = 
  1
a ;
a short position
2 () =  1
2
b2
1
a
in a second risky fund
f2 () = 
1
a ;
and a xed investment
3 () = C0
in the risk-free asset
f3 () = 1:
One nice property of the SAHARA utility is that the two power terms  
1
a and 
1
a in the
inverse marginal utility are reciprocals of each other. As such, by multiplying 
1
a on both
sides of (1.25), we can easily rewrite it as a quadratic equation of 
1
a , which further allows
us to invert I so as to recover the primal utility function. Explicitly, multiplying 
1
a on both
sides of (1.25) and setting x = I () and u0 (x) =  yield
b2 (u0 (x))
2
a + 2 (x  C0) (u0 (x))
1
a   1 = 0:
Since u0 (x) > 0; solving this quadratic equation gives us
u0 (x) =
 p
x^2 + b2   x^
b2
!a
;
where x^ = x  C0: We then integrate u0 (x) to obtain the primal utility function
u (x) =
(
1
1 a2
 p
x^2 + b2 + x^
 a  
a
p
x^2 + b2 + x^

; a 6= 1
1
2

log
 p
x^2 + b2 + x^

+ x^
b2
 p
x^2 + b2   x^ ; a = 1 :
Notice that having a constant term C0 in the inverse marginal utility is equivalent to intro-
ducing a shift in the primal utility.
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1.4.2 GOBI Utility
Motivated by the SAHARA class, we then turn to another class of utility functions whose
inverse marginal utility takes the form
I () = C1
 + C2
2 + C0; (1.26)
where ; C1; C2 6= 0: We name this class the GOBI preferences. We will show in Section
1.6 (Proposition 22) that strict concavity implies that C1 < 0 and C2 < 0: As before, we
include a constant term C0 to allow for potential shifts.
It is easy to verify that when C0 6= 0 we have three-fund separation. The optimal portfolio
of an investor with GOBI utility consists of wealth-dependent investments
1 () = C1
;
2 () = C2
2;
in two risky funds
f1 () = 
;
f2 () = 
2;
and a xed position
3 () = C0
in the risk-free asset
f3 () = 1:
When C0 = 0; we have a degenerate case with two-fund separation, in which the two sepa-
rating funds are given by f1 () and f2 () ; respectively.
Similar to the SAHARA class, (1.26) can be viewed as a quadratic equation of : Setting
x = I () and u0 (x) = ; (1.26) becomes
C2 (u
0 (x))2 + C1 (u0 (x))
   (x  C0) = 0; (1.27)
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which can be solved to obtain u0 (x) : Since u0 (x) > 0; (1.27) must have a positive solution.
This requires C2 (x  C0) > 0, which imposes a constraint on the domain of the utility
function. In particular, when C2 < 0 (which by strict concavity happens when  > 0),
the utility function is dened on x 2 ( 1; C0) : When C2 > 0 (which by strict concavity
happens when  < 0), the utility function is dened on x 2 (C0;+1).
Since u0 (x) > 0; solving (1.27) yields
u0 (x) =

G (x)  C1
2C2
 1

;
where G (x) =
p
C21 + 4C2 (x  C0): Integrate u0 (x) then gives us the primal utility function
u (x) =
8>>><>>>:

(2C2)
1
+1(2+1)
(G (x)  C1)
1

+1

G (x) + 
+1
C1

;  6=  1
2
and  6=  1
1
3

2
C2
 1
2
(G (x)  C1)
1
2 (G (x) + 2C1) ;  =  12
G (x) + C1 log (G (x)  C1) ;  =  1
:
Again, having a constant term C0 in the inverse marginal utility is equivalent to introducing
a shift in the primal utility.
1.5 Money Separation
Money separation is a special case of mutual fund separation, which obtains when we can
choose the risk-free asset as one separating fund. Examples of money separation that we have
encountered so far include quadratic (Example 5), CARA (Example 7), SAHARA (Section
1.4.1) and GOBI (1.4.2) preferences. In this section, we discuss money separation and its
properties in more detail.
1.5.1 Money Separation and Constant Investment Weight
An interesting observation is that for the quadratic, CARA, SAHARA and GOBI prefer-
ences, all of which exhibit money separation, the optimal investment strategy always involves
assigning a constant weight (dollar amount) to one of the separating funds, regardless of the
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initial wealth level. In particular, for the quadratic, SAHARA and GOBI cases, the con-
stant weight is assigned to the risk-free asset, whereas a CARA investor optimally assigns a
constant weight to a risky fund. A natural question is whether this is merely a coincidence
or it actually reveals a property of money separation? The following theorem addresses this
issue.
Theorem 19 A separating utility function exhibits money separation if and only if the op-
timal investment portfolio can be constructed by assigning a constant dollar investment to
one separating fund, regardless of the initial wealth.
Proof of Theorem 19: By Theorem 9, if a utility function u exhibits mutual fund separa-
tion, then one set of separating funds must take the following forms
fk;l () = 
k (log )l ; (1.28)
f
k;1;l
() = k cos (bk log ) (log )
l ; (1.29)
f
k;2;l
() = k sin (bk log ) (log )
l : (1.30)
Other sets of separating funds can be constructed as linear combinations of the original ones.
Therefore, u satises mutual fund separation if and only if (1.28), (1.29), (1.30), or any of
their linear combinations equals a constant. Due to the cos and sin terms, (1.29), (1.30) or
any linear combination with a non-zero weight on (1.29) or (1.30) can never be a constant.
As a result, money separation hold only when (1.28) gives rise to a constant term, which
happens if and only if (k; bk) = (0; 0) :
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For a separating preference, the investment weights associated with separating funds
(1.28), (1.29) and (1.30) are given by
k;l () = 
k
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l ; (1.31)

k;1;l
() = 1ldk;1
k cos (bk log )
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l (1.32)
+1ldk;2
k sin (bk log )
dk;2X
j=l
Ck;2;j

j
l

(log )j l ;

k;2;l
() = 1ldk;2
k cos (bk log )
dk;2X
j=l
Ck;2;j

j
l

(log )j l (1.33)
 1ldk;1k sin (bk log )
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l ;
For other sets of separating funds, the corresponding investment weights are linear combina-
tions of (1.31), (1.32) and (1.33). Therefore, one separating fund receives a constant weight
if and only if (1.31), (1.32), (1.33) or any of their linear combinations equals a constant.
Again, due to the cos and sin terms, (1.32), (1.33) or any linear combination with a non-zero
weight on (1.32) or (1.33) can never be a constant. As a result, a constant weight can only
be obtained from (1.31), which happens if and only if (k; bk) = (0; 0) :
Hence, the theorem is proved.
According to Theorem 19, for a money separating preference, the optimal investment
strategy involves assigning a wealth-independent amount to one of the separating funds.
However the theorem is mute on which fund receives the constant weight. As we have seen
so far, the fund with the constant weight can be either the risk-free asset (e.g., quadratic,
SAHARA, GOBI utility) or a risky fund (e.g., CARA utility).
To better understand this point, suppose money separation holds with (k; bk) = (0; 0)
for some k. This corresponds to the case in which (1.14) has a zero root. Let dk;1 + 1 denote
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the multiplicity of the zero root. Then the separating fund representing the risk-free asset is
fk;0 () = 1;
whose associated investment weight is given by
k;0 () =
dk;1X
j=0
Ck;1;j (log )
j :
On the other hand, this also gives rise to another separating fund
fk;dk;1 () = (log )
dk;1 ;
which is assigned a constant investment weight
k;dk;1 () = Ck;1;dk;1 :
It is thus clear that the risk-free asset may not coincide with the fund with a constant
investment weight. Indeed, they coincide with each other only when dk = 0; i.e., (1.14)
has a non-repeated zero root, as in the case of quadratic, SAHARA and GOBI preferences.
Whenever dk > 0 representing a repeated zero root, it is a risky fund receiving a wealth-
independent investment weight. For example, in the case of the CARA utility, we have
dk = 1 implying that zero is a twice-repeated root of (1.14).
1.5.2 Money Separation and Shifts in Utility
In this section, we show that money separation is closely related to shifts in the utility
function. Indeed, we can construct money separating preferences from non-money separation
by introducing a shift in the primal utility.
Consider a utility function u with inverse marginal utility I: Dene another utility func-
tion
u^ (x) = u (x  C0) :
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One can verify that the associated inverse marginal utility is given by
I^ () = I () + C0:
This indicates that introducing a shift to the primal utility is equivalent to adding a constant
term in the inverse marginal utility.
If u exhibits K-fund separation, i.e.,
I () =
KX
k=1
k () fk () ;
then we have
I^ () = I () + C0 =
KX
k=1
k () fk () + C0:
Suppose that u does not have money separation, meaning that none of the fk ()s can
be chosen as the risk-free asset (a constant). Then, adding a constant C0 in the inverse
marginal utility introduces the risk-free as an additional separating fund. Hence, u^ exhibits
(K + 1)-fund money separation.
The above analysis implies that money separation can be constructed by introducing
a shift to a non-money separating utility function. To better see this idea, it is useful to
revisit the SAHARA and GOBI preferences discussed in Section 1.4. For both classes, the
standard version has two-fund separation with two risky separating funds. Once we include
an additional constant term to the inverse marginal utility, which is equivalent to introducing
a shift to the primal, the risk-free asset is added as a third separating fund.
As another example, we start with the class of one-fund separating preferences, and we
try to construct two-fund money separation by adding a shift to the primal utility. Namely,
adding a shift term C0 6= 0 in (1.16) yields
u^ (x) =
(
C
+1
 
x C0
C
 1

+1
;  6=  1 and  6= 0
C log
 
x C0
C

;  =  1 ; (1.34)
where x 2 (C0;+1) when C > 0 and x 2 ( 1; C0) when C < 0: This is e¤ectively the
HARA class with the exclusion of the CARA utility. For instance, the shifted power (log)
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utility function is obtained by introducing a shift term to the CRRA utility with any  < 0,
whereas the quadratic utility function is obtained by adding a shift to the mirror CRRA
utility with  = 1. It can be easily veried that any utility of the form (1.34) exhibit two-
fund money separation, with one separating fund being the risk-free asset and the other
being a risky fund :
It is worth noticing that money separating preferences obtained this way always assign
a constant weight to the risk-free asset. This, as discussed in Section 1.5.1, is only one of
the two possible cases of money separation. The other case in which the constant weight is
assigned to a risky fund cannot be obtained in this manner.
The above discussion focuses on the case where the original utility function u does not ex-
hibit money separation. More generally, it is possible that u itself satises money separation.
Then, we may have di¤erent cases, which are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 20 Suppose that a utility function u exhibitsK-fund separation, and dene u^ (x) =
u (x  C0) :
1. If money separation does not hold for u, then u^ exhibits (K + 1)-fund money separation.
2. If money separation holds for u with f1 () = 1 and 1 () 6=  C0; then u^ exhibits
K-fund money separation.
3. If money separation holds for u with f1 () = 1 and 1 () =  C0; then u^ exhibits
(K   1)-fund non-money separation.
Proof of Theorem 20: The discussion in the text has already proved case 1. Now we
prove the other two cases.
Case 2. Since u has money separation with f1 () = 1; we have
I^ () = I () + C0 = (1 () + C0) +
KX
k=2
k () fk () : (1.35)
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Because, 1 () 6=  C0; we have 1 () + C0 6= 0; and hence u^ exhibits K-fund money
separation.
Case 3. For utility function u; we again have (1.35). Since 1 () =  C0; (1.35) reduces to
I^ () =
KX
k=2
k () fk () :
Therefore, u^ exhibits (K   1)-fund non-money separation.
1.6 Strict Concavity
We have so far assumed that all utility functions under consideration are strictly concave.
This condition allows us to characterize the set of separating preferences by (1.3) in terms
of the inverse marginal utility. However, not all utility functions satisfying (1.3) are strictly
concave, but instead certain restrictions need to be imposed on the parameter values. In
this section, we study strict concavity of separating preferences and how it can be used to
narrow down our separating class.
Theorem 21 Consider a utility function u exhibiting mutual fund separation. The following
statements are equivalent:
1. The utility function u is strictly concave, i.e., u00 < 0:
2. For all  > 0; we have I 0 () < 0:
3. The equation I 0 () = 0 has no positive solution and I 0 () < 0 for some .
Proof of Theorem 21: Since I () = (u0) 1 () ; di¤erentiating yields
I 0 () =
1
u00 (I ())
:
This implies that strict concavity holds (u00 < 0) if and only if I 0 () < 0 for all  > 0: Hence,
statements 1 and 2 are equivalent.
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On the other hand, if u satises mutual fund separation, its inverse marginal utility I ()
takes the form of (1.3). One can easily verify that I 0 () is a continuous function in : It is
then immediate that statements 2 and 3 are also equivalent.
Theorem 21 suggests that the primal utility function u is strictly concave if and only if
the corresponding inverse marginal utility I is monotonically decreasing. This allows us to
check strict concavity by directing looking at the inverse marginal utility. For instance, the
set of one-fund separating preferences (1.15) satises strict concavity if and only if
I 0 () = C 1 < 0;
which is equivalent to
C < 0:
While the necessary and su¢ cient condition for strict concavity turns out to be straight-
forward for one-fund separation, it can become very complicated, if not impossible, when
higher-degree separation is taken into account. To see this, consider as an example a K-fund
separating preference whose inverse marginal utility takes the form
I () =
KX
k=1
Ck
k : (1.36)
We learn from Theorem 21 that solving strict concavity in this case is equivalent to solving
a polynomial equation. Given the intrinsic di¢ culty in solving a high-degree polynomial
equation, it is no wonder that a necessary and su¢ cient characterization for strict concavity
is in most cases impossible and probably needs to be handled numerically.
Despite the intrinsic challenge in providing a necessary and su¢ cient characterization,
below we seek to identify some conditions on the parameter values that are needed to induce
strict concavity. While these conditions are not su¢ cient, they allow us to narrow down
the class of separating preferences by ruling out parameter values and forms of the inverse
marginal utility that are not permitted.
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The next proposition deals with the special case of fund separation, in which the inverse
marginal utility is given by (1.36).
Proposition 22 Suppose that a utility function exhibits K-fund separation, and its inverse
marginal utility is given by (1.36) with 1 < 2 <    < K and non-zero C1; C2;    ; CK :
Then, strict concavity implies the following.
1. If 1 6= 0; then C11 < 0;
2. If 1 = 0; then C22 < 0;
3. If K 6= 0; then CKK < 0;
4. If K = 0; then CK 1K 1 < 0:
The following result further rules out forms of the inverse marginal utility that violate
strict concavity.
Proposition 23 If a separating utility function is strictly concave, then its inverse marginal
utility I cannot take the following forms:
1. I () = P (log ) ; where the polynomial function P () is of an even degree d  2;
2. I () = P (log ) ; where  6= 0 and the degree of P () is odd;
3. I () =
JX
k=1
kPk;1 (log ) cos (bk log ) +
JX
k=1
kPk;2 (log ) sin (bk log ) ; where bk 6= 0
for all k:
Proposition 23 implies among others that if a two-fund separating utility is concave, then
its inverse marginal utility can only take two forms:
I () = C1
1 + C2
2 ;
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with 1 6= 2; or
I () = C1 + C2 log :
Examples of the rst form include the SAHARA and GOBI preferences, whereas the second
form corresponds to the CARA utility. The sin and cos terms, however, can never show up
in two-fund separation due to their cyclicality.
While preferences with an inverse marginal utility function of the forms listed in Proposi-
tion 23 violate strict concavity, they can actually be saved by including additional terms. We
illustrate this using a few examples. These examples also show how one can nd parameter
values such that strict concavity is satised. Example 24 below demonstrates that the cos
and sin terms (Case 3 of Proposition 23) can be saved by an extra power term of the same
order as the existing one.
Example 24 Consider a three-fund separating utility, whose inverse marginal utility func-
tion is given by
I () = [C1 cos (b log ) + C2 sin (b log )] 
 + C3
:
Di¤erentiating yields
I 0 () =  1 [(C1 + C2b) cos (b log ) + (C2   C1b) sin (b log ) + C3]
=  1
q
(C1 + C2b)
2 + (C2   C1b)2 sin ( + b log ) + C3

;
where sin  = C1+C2bp
(C1+C2b)
2+(C2 C1b)2
and cos  = C2 C1bp
(C1+C2b)
2+(C2 C1b)2
:
Since  1 > 0 and jsin ( + b log )j  1; it is clear that I 0 () < 0 holds for all  > 0 if
and only if
C3 <  
q
(C1 + C2b)
2 + (C2   C1b)2:
Case 2 of Proposition 23 violates strict concavity when the degree of the polynomial
function P () is odd. The following example shows that the exact same form with an even
degree of P () can be permitted.
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Example 25 Consider a three-fund separating utility, whose inverse marginal utility func-
tion is given by
I () = 
 
C1 + C2 log  + C3 (log )
2 ;
where  6= 0: Di¤erentiating yields
I 0 () =  1
 
(C1 + C2) + (C2 + 2C3) log  + C3 (log )
2 :
Since  1 > 0, in order to have I 0 () < 0, we only need 8 > 0;
(C1 + C2) + (C2 + 2C3) log  + C3 (log )
2 < 0:
Notice that the left hand side can be viewed as a quadratic function of log : As a result, this
inequality holds if and only if
C3 < 0;
and
(C2 + 2C3)
2   4C3 (C1 + C2) < 0:
Therefore, any set of parameter values satisfying the above two conditions would give rise to
a strictly concave separating utility function.
Another way to save Case 2 of Proposition 23 involves adding a power term of a di¤erent
order as the existing one. We illustrate this in the following example.
Example 26 Consider a three-fund separating utility, whose inverse marginal utility func-
tion is given by
I () = 1 (C1 + C2 log ) + C3
2 ;
where 1 6= 2 and 12 6= 0: Di¤erentiating yields
I 0 () = 1 1 ((1C1 + C2) + 1C2 log ) + C32
2 1
= 2 1

(1C1 + C2) 
1 2 + 1C2
1 2 log  + C32

:
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We will show that when (i) 1 < 2; 1C1 + C2 < 0; and 1C2 > 0; or (ii) when 1 > 2;
1C1 +C2 < 0; and 1C2 < 0, we can always set C32 low enough such that I
0 () < 0 holds
for all  > 0: We will show part (i) in detail only. The analysis for (ii) is parallel.
(i) Since 1C1 + C2 < 0; we have (1C1 + C2) 
1 2 < 0 for all  > 0: Since 1C2 > 0; we
know 1C2
1 2 log   0 for all  2 (0; 1]: Hence, we only need to show that 1C21 2 log 
is bounded from above when  > 1, and then setting C32 lower than the negative value of
this upper bound is enough to guarantee I 0 () < 0 for all  > 0:
Since 1 < 2; we have
lim
!+1
1 2 log  = 0:
This implies that for any C > 0; there exists  such that 8 > ;
1 2 log  < C:
On the other hand, for all  2 (1; ]; we have
1 2 log  < log  < log :
Hence, for all  > 1 we obtain
1 2 log  < max

C; log 
	
:
Therefore, strict concavity is guaranteed by setting
C32 <  1C2 max

C; log 
	
:
1.7 Conclusion
This paper extends Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and studies the general preference-basedK-fund
separation. We show that one can construct high-degree separating preferences by adding
low-degree ones in the inverse marginal utility function. However, this does not allow us
to nd all utility functions satisfying fund separation, because there are separating funds
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involved in high-degree separations that never appear in low-degree separations. While it
is generally very di¢ cult to derive the primal utility of a separating preference, we provide
two classes of preferences, SAHARA and GOBI, both exhibiting three-fund separation, for
which we can write down the primal utility function in closed form.
We then study the special case of money separation, in which the risk-free asset can be
chosen as one of the separating funds. We show that money separating holds if and only if we
can choose a separating fund whose optimal investment weight is constant and in particular
does not depend on the initial wealth. Somewhat surprisingly, the constant weight can be
assigned to either the risk-free asset or a risky fund. We also show that money separation
is closely related to shifts in the utility. In particular, starting with a non-money separating
preference, we can easily construct money separation by introducing a non-zero shift in the
utility function.
The characterization of fund separation in this paper provides us with a broad class of
preferences, which can be very useful for theoretical modeling and empirical tests in future
research. When modeling an economy with fund separation, high-degree separation allows for
a larger extent of heterogeneity among investors relatively to the familiar one- and two-fund
separating utility.
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Chapter 2
Generalized Systematic Risk1
This chapter generalizes the concept of systematic riskto a broad class of risk measures
potentially accounting for high distribution moments, downside risk, rare disasters, as well
as other risk attributes. We o¤er two di¤erent approaches. First is an equilibrium framework
generalizing the Capital Asset Pricing Model, two-fund separation, and the security market
line. Second is an axiomatic approach resulting in a systematic risk measure as the unique
solution to a risk allocation problem. Both approaches lead to similar results extending the
traditional beta to capture multiple dimensions of risk. The results lend themselves naturally
to empirical investigation.
2.1 Introduction
Risk is a complex concept. The denition of risk and its implications have long been the
subject of both academic and practical debate. This issue has gained even more prominence
during the recent nancial crisis, when markets and individual assets were hit by catastrophic
events whose ex-ante probabilities were considered negligible. Indeed, these events demon-
strate that risk accounts for much more than what is measured by the variance of the
returns of an asset. High distribution moments, rare disasters, and downside risk are just
some of the di¤erent aspects that may be of interest when measuring risk.
1This chapter is joint work with Ohad Kadan and Suying Liu.
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In this paper we allow risk to take a very general form. We then re-visit the classic
notion of systematic risk, which reects the contribution of an asset to the risk of a
portfolio. Traditional measures of systematic risk focus on a narrow set of risk attributes.
In particular, the most well-known and widely used measure of systematic risk is the beta of
the asset, which is the slope from regressing the asset returns on portfolio returns (Sharpe
(1964), Lintner (1965a,b), and Mossin (1966)). Beta is the contribution of an asset to the
risk of the portfolio as measured by the variance of its return. It sets the foundations for
all risk-return analysis as part of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). However, the
traditional beta ignores all aspects of risk other than the variance, such as high distribution
moments and rare disasters.
We o¤er two di¤erent approaches to generalizing systematic risk. First we study an
equilibrium framework modifying the traditional CAPM to allow for a broad set of risk
attributes. The equilibrium approach allows us to extend classic results such as the geometry
of e¢ cient portfolios, the two-fund separation theorem, the e¢ ciency of the market portfolio,
and the security market line. Second is an axiomatic approach in which we recast the issue
as a risk allocation problem. We then specify desirable properties of systematic risk, leading
to a unique solution. Both approaches yield similar results, generalizing the traditional beta
to reect a variety of risk attributes.
We begin with a broad denition of what would constitute a measure of risk. We dene
a risk measure as any mapping from random variables to real numbers. That is, a risk
measure is simply a summary statistic that encapsulates the randomness using just one
number. The variance (or standard deviation) is obviously the most commonly used risk
measure. However, many other risk measures have been proposed and used. For example,
high distribution moments can account for skewness and tail risk, downside risk accounts
for the variation in losses, and value at risk is a popular measure of disaster risk. Recently,
Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart (2009) o¤ered two appealing risk measures
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that account for all distribution moments and for disaster risk.2 All of these measures fall
under our wide umbrella of risk measures. Moreover, any linear combination of risk measures
is itself a risk measure. Thus, one can easily create measures of risk that account for a number
of dimensions of riskiness, assigning the required weight to each dimension.
Our rst analysis generalizes the classic CAPM to allow for a broad set of risk measures.
The idea is simple. In the classic CAPM setting investors are assumed to have mean-variance
preferences. That is, their utility is increasing in the expected payo¤ and decreasing in the
variance of their payo¤s. In our generalized setting we assume that investors have mean-risk
preferences, where the term riskstands for a host of potential risk measures. We provide
mild su¢ cient conditions under which these preferences are locally consistent with expected
utility in the sense of Machina (1982).
We consider an exchange economy with a nite number of risky assets, one risk-free
asset, and a nite number of investors with mean-risk preferences. As usual, in equilibrium
each investor chooses a portfolio of assets from the set of e¢ cient portfolios, minimizing
risk for a given expected return. However, due to the generality of the risk measure, the
geometry of this set is more complicated than in the case where risk is measured by the
variance. Nevertheless, we establish su¢ cient conditions on the risk measure under which
the solution to each investors problem satises Tobins (1958) two-fund separation property.
That is, each investors optimal portfolio of assets can be presented as a linear combination
of the risk-free asset and a unique portfolio of risky assets. We demonstrate that a variety of
risk measures satisfy these su¢ cient conditions, where the variance is just one special case.
A consequence of two-fund separation is that the equilibrium market portfolio lies on the
e¢ cient frontier. Using this we establish a generalization of the classic security market line
(SML) to a large class of risk measures. Specically, in equilibrium, the expected return of
2See Hart (2011) for a unied treatment of these two measures and Kadan and Liu (2014) for an analysis
of the moment properties of these measures.
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each risky asset i satises
E (~zi) = rf + BRi
 
E
 
~zM
  rf ;
where ~zi is the risky return of asset i; ~zM is the risky return of the market portfolio, rf is the
risk-free rate, and BRi is the systematic risk of asset i given the risk measure R. Moreover,
BRi is given in closed form as the marginal contribution of asset i to the market risk scaled
by the weighted average of such marginal contributions across all assets in the economy.
In the special case in whichR is the variance, BRi coincides with the traditional beta. More
generally, we show that our equilibrium setting is versatile enough to allow for a variety of risk
attributes such as tail risk, downside risk, and rare disasters, among others. Our setting can
also readily account for risk measures that reect several of these risk attributes, assigning
di¤erent weights to each of them. We illustrate that in all these cases one can readily derive
closed form solutions for the generalized betas. Typically, these betas reect the covariation
of the return of asset i with some function of the market return. In general, these betas do
not take the form of a regression coe¢ cient. Nevertheless, they can be estimated directly
from return data and applied in a standard Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional analysis.
The CAPM equilibrium can be thought of as a special case of the more general problem
of risk allocation. Indeed, the CAPM beta measures the contribution of one asset to the
risk of the market portfolio. Many other problems of considerable economic import require
estimating the contribution of one asset to some specic portfolio of assets (not necessarily
the market portfolio). For example, the government is constantly interested in the contri-
bution of particular banks and other nancial institutions to the total market risk (known
as systemic risk). Banks and other nancial institutions may also nd it useful to calculate
the contribution of di¤erent assets on their balance sheet to the total risk of the institution,
so that each asset or business unit could be taxedappropriately. All of these problems
are essentially risk allocation problems in which total risk should be allocated among the
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constituents of a portfolio. We broaden the term systematic risk to designate solutions
to such problems. That is, a systematic risk measure is a vector specifying the portion of
the total portfolio risk allocated to each asset in the portfolio. The literature has not yet
presented a general solution to this problem for a broad set of risk measures and for arbitrary
portfolios.
In the second part of this paper we tackle this problem from an axiomatic point of view.
We state desirable properties of systematic risk measures, which we call axioms, and we look
for solutions that satisfy these properties. Unlike in the equilibrium setting, here we do not
need to impose almost any structure on the risk measure. Moreover, the portfolio of assets
is arbitrary and is not limited to the market portfolio.
We state four economically plausible axioms that systematic risk measures are expected
to satisfy. We then show that these four axioms imply a unique systematic risk measure
which applies to all risk allocation problems. This measure is given by a scaled version of
the Aumann-Shapley (1974) diagonal formula, which was developed as a solution concept in
cooperative game theory. Essentially, this formula calculates for each asset the average of
its marginal contributions to portfolios along a diagonal starting from the origin and ending
at the portfolio of interest. In the common case in which the risk measure is homogeneous
of some degree, the solution becomes very simple, and it coincides with the generalized beta
obtained in the equilibrium setting above. In particular, it assigns to each asset its marginal
contribution to total portfolio risk scaled by the weighted average of marginal contributions of
all assets. Our proof of the axiomatization result relies on a mapping between risk allocation
problems and cost allocation problems studied in Billera and Heath (1982).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related literature. In Section 2.3
we dene the notion of risk measures. Section 2.4 studies the equilibrium setup and o¤ers
a generalization of the CAPM. In Section 2.5 we present the axiomatic approach. Section
2.6 concludes. Proofs of the main theorems are in Appendix I, proofs of propositions and
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other derivations are in Appendix II, and other technical results are provided in an Internet
Appendix.
2.2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, the paper adds to the grow-
ing literature on high distribution moments, disaster risk, and other risk attributes, as well as
their e¤ect on prices. Rubinstein (1973), Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), Jean (1971), Kane
(1982), and Harvey and Siddique (2000) argue that investors favor right-skewness of returns,
and demonstrate the cross-sectional implications of this e¤ect. In addition, Barro (2006,
2009), Gabaix (2008, 2012), Gourio (2012), Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012), and Wachter
(2013) study the aversion of investors to tail risk and rare disasters. Ang, Chen, and Xing
(2006) and Lettau, Maggiori, and Weber (2013) show that downside risk is a good explana-
tory variable for returns in both equity and currency markets. Our paper adds to this
literature by outlining a general approach to measuring systematic risk that can capture the
contribution of an asset to a range of risk dimensions such as high distribution moments,
downside risk, and rare disasters. Our framework is exible and can account for either one
risk aspect or a combination of several of them.
Our equilibrium approach follows a reduced form, where preferences are described through
the aversion to broadly dened risk. Our main results are derived without the need to specify
an exact form of the utility function. This is di¤erent from the approach in consumption-
based asset pricing models (e.g., Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Campbell and Cochrane
(1999)). These models rely on the specication of a particular utility function (such as Ep-
stein and Zin (1989) preferences or preferences reecting past habits). One advantage of our
approach is that it provides a parsimonious and simple one-factor model that can capture
di¤erent aspects of risk in a manner that may lend itself naturally to empirical investiga-
tion. Another feature of our approach is that, unlike consumption-based models, it resorts
52
to prices directly. Thus, one can potentially test our model without relying on consumption
data.
The paper also adds to the growing literature on risk measurement. This literature dates
back to Hadar and Russell (1969), Hanoch and Levy (1969), and Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970) who extend the notion of riskiness beyond the varianceframework by introducing
stochastic dominance rules. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) specify desirable
properties of coherent risk measures, and Rockafellar, Uryasev, and Zabarankin (2006a)
introduce the notion of generalized deviation measures. More recently, Aumann and Serrano
(2008), Foster and Hart (2009, 2013), and Hart (2011) have come up with appealing risk
measures that generalize conventional stochastic dominance rules. Notably, all the risk
measures discussed in this literature are idiosyncratic in nature. Our paper contributes to
this literature by specifying a method to calculate the systematic risk of an asset for any
given risk measure. This in turn allows us to study the fundamental risk-return trade-o¤
associated with a risk measure.
Our paper also adds to the recent literature on systemic risk, which is the risk that the
entire economic system collapses. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) dene the CoV aR
measure as the di¤erence between the value at risk of the banking system conditional on
the distress of a particular bank and the value at risk of the banking system given that the
bank is solvent. Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) propose the Systemic
Expected Shortfall measure, which estimates the exposure of a particular bank in terms of
under-capitalization to a systemic crisis. Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) measure the systemic
risk of a nancial institution by the price of insurance against nancial distress. Our paper
takes a general approach to the problem of estimating the contribution of one asset to the
risk of a portfolio of assets. We provide an easy-to-calculate and intuitive measure that
applies to a wide variety of risk measures, as well as in an array of contexts.
Our paper also contributes to the literature studying conditions for two-fund separation.
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The idea of two-fund separation was introduced by Tobin (1958). Since then the literature
discussed di¤erent su¢ cient conditions in terms of either agents utility (e.g., Cass and
Stiglitz (1970) and Dybvig and Liu (2015)) or the distribution of returns (e.g., Ross (1978)).
Here we take a somewhat di¤erent approach, as we specify su¢ cient conditions for two-
fund separation in terms of properties of the risk measure. This approach is similar to the
one taken in Rockafellar, Uryasev, and Zabarankin (2006b), who consider general deviation
measures. Our restrictions on risk measures are weaker than theirs as we do not require
homogeneity. All of these papers consider two-fund separation only and do not provide any
generalization of the notion of systematic risk, which is the focus of our paper.
Finally, the paper adds to an extensive list of studies applying the Aumann-Shapley solu-
tion concept in di¤erent contexts, e.g., Billera, Heath, and Raanan (1978), Samet, Tauman,
and Zang (1984), Powers (2007), and Billera, Heath, and Verrecchia (1981). Tarashev, Bo-
rio, and Tsatsaronis (2010) use the Shapley value (Shapley (1953), a discrete version of the
Aumann-Shapley solution concept) to measure systemic risk. Our paper o¤ers theoretical
foundations for their practical approach.
2.3 Risk Measures and Their Properties
Let (
;F ; P ) be a probability space, where 
 is the state space, F is the -algebra of events,
and P () is a probability measure. As usual, a random variable is a measurable function
from 
 to the reals. In the context of investments, we typically consider random variables
representing the payo¤s or the returns of nancial assets. Thus, we often refer to random
variables as investments or random returns.We generically denote random variables
by ~z; which is a shorthanded notation for ~z (!) ; 8! 2 
: We restrict attention to random
variables for which all moments exist. We denote the expected value of ~z by E (~z) and its
kth central moment by mk (~z) = E (~z   E (~z))k, where k  2:
A risk measure is simply a function that assigns to each random variable a single number
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summarizing its riskiness. Formally,
Denition 27 A risk measure is a function mapping random variables to the reals.3
We generically denote risk measures by R () : The simplest and most commonly used
risk measure is the variance (R (~z) = m2 (~z)). However, many other risk measures have been
proposed in the literature, capturing higher distribution moments and other risk attributes.
A risk measure R () is homogeneous of degree k; if for any random return ~z and positive
number  > 0;
R (~z) = kR (~z) :
A weaker requirement, which is su¢ cient for most of our results, is that the risk ranking
between two investments does not depend on scaling. We say that R () is scaling independent
if for all  > 0 and any two random returns ~z1 and ~z2; R (~z1) > R (~z2) implies R (~z1) >
R (~z2) :
The next property of risk measures which will become useful is convexity. Formally, we
say that a risk measure R () is convex if for any two random returns ~z1 and ~z2; and for any
 2 (0; 1) ; we have
R (~z1 + (1  ) ~z2)  R (~z1) + (1  )R (~z2) ;
with equality holding only when ~z1 = ~z2 with probability 1. Notice that ~z1 + (1  ) ~z2
can be considered as the return of a portfolio that assigns weights  and 1   to ~z1 and ~z2,
respectively. Then the convexity condition says that the risk of the portfolio should not be
higher than the corresponding weighted average risk of the constituent investments. Thus,
convexity of a risk measure captures the idea that diversifying among two investments lowers
the total risk.
3Strictly speaking, a risk measure is also a function of the underlying probability measure P: However,
in our analysis we x P throughout, and yet consider di¤erent random variables. Thus, it is convenient to
think about risk measures as functions of the random variables, viewing the probability measure as a xed
parameter.
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Next we would like to formalize a property dealing with the type of assets that are risk-
free. We say that a risk measure R () has the risk-free property, if (i) R (~z)  0 for all ~z; (ii)
R (~z) = 0 if and only if P (f~z = cg) = 1 for some constant c; and (iii) R (~z1 + ~z2) = R (~z1)
whenever R (~z2) = 0. Namely, R has the risk-free property if the only assets with zero risk
are those that pay a constant amount with probability 1, if all other assets have strictly
positive risk, and if adding a zero-risk asset does not change risk. In what follows, we often
refer to assets satisfying R (~z) = 0 as risk-free.
Risk measures can be applied to individual random variables or to portfolios of random
variables. Formally, assume there are n random variables represented by the vector ez =
(~z1; :::; ~zn) : A portfolio is a vector x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 Rn; where xi is the dollar amount
invested in ~zi:4 Then, x  ez = Pni=1 xi~zi is itself a random variable. We then say that the
risk of portfolio x is simply R (x  ez) : When the vector of random variables is unambiguous,
we often abuse notation and denote R (x) as a shorthand for R (x  ez). We say that a risk
measure is smooth if for any vector of random returns ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) and for all portfolios
x = (x1; :::; xn) we have that R (x  ez) is continuously di¤erentiable in xi for i = 1; :::; n: We
then write Ri (x) (or Ri (x  ez)) for the partial derivative of R () with respect to the amount
invested in the ith asset evaluated at x:5
When restricting attention to homogeneous risk measures, the properties discussed above
are maintained when taking convex combinations of di¤erent risk measures with the same
degree of homogeneity. Thus, we can easily create new risk measures satisfying these prop-
erties from existing homogeneous risk measures. That is, let s be a positive integer, let
R1 () ; :::; Rs () be risk measures, and choose  = (1; :::; s) with j > 0 8j. We can then
4Throughout the paper we denote vectors using bold notation (for both numbers and random variables).
5Note that we use subscripts to denote both elements of a vector and partial derivatives. For example,
xi is the ith element of the vector x while Ri () is the partial derivative of R () considered as a function of
portfolio amounts. This notation does not result in any ambiguity since the only case in which the subscript
should be interpreted as a partial derivative is when applied to the risk measure considered as a function of
portfolio amounts.
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dene a new risk measure by
R (~z) =
sX
j=1
jR
j (~z) ;
where j reects the weight assigned to the risk attribute measured by Rj. We then have
the following trivial but useful lemma.
Lemma 28 Assume that each Rj is homogeneous of degree k; convex, smooth, and satises
the risk-free property. Then, R also satises all of these properties.
2.3.1 Examples of Risk Measures
Below we present some popular examples of risk measures and discuss their properties. Each
of these examples highlights a di¤erent aspect of risk that may be of interest in applications.
These examples will be crucial later in the paper when we demonstrate how to apply our
main results.
Example 29 Even central moments and normalized even central moments. For
any integer k  2 even, the central moment R (~z) = mk (~z) is a risk measure which is
homogeneous of degree k, convex, smooth and satises the risk-free property. The normalized
central moment wk (~z) = (mk (~z))
1
k is also a risk measure. For example, when k = 2; wk (~z)
is the standard deviation of ~z: Normalized central moments satisfy all of the above properties
as well (with homogeneity of degree 1). Indeed, homogeneity, smoothness, and the risk-free
property are trivial in these cases. Convexity stems from the following result, which shows
that wk (~z) is convex, and thus mk (~z) is a fortiori convex.
Proposition 30 For all k  2 even, R (~z) = wk (~z) is a convex risk measure.
Example 31 Odd central moments and normalized odd central moments. For any
integer k  3 odd, the central moment R (~z) = mk (~z) is a risk measure which is homogeneous
of degree k and smooth. Similarly, the normalized odd moments wk (~z) are homogeneous of
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degree 1 and smooth. In contrast to the even central moments, neither convexity nor the
risk-free property holds in this case.6
Evidently, the feature of odd central moments that prevents them from satisfying con-
vexity and the risk-free property is that they admit negative values. A natural way to x
this is to focus on just one side of the distribution. The next example follows this idea,
allowing one to readily incorporate aspects of odd central moments (such as skewness) into
risk measures that also satisfy convexity and the risk-free property.
Example 32 Downside risk. When considering risk, investors sometimes restrict atten-
tion to the lower outcomes of the distribution, in particular to those which fall below the
mean. Such an approach is called downside risk. Formally, for any integer k  2; dene the
downside risk of order k of ~z as
DRk (~z) = ( 1)k

E
 
[~z   E (~z)] k 1k ;
where [t]  = min (t; 0) for t 2 R: Often, this measure is used in the special case of k = 2.
More generally, for any k  2; DRk (~z) is a risk measure which is homogeneous of degree
1, smooth, and satises the risk-free property. The next proposition establishes that this risk
measure is also convex.
Proposition 33 For any k  2; DRk (~z) is a convex risk measure.
Example 34 Value at risk. A risk measure widely used in nancial risk management is
the Value at Risk (VaR), designed to capture the risk associated with rare disasters. VaR
6To see the former, consider the simple example of two random returns, ~z1 and ~z2; which are independent
and have negative third central moments m3 (). Then, by independence and the homogeneity of central
moments,
m3

1
2
~z1 +
1
2
~z2

= (
1
2
)3m3(~z1) + (
1
2
)3m3(~z2) >
1
2
m3(~z1) +
1
2
m3(~z2);
since m3(~z1) + m3(~z2) < 0. To see the latter, note that the third moment can be negative, violating the
risk-free property.
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measures the amount of loss not exceeded with a certain condence level. Formally, given
some condence level  2 (0; 1), for any random return ~z; the VaR measure is dened as the
negative of the -quantile of ~z; i.e.,
VaR(~z) =   inf fz 2 R : F (z)  g ; (2.1)
where F () is the cumulative distribution function of ~z: Notice that we include the minus
sign to reect the fact that a larger loss indicates higher risk. If ~z is continuously distributed
with a density function f (), then (2.1) is implicitly determined byZ  VaR(~z)
 1
f (z) dz = : (2.2)
This risk measure is homogeneous of degree 1 and smooth.7 For any risk-free return ~z with
P (f~z = cg) = 1; we have VaR(~z) =  c; implying that the VaR of risk-free assets depends
on the risk-free return. Hence, the risk-free property is not satised. In addition, it is not
hard to nd examples where convexity is violated for the VaR measure.
Example 35 Expected shortfall and demeaned expected shortfall.8 These measures
capture the average loss from disastrous events, dened as those involving a loss larger than
the VaR. Formally, assume that ~z can be represented by a density f (). Given some con-
dence level  2 (0; 1), for any random return ~z the Expected Shortfall (ES) is the negative of
the conditional expected value of ~z below the -quantile. That is,
ES(~z) =  1

Z  VaR(~z)
 1
zf (z) dz: (2.3)
Additionally, when ~z = c (a constant) with probability 1 we set ES(~z) =  c: Similar to VaR,
ES is homogeneous of degree 1 and is smooth, but it does not satisfy the risk-free property.
7Formally, smoothness follows if a joint density of the random returns in a portfolio exists. This is shown
using an application of the implicit function theorem to (2.2). We omit the proof for brevity.
8Expected shortfall is sometimes termed conditional VaR.
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To ensure that the risk-free property is satised it is useful to consider the demeaned version
of ES dened as
DES(~z) =  1

Z  VaR(~z)
 1
(z   E (~z)) f (z) dz = ES(~z) + E (~z) :
Similar to ES, DES also captures the expected loss from a rare disaster. This risk measure
is also homogeneous of degree 1, smooth, and it satises the risk-free property.9 Moreover,
unlike VaR, both ES and DES satisfy the convexity property as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 36 For any  2 (0; 1); R (~z) = ES(~z) and R (~z) = DES(~z) are convex.
Example 37 The Aumann-Serrano and Foster-Hart risk measures. Two measures
of riskiness have been proposed by Aumann and Serrano (2008, hereafter AS) and Foster and
Hart (2009, hereafter FH). These measures generalize the notion of second-order stochastic
dominance (SOSD). The AS measure RAS (~z) is given by the unique positive solution to the
implicit equation
E

exp

  ~z
RAS (~z)

= 1: (2.4)
The FH measure RFH (~z) is given by the unique positive solution to the implicit equation
E

log

1 +
~z
RFH (~z)

= 0: (2.5)
Both these measures are homogeneous of degree 1 and smooth. These two risk measures also
satisfy the convexity property.10 By contrast, these two measures do not satisfy the risk-free
property.11
All of the risk measures discussed thus far are homogeneous of some degree. However,
most of our results do not require homogeneity. The next set of examples illustrates how
non-homogeneous risk measures satisfying all of the other properties can be constructed.
9The risk-free property follows since ES(~z) + E (~z)  0 for all signicance level 0 <  < 1 with equality
if and only if ~z is a constant with probability 1.
10This follows since these risk measures are subadditive and homogeneous of degree 1.
11To see this, note that for any constant c > 0, ~z + c rst-order stochastically dominates ~z: Since RAS is
consistent with rst-order stochastic dominance, we have that RAS (~z + c) < RAS (~z) : A similar argument
applies to RFH : Also, technically, these two risk measures are not dened for risk-free assets.
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Example 38 Let R be a risk measure which is homogeneous of some degree k, convex,
smooth, and satises the risk-free property, and let h : [0;1) ! R be a strictly increasing,
strictly convex, and continuously di¤erentiable function. Dene a new risk measure R^ by
R^ (~z) = h (R (~z))  h (0) :
It is straightforward to verify that R^ is scaling independent, convex, smooth, and satises
the risk-free property. However, R^ may fail to be homogeneous of any degree. For a concrete
example, set h (x) = ex, and let R (~z) = mk (~z) for k even. Then, R^ (~z) = eR(~z)   1 is not
homogeneous of any degree and yet it satises all of the other properties.
2.4 Systematic Risk in an Equilibrium Setting
Traditionally, systematic risk is derived from the CAPM equilibrium setting. We will now
present a generalized version of this model. We rst outline the setup of the model. We
then study the geometry of solutions, and present a two-fund separation result implying the
e¢ ciency of the market portfolio. Finally, we derive a variant of the security market line,
enabling us to obtain a generalization of the traditional beta as a measure of systematic risk.
2.4.1 Model Setup
Investors, Assets, and Timing. Assume a market with n + 1 assets f0; :::; ng : Assets
1; :::; n are risky and pay a random amount denoted by (~y1; :::; ~yn) : Asset 0 is risk-free,
paying an amount ~y0 which is equal to some constant y0 6= 0 with probability 1. Denoteey = (~y0; :::; ~yn) : There are ` investors in the market, all of whom agree on the parameters
of the model. The choice set of each investor is Rn+1; where j 2 Rn+1 represents the
number of shares investor j chooses in each asset i = 0; :::; n, i.e., j is a bundle of assets.
Negative numbers represent short sales, and we impose no short-sale constraints. The initial
endowment of investor j is a non-zero ej 2 Rn+1+ :We assume that
P`
j=1 e
j
i > 0 for i = 1; :::; n.
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That is, risky assets are in positive net supply. An allocation is an `-tuple A =  1; :::; `
consisting of a bundle j 2 Rn+1 for each investor. An allocation A is attainable ifP`j=1 j =P`
j=1 e
j, that is, if it clears the market. A price system is a vector p = (p0; :::; pn) specifying
a price for each asset. Similar to the standard CAPM setting, there are two dates. At Date
0, investors trade with each other and prices are set. At Date 1, all random variables are
realized.
Risk and Preferences. The traditional approach features investors with mean-variance
preferences, i.e., they prefer higher mean and lower variance of investments. Instead, we
assume that investors have mean-risk preferences. Formally, x a risk measure R () : The
utility that investor j = 1; :::; ` assigns to a bundle  2 Rn+1 is given by
U j () = V j (E (  ey) ; R (  ey)) ; (2.6)
where V j is continuous, strictly increasing in its rst argument (expected payo¤) and strictly
decreasing in its second argument (risk of payo¤), and quasi-concave.
Note that U j () cannot be in general supported as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility.
Nevertheless, in the Internet Appendix we show that if V j is di¤erentiable and if the risk
measure is a di¤erentiable function of a nite number of moments, then U j () is a local
expected utility function in the sense of Machina (1982). Namely, comparisons of close by
investments are well approximated by expected utility. These conditions apply to a wide
range of risk measures representing high distribution moments.
An implication of quasi-concavity of V j is that when plotted in the mean-risk space, the
upper contour of each indi¤erence curve is convex. Similar to the standard mean-variance
case, we will assume that a risk-free asset cannot be created synthetically from risky assets.
That is, there is no redundant risky asset: for any  = (0; 1; :::; n) 2 Rn+1 we have
R (  ey) 6= 0 unless (1; :::; n) = (0; :::; 0) :12
12In the standard mean-variance case this condition corresponds to the variance-covariance matrix of risky
assets being positive-denite.
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Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a pair (p;A) where p 6= 0 is a price system and A = 
1; :::; `

is an attainable allocation, such that for each j 2 f1; :::; `g ; p  j = p  ej; and
if  2 Rn+1 and U j () > U j  j then p   > p  ej. In words, an equilibrium is a price
system and an allocation that clear the market such that each investor optimizes subject to
her budget constraint. The next theorem species conditions under which an equilibrium
exists.
Theorem 39 Suppose that R () is convex, smooth, and satises the risk-free property.
Then, an equilibrium exists.
It is well known that the CAPM setting can yield negative or zero prices (see for example
Nielsen (1992)). The reason for this is that preferences are not necessarily monotone in the
number of shares. Specically, the expected payo¤ to an investors bundle increases as she
holds more shares of a risky asset, but so does the risk. It may well be that at some point,
the additional expected payo¤ gained from adding more shares to the bundle is not su¢ cient
to compensate for the increase in risk. If the equilibrium happens to fall in such a region
then the asset becomes undesirable, rendering a negative price. For our following results
we will need that prices are positive for all assets. The literature has suggested several
ways to guarantee such an outcome. In the Internet Appendix we provide one su¢ cient
condition which follows Nielsen (1992). Other (and possibly weaker) su¢ cient conditions
may be obtained, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
From now on we will only consider equilibria with positive prices. Given positivity of
prices, naturally, each equilibrium induces a vector of random returns ~zi =
~yi
pi
; and we can
talk about the expected returns and the risk of the returns in equilibrium, as in the usual
CAPM setting. In particular, the equilibrium return from the risk-free asset ~z0 is equal to
some constant rf with probability 1. We now study these returns.
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2.4.2 A Generalized CAPM
Geometry of E¢ cient Portfolios
Let (p;A) be an equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation  1; :::; ` naturally induces a
portfolio for each investor j given by xj =
 
xj0; :::; x
j
n

; where xji = pi
j
i is the amount
invested in asset i; and where the vector of portfolio weights of investor j is denoted by j
and given by ji =
xjiPn
h=0 x
j
h
: Let
j =
nX
i=0
jiE (~zi)
be the expected return obtained by investor j in equilibrium. The next theorem shows
that the standard procedure of minimizing risk for a given expected returnapplies to the
equilibrium setting. It relies on the scaling independence and convexity of the risk measure.
Theorem 40 Suppose that R () is scaling independent and convex. Then, in an equilibrium
with positive prices, for all investors j 2 f1; :::; `g, j is the unique solution to
min
2Rn+1
R (  ez) (2.7)
s:t:
nX
i=0
iE (~zi) = 
j:
nX
i=0
i = 1:
Given this, we can now discuss the geometry of portfolios in the -R plane where the
horizontal axis is the risk of the return of a portfolio (R) and the vertical axis is the expected
return (). The locus of portfolios minimizing risk for any given expected return is the
boundary of the portfolio opportunity set. This set is convex in the -R plane whenever
R () is a convex risk measure. This follows simply because the expectation operator is
linear, implying that the line connecting any two portfolios in the -R plane lies to the right
of the set of portfolios representing convex combinations of these two portfolios. Figure 2.1
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Figure 2.1: Portfolio Opportunity Set and E¢ cient Frontier
illustrates two curves. The blue curve depicts the opportunity set of risky assets only. The
red curve depicts portfolios minimizing risk for a given expected return, corresponding to
Program (2.7). Both of these are dening convex sets. Unlike in the special case of the
standard deviation, we do not, in general, obtain a straight line connecting the risk-free
asset and risky portfolios. We say that a portfolio is e¢ cient if it solves Program (2.7) for
some j 2 R: Thus, the red curve in Figure 2.1 corresponds to the set of e¢ cient portfolios.
Two-Fund Separation
We say that two-fund separation holds if the equilibrium optimal portfolios for all investors
can be spanned by the risk-free asset and a unique portfolio of risky assets. That is, there
exists a unique portfolio with weightsP such that P0 = 0; and for all investors j 2 f1; :::; `g ;
the solution to Problem (2.7) is a linear combination of P and the risk-free asset.
Theorem 41 Consider an equilibrium with positive prices. Assume that R () is scaling
independent, convex, and satises the risk-free property. Then, two-fund separation holds.
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The proof is very intuitive, and we show it here. Let 1 and 2 be solutions to Problem
(2.7) for investors j1 6= j2, respectively, and without loss of generality assume j1 = 1 and
j2 = 2: The case of interest is when both 1 and 2 have non-zero weights in some risky
assets.13 By the risk-free property and by the non-redundancy assumption, R (j  ez) > 0
for j = 1; 2: Hence, j = E (j  ez) > rf for j = 1; 2; since otherwise j would be mean-risk
dominated by the risk-free asset, and thus would not be optimal.
Now, consider all the linear combinations of these two portfolios with the risk-free asset.
Since R () is assumed convex, the resulting curves are concave in the -R plane as illustrated
in Figure 2.2. Note that both 1 and 2 can be presented as a linear combination of the
risk-free asset and some portfolios P1 and P2 of risky assets only (i.e., P10 = 
P2
0 = 0):
To show two-fund separation we need to show that P1 = P2 : Suppose this is not the case.
Then let ^1 be a linear combination of P2 and the risk-free asset such that E
 
^1  ez = 1:
Similarly, let ^2 be a portfolio of P1 and the risk-free asset such that E
 
^2  ez = 2: By
convexity of R (), 1 and 2 are the unique solutions to Program (2.7) for j = 1; 2. Hence,
R
 
^1  ez > R  1  ez and R  ^2  ez > R  2  ez : (2.8)
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 2.2, the two curves must cross at least once. We will now show
that such crossings are impossible. Indeed, by scaling independence (2.8) implies that for
any  > 0;
R(1  ez) < R(^1  ez);
which together with risk-free property implies
R(1  ez + (1  ) rf ) < R(^1  ez + (1  ) rf ):
This means that all linear combinations of 1 with the risk-free asset (with positive ) lie
strictly to the left of all linear combinations of ^1 with the risk-free asset. In particular, ^2
13If only one investor holds non-zero weights in risky assets then two-fund separation is trivial.
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can be obtained as a linear combination of 1 with the risk-free asset by setting
 =
2   rf
1   rf > 0;
where the inequality follows since j > rf for j = 1; 2: But, using this  we obtain
R(^2  ez) < R(2  ez);
contradicting (2.8). Thus, two-fund separation must hold.
A corollary is that the unique portfolio P is e¢ cient. Indeed, let P = E
 
P  ez : Since
in equilibrium all investors hold a linear combination of the risk-free asset and P ; and since
j = E (j  ez)  rf for all j with strict inequality for some j; we have two cases:14 (i) all
investors hold P with a non-negative weight, and P > rf ; or (ii) all investors hold P
with a non-positive weight, and P < rf : But, the second case is impossible since then the
market cannot clear for at least one risky asset, which is held in positive weight in P : Thus,
P > rf :
Now, assume that 0 6= P solves Problem (2.7) for j = P : Then, R (0  ez) <
R
 
P  ez ; and so by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 41, all linear com-
binations of 0 with the risk-free asset would have strictly lower risk than the corresponding
linear combinations of P with the risk-free asset. This contradicts that P and the risk-free
asset span all optimal portfolios. We thus have:
Corollary 42 Under the conditions of Theorem 41, the portfolio P is e¢ cient. In partic-
ular, it solves Problem (2.7) for some P > rf :
Let xMi =
P`
j=1 x
j
i be the total amount invested in asset i in equilibrium. We call
xM =
 
xM1 ; :::; x
M
n

the market portfolio (consisting of risky assets only). Let M be the
corresponding portfolio weights. By Theorem 41, in equilibrium, the market portfolio is
14If all investors choose the risk-free asset then the market for risky assets cannot clear.
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Figure 2.2: Graphical Illustration of the Proof of Theorem 41
equal to P ; the unique portfolio of risky assets that together with the risk-free asset spans
all optimal portfolios.15 Moreover, by corollary 42, the market portfolio is e¢ cient, and its
expected return is strictly higher than rf :
Corollary 43 Under the conditions of Theorem 41, the market portfolio is e¢ cient. In
particular, it solves Problem (2.7) for some M > rf :
A Generalized Security Market Line
In the traditional CAPM framework, the security market line describes the equilibrium
relation between the expected returns of individual assets and the market expected return.
Specically, the expected return of any asset in excess of the risk-free rate is proportional to
the excess market expected return, with the coe¢ cient of proportionality being equal to the
traditional beta. The following theorem provides su¢ cient conditions under which a similar
relation holds for a broad set of risk measures.
15Note that P is of dimension n+ 1; but its rst component is zero. By saying that P = M we mean
that Pi = 
M
i for i = 1; :::; n:
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Theorem 44 Consider an equilibrium with positive prices and let M be the market port-
folio. Assume that R () is scaling independent, convex, smooth, and satises the risk-free
property. Then, for each asset i = 1; :::; n;
E (~zi) = rf + BRi
 
E
 
M  ez  rf ; (2.9)
where
BRi =
Ri
 
M
Pn
h=1 
M
h Rh (
M)
: (2.10)
If R () is also homogeneous of some degree k, then (2.10) takes the form
BRi =
Ri
 
M

kR (M)
:
Thus, the security market line has the traditional form, with the generalized systematic
risk measure
 BRi  given as the marginal contribution of asset i to the total risk of the
market portfolio, scaled by the weighted average of marginal contributions of all assets. If R
is furthermore homogeneous, it is simply given by the marginal contribution of asset i scaled
by total risk multiplied by the degree of homogeneity.
To see the intuition for this result, start with an e¢ cient portfolio  and consider
borrowing one dollar at the risk-free rate and investing this dollar in asset i: The e¤ect of
this exercise on the risk of the portfolio is (up to rst-order approximation) Ri () R0 () ;
which by the risk-free property is just Ri () : Since  is e¢ cient, the e¤ect of this exercise
on risk is equal to the shift in the expected return constraint times the shadow price of the
constraint, , i.e.,
Ri (
) =  (E (zi)  rf ) : (2.11)
Taking the weighted average using the portfolio weights gives
nX
i=1
iRi (
) =  (E (  ez)  rf ) : (2.12)
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Using (2.11) and (2.12) we obtain that for any e¢ cient portfolio ;
Ri (
)Pn
i=1 

iRi (
)
=
E (zi)  rf
E (  ez)  rf :
Namely, in equilibrium, BRi (as given in (2.10)) equals the ratio of the expected excess return
of any asset i to the expected excess return of the e¢ cient portfolio . Finally, since M
has been shown to be e¢ cient (Corollary 43) we obtain the result.
2.4.3 Applications and Empirical Implementation
We now provide several applications to illustrate the versatility and power of Theorem 44
and its potential empirical usefulness. We show how to use this theorem to generalize the
traditional CAPM to account for high distribution moments, downside risk, rare disasters,
as well as combinations thereof. We also discuss the economic interpretation of systematic
risk in these cases and explain how these results can be implemented empirically.
Applications
Application I: The standard CAPM. When the risk measure R is the variance, i.e.,
R (~z) = Var (~z) ; Theorem 44 coincides with the standard CAPM (see Appendix II for the
derivation). Namely,
BRi =
Cov
 
~zi;
M  ez
Var (M  ez) : (2.13)
Thus, in this case systematic risk is measured as the standard regression coe¢ cient. The
same result is obtained when R (~z) = w2 (~z) ; i.e., the standard deviation of returns.
Application II: A CAPM reecting aversion to tail risk. The simplest generalization
of the standard CAPM is to the case in which investors are averse to any moment of an even
degree. That is, set R (~z) = mk (~z) = E (~z   E (~z))k ; k even. This risk measure satises all
of the conditions in Theorem 44 (see Example 29). In this case the systematic risk takes the
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form (see Appendix II for the derivation)
BRi =
Cov

~zi;

M  ez M  E (ez)k 1
mk (M  ez) : (2.14)
That is, the systematic risk of asset i is proportional to the covariance of ~zi with the (k   1)th
power of the demeaned market return. In the special case of k = 2 (variance), this reduces
to (2.13) as expected. Another important special case is k = 4; in which R (~z) measures the
tail risk of ~z: Then,
BRi =
Cov

~zi;

M  ez M  E (ez)3
m4 (M  ez) :
Namely, the systematic risk of asset i is proportional to the co-kurtosis of ~zi with the de-
meaned market return. Similarly, when R (~z) = wk (~z), the normalized kth central moment,
BRi again takes the form (2.14).
Application III: A CAPM reecting aversion to downside risk. Assume R (~z) =
DRk (~z) for k  2: This risk measure satises all of the conditions in Theorem 44 (see
Example 32). The systematic risk is then given by (see Appendix II for the derivation)
BRi = ( 1)k
Cov

~zi;

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1
(DRk (M  ez))k : (2.15)
That is, the systematic risk of asset i is proportional to the covariance of ~zi with the (k   1)th
power of the demeaned market return, censored at zero.
Application IV: A CAPM reecting aversion to rare disasters. To account for
rare disasters we can use the demeaned expected shortfall measure, which satises all the
requirements in Theorem 44 (see Example 35). Assume then that R (~z) = DES (~z) ; where
0 <  < 1 is some condence level. The systematic risk in this case is given by (see Appendix
II for the derivation)
BRi =  
E

~zi   E (~zi) jM  ez   VaR(M  ez)
DES(M  ez) : (2.16)
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Thus, the systematic risk of asset i in this case equals (the negative of) the expected de-
meaned return of asset i conditional on the market being in a disaster, scaled by the markets
demeaned expected shortfall. An equivalent expression is
BRi =  
Cov

~zi; 1M ez VaR(M ez)
 DES(M  ez) ;
showing that systematic risk in this case is proportional to the covariance of the asset return
with an indicator equal to one when the market is in a disaster.
So far we have restricted our applications to cases in which investors are averse to just
one risk aspect. In reality, it is likely that investors are averse to several risk attributes.
Our framework allows for this by constructing risk measures that account for several risk
characteristics using Lemma 28. The next application illustrates this point.
Application V: A CAPM reecting aversion to variance, downside skewness, tail
risk, and rare disasters. Consider the following family of risk measures
R (~z) = 1w2 (~z) + 2DR3 (~z) + 3w4 (~z) + 4DES (~z)
for some condence level : Here 1; :::; 4 are non-negative weights accounting for the degree
of aversion to variance, downside skewness, tail risk, and rare disasters, respectively.16 The
case 1 = 1 and 2 = 3 = 4 = 0 corresponds to the traditional CAPM, whereas di¤erent
values of the weights allow us to reect di¤erent levels of aversion to the di¤erent risk
attributes.
By Lemma 28 these risk measures satisfy all the conditions in Theorem 44 and so all
the CAPM results above hold. The resulting systematic risk measure accounts for the
contribution of asset i to all four risk attributes. It is simply given by a weighted average
16Note that we are using here w2 () and w4 () (the normalized second and fourth moments) instead of
m2 () and m4 () : This is done to make sure that all of the components in R () are homogeneous of degree
1, and so R () is homogeneous.
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of the systematic risk measures as calculated in the above applications (see Appendix II).
Namely,
BRi =
R1
 
M

R (M)
BR1i +
R2
 
M

R (M)
BR2i +
R3
 
M

R (M)
BR3i +
R4
 
M

R (M)
BR4i ; (2.17)
where R1 () = 1w2 () ; R2 () = 2DR3 (), R3 () = 3w4 () ; and R4 () = 4DES () ; and
where BR1i ; BR2i ; BR3i ; and BR4i are given by (2.13)(2.16).
Empirical Implementation
Similar to the classic CAPM, Theorem 44 and its applications lend themselves naturally to
empirical investigation. The standard approach for testing and applying the CAPM follows
Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Fama and French (1992). The rst stage in their approach
consists of estimating beta through time-series regressions, whereas the second stage consists
of cross-sectional regressions of excess asset returns on estimated betas.
To apply this approach in our case, one needs to rst take a stand on what the risk
measure R is. Then, using Theorem 44 one can estimate BRi from time-series data. For
example, if R takes the form as in Application V above, then we need time series return
data for asset i and for the market portfolio in order to estimate BRi from (2.17). This will
be a weighted average of the betas prescribed in Applications IIV. Note that unlike in the
classic CAPM, BRi is in general not a regression coe¢ cient. Nevertheless, it often takes the
form of some scaled covariance of the asset returns and some function of the market returns
(see Applications IIV). Thus, BRi can still be readily estimated from time-series return data.
The cross-sectional part is then identical in nature to that in Fama and MacBeth (1973).
It is important to note that the model does not provide us with guidance as to what R
is. Rather, for any given risk measure the model provides an expression for the associated
systematic risk. In practice we believe that the data can guide us in nding what the true
risk is, to which investors are averse. For example, consider Application V, which allows
the risk measure to reect aversion to variance, downside skewness, tail risk, and disaster
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risk. One still has a lot of exibility in choosing the weights 1; :::; 4; which determine the
degree of aversion to each particular aspect of risk. The model can then allow the data to
determine which set of weights obtains the most support. This exibility is tantamount to
the freedom provided by the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross (1976b)) in which the model
suggests the existence of multiple systematic factors but does not provide guidance as to
what these factors are.
2.4.4 Further Discussion
Note that Theorem 44 relies on the market portfolio being e¢ cient, and that two-fund
separation is a way to achieve this e¢ ciency result. Our assumptions on the risk measure
are su¢ cient for two-fund separation, but they are by no means necessary. Weaker conditions
that guarantee two-fund separation may exist. Further, even when two-fund separation fails,
it does not necessarily mean that market e¢ ciency is rejected. The literature explores market
e¢ ciency from both theoretical (see, for example, Dybvig and Ross (1982)) and empirical
(see, for example, Levy and Roll (2010)) views. Our generalized SML remains valid as long
as we have evidence that the market portfolio is mean-risk e¢ cient.
We should also mention that the classical notion of beta and its relation to expected
returns go beyond the standard CAPM setup. Specically, as long as there is no arbitrage
and so a stochastic discount factor exists, a beta representation of the form
E (~zi) =  + Bi
exists (see Hansen and Richard (1987) and Cochrane (2001) Ch. 6). This does not stand
in conict to the results in this section. Rather, our results essentially identify a class of
stochastic discount factors driven by the mean-risk preferences being assumed.
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2.5 Systematic Risk as a Solution to a Risk Allocation
Problem
The equilibrium approach presented in the previous section generalizes the classic CAPM,
but it has two limitations. First, this approach allows us to calculate the contribution of an
asset to the risk of the market portfolio, but not to arbitrary portfolios of risky assets. Sec-
ond, to obtain the equilibrium results we imposed restrictions on the risk measures (scaling
independence, convexity, and the risk-free property). These restrictions allow us to establish
existence of equilibrium and e¢ ciency of the market portfolio. However, some risk measures
do not satisfy these conditions.
In this section we o¤er an alternative approach to developing a systematic risk measure.
This approach applies to any portfolio of risky assets and to a broader class of risk measures.
For example, if a bank would like to use the VaR measure to estimate the contributions
of di¤erent assets on its balance sheet to the total VaR of the bank, then the results in
this section can be applied. Importantly, when the risk measure is homogeneous, the two
approaches lead to an identical result, generalizing the traditional beta.
Our approach is to consider this issue as a risk allocation problem, where the total risk
of a given portfolio needs to be fairly allocated among its components. We o¤er four
axioms that describe reasonable properties of solutions to risk allocation problems. We then
show that these axioms determine a unique formula for the systematic risk of an asset, the
contribution of the asset to the risk of the portfolio.
2.5.1 Axiomatic Characterization of Systematic Risk
A risk allocation problem of order n  1 is a pair (R;x) ; where R is a risk measure and x 2
Rn++ is a portfolio specifying the dollar amount invested in each of n assets ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) ;
and R (x  ez) 6= 0. Denote the total dollar amount invested by x = Pni=1 xi. Also, let  be
the vector of corresponding portfolio weights, i.e., i = xi=x. The only two requirements we
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impose on R in this section are that R (0) = 0 (i.e., zero investment entails no risk) and that
R () is smooth.
A systematic risk measure is a function mapping any risk allocation problem of order
n to a vector BR (x) =
 BR1 (x) ; :::;BRn (x) in Rn: Intuitively, one can think of BRi (x) as
the contribution of asset i to the total risk of portfolio x; which is R (x  ez) : Note that a
systematic risk measure applies to all possible pairs of risk measures and portfolios, rather
than to a given pair.
We now state four axioms specifying desirable economic properties of systematic risk
measures. The intuition for why these axioms make sense mostly comes from the traditional
beta. Here we simply try to identify properties of beta and ask how these properties could
be generalized to arbitrary risk measures. It is important to emphasize that these axioms
do not impose any restriction on the risk measure. Rather, they impose structure on what
would constitute a solution to the risk allocation problem.
The rst axiom postulates that (as for the traditional beta) the weighted average of
systematic risk values across all assets is normalized to 1.
Axiom 45 Normalization:
Pn
i=1 iBRi (x) = 1:
The sum of any two risk measures is itself a risk measure. The next axiom requires that
in such a case the systematic risk measure of the sum will be a risk-weighted average of
systematic risk based on each of the two risk components.
Axiom 46 Linearity: If R () = R1 () +R2 () ; then
BRi (x) =
R1 (x)
R (x)
BR1i (x) +
R2 (x)
R (x)
BR2i (x) for all i = 1; :::; n:
When risk is measured using variance, the notion of systematic risk is closely tied to the
concepts of correlation and covariance. It is not easy to generalize these concepts to arbitrary
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risk measures. However, two features can be easily generalized laying the foundations for
the next two axioms.
First, while the concept of correlation is not easy to generalize, the idea of perfect
correlationdoes lend itself to a natural generalization. The intuition is that if several assets
are perfectly correlated, then essentially they can be thought of as the same asset. Thus, a
portfolio of perfectly correlated assets can be viewed as one bigasset. This intuition comes
from the standard notion of correlation relating to risk being measured by the variance, but
it can easily be generalized to arbitrary risk measures.
Formally, given a risk measure R; we say that assets ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-perfectly
correlated if there exists a function g () : R 7! R and a non-zero vector q = (q1; :::; qn) 2 Rn+,
such that for any portfolio  = (1; :::; n) 2 Rn+ we have R (  ez) = g(  q): That is, the
n assets are R-perfectly correlated if the risk of any portfolio of these assets as measured
by R only depends on some linear combination of their investment amounts. In essence,
this means that the n assets can be aggregated into one bigasset by assigning each asset
a certain weight specied by the vector q:17 Note that di¤erent risk measures correspond
to di¤erent concepts of R-perfect correlation, which typically would not coincide with the
standard notion of perfect correlation associated with the variance.18
The next axiom imposes that if the n assets are R-perfectly correlated, then their sys-
tematic risk measures are proportional to each other.
17To see the correspondence to the standard notion of perfect correlation, consider the following example.
Assume risk is measured using variance and let ez = (~z1; ~z2; ~z3) with ~z2 = 2~z1 and ~z3 = 5~z1. Then, all three
assets are perfectly correlated and for any portfolio (1; 2; 3) we have
V ar (1~z1 + 2~z2 + 3~z3) = (1 + 22 + 53)
2
V ar (~z1) :
Thus, we can set g (t) = t2 and the vector of weights is q =
p
V ar (ez1) (1; 2; 5) : More generally, it is easy
to verify that when risk is measured using variance, the concept of R-perfect correlation coincides with the
standard denition of perfect correlation.
18In the standard notion of perfect correlation, we di¤erentiate between positive and negative perfect
correlation. We could do the same here by allowing elements of q to take negative values. However, this is
not needed for our axiomatic characterization.
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Axiom 47 Proportionality: If ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-perfectly correlated with weights q =
(q1; :::; qn), then
qjBRi (x) = qiBRj (x) for all i; j = 1; :::; n: (2.18)
Next we turn to generalize the idea of positive correlation.Assume rst that risk is
measured using variance. Then, if two assets are positively correlated, adding additional
units of an asset to any portfolio of the two always increases total variance. We can then
rely on this feature to get a generalized notion of positive correlation. Specically, given a
risk measure R; we say that assets ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-positively correlated if Ri (  ez)  0
for all  2 Rn+ and for all i = 1; :::; n. Namely, the assets are R-positively correlated if adding
one more unit of an asset to any portfolio with non-negative weights can never reduce total
risk. The key to this denition is that for the assets to be R-perfectly correlated it is not
enough that adding one more unit of an asset would increase risk for a particular portfolio.
Rather, this property has to hold for all possible portfolios of these assets.19 The next axiom
requires that when the assets are R-positively correlated, the systematic risk of all assets is
non-negative.
Axiom 48 Monotonicity: If ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-positively correlated, then BRi (x)  0 for
all i = 1; :::; n:
Our main result in this section follows. It states that Axioms 14 are su¢ cient to pin
down a unique systematic risk measure, which takes on a very simple and intuitive form.
Moreover, when the risk measure is homogeneous, the solution coincides with the equilibrium
result in Theorem 44.
19It is easy to check that when risk is measured using variance, the assets are R-positively correlated if
and only if the correlation between any two assets is non-negative.
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Theorem 49 There exists a unique systematic risk measure satisfying Axioms 4548. For
each risk allocation problem (R;x) of order n; it is given by
BRi (x) =
x
R 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
for i = 1; :::; n: (2.19)
Furthermore, if R is homogeneous of some degree k; then (2.19) reduces to
BRi (x) =
Ri ()Pn
h=1 hRh ()
(2.20)
=
Ri ()
kR ()
: (2.21)
Thus, when R is homogeneous (which is a common case), the systematic risk of asset i
is measured simply as the marginal contribution of asset i to the total risk of the portfolio,
scaled by the weighted average of marginal contributions of all assets. This is identical to
the result in Theorem 44 only with respect to an arbitrary portfolio rather than the market
portfolio. When the risk measure is not homogeneous, the expression in (2.19) shows that
systematic risk depends not only on marginal contributions at x; but rather on marginal
contributions along a diagonal between (0; :::; 0) and x: This is a variation of the diagonal
formula of Aumann and Shapley (1974). The integral can be interpreted as an average of
marginal contributions of asset i to the risk of portfolios along the diagonal. Then, BRi (x)
is simply a scaled version of the integral where the scaling ensures that Axiom 1 is satised.
Note that when the risk measure is homogeneous, BRi (x) depends only on the portfolio
weights (and not on the dollar amounts invested in each asset). Indeed, in the homogeneous
case Ri (tx1; :::; txn) is proportional to Ri (x1; :::; xn) for all t 2 [0; 1] ; yielding the simple
expression in (2.20). When the risk measure is not homogeneous, the actual investment
amounts (not just the weights) are necessary for the calculation of systematic risk.
The uniqueness part of the proof of Theorem 49 is in Appendix I. It relies on the solutions
to cost allocation problems established in Billera and Heath (1982).20 In this proof we draw
20Billera and Heath (1982) dene a cost allocation problem of order n as a pair (h;x) where h : Rn+ ! R
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a one-to-one mapping between risk allocation problems and cost allocation problems, and
from systematic risk measures to solutions of cost allocation problems. Then, we show that
given these mappings, our set of axioms is stronger than the set of conditions specied in
Billera and Heath (1982). This in turn allows us to apply their result to obtain uniqueness.
Existence is straightforward and we show it below by demonstrating that (2.19) satises
Axioms 14. Suppose that BRi (x) is given by (2.19). Then,
nX
i=1
iBRi (x) =
nX
i=1
xi
x
x
R 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
=
R 1
0
Pn
i=1 xiRi (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
=
R 1
0
dR(tx1;:::;xn)
dt
dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
= 1; (since R (0) = 0)
and so Axiom 1 holds. To see Axiom 2, suppose R () = R1 () +R2 () : Then,
BRi (x) =
x
R 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
=
x
R 1
0 R
1
i (tx1;:::;txn)dt
R1(x1;:::;xn)
R1 (x1; :::; xn) +
x
R 1
0 R
2
i (tx1;:::;txn)dt
R2(x1;:::;xn)
R2 (x1; :::; xn)
R (x1; :::; xn)
;
as required. Next, for Axiom 3, suppose that ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) areR-perfectly correlated. Then,
there exists g () : R 7! R and a nonzero vector q 2 Rn+ such that for all  = (1; :::; n) we
have R () = g(  q). It follows that
Ri () = qig
0(  q) for all i = 1; :::; n:
Hence, for all i = 1; :::; n;
BRi (x) =
xqi
R 1
0
g0 (tx  q) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
;
which implies (2.18). Finally, given the denition of R-positive correlation, it is immediate
that (2.19) satises Axiom 4.
is continuously di¤erentiable and h (0) = 0: They interpret x as a vector of inputs and h as a cost function.
The question they ask is how to allocate total cost among the di¤erent inputs. See Appendix I for more
details on their model.
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2.5.2 Applying the Result
In Section 2.4.3 we have provided several applications and shown how to calculate systematic
risk for di¤erent risk measures. All of these results apply to the approach presented in this
section as well, but now they can be used with respect to arbitrary portfolios rather than
just the market portfolio. The next example illustrates a case of risk measures that do not
satisfy the conditions in Section 2.4, but for which Theorem 49 applies.
Recall the Aumann-Serrano and Foster-Hart risk measures in Example 37. These mea-
sures are homogeneous, convex, and smooth, but they do not satisfy the risk-free property.21
Still, Theorem 49 allows us to calculate the systematic risk associated with these risk mea-
sures.
Using Theorem 49 and applying the implicit function theorem to (2.4) and (2.5) yields
the systematic risk of individual assets associated with the AS and FH measures relative to
any portfolio weights  as follows:
BRASi () =
E
h
exp

  ez
R()

~zi
i
E
h
exp

  ez
R()

  ezi ;
and
BRFHi () =
E
h
~zi
R()+ez
i
E
h
ez
R()+ez
i :
2.5.3 Discussion
It is interesting to ask what would happen if we used (2.20) to dene systematic risk when
R is not homogeneous (instead of using (2.19)). In particular, this alternative measure only
21Although RAS (0) and RFH (0) are not dened, they can be approximated using a limiting argument.
Specically, take any random return ~z satisfying E (~z) > 0 and P (f~z < 0g) > 0: Then, for both R () =
RAS () and R () = RFH () ; we can dene R (0) by
R (0)  lim
t!0
R (t~z) = 0;
where the equality follows since both the AS and the FH measures are homogeneous of degree 1.
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relies on the marginal contribution of asset i at  and not along the diagonal. In the absence
of homogeneity these two alternative denitions yield di¤erent results. Thus, given Theorem
49, it must be that (2.20) violates at least one of our axioms. It is straightforward to check
that the axiom being violated in this case is Axiom 2 while the other three axioms are
satised.
Another alternative to measuring systematic risk might be to dene
BRi () =
Ri ()
R ()
;
namely, the systematic risk of an asset is the marginal contribution of the asset to total risk,
scaled by total risk. This measure satises Axioms 2, 3, and 4 but it fails Axiom 1, so it
cannot be considered as a generalization of the traditional beta.
Finally, it is worth noting that (2.20) can also be written as
BRi () =
d
dt

t=0
R (+t"i)
d
dt

t=0
R (+t)
;
where "i is an n-dimensional vector equal to 1 at the ith dimension and zero elsewhere.
Namely, when the risk measure is homogeneous, systematic risk of asset i can be thought
of as the directional derivative of total risk along the ith dimension scaled by the derivative
along the diagonal in the direction of the portfolio itself.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we generalize the concept of systematic risk to account for a variety of risk
characteristics. Our equilibrium approach shows that results attributed to the classic CAPM
hold much more broadly. In particular, aspects of the geometry of e¢ cient portfolios, two-
fund separation, and the security market line are derived in a setting where risk can account
for a variety of attributes. Our axiomatic approach species four economically meaningful
conditions that pin down a unique measure of systematic risk. Both approaches lead to
similar generalizations of the traditional beta.
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When risk is conned to measure the variance of a distribution, our systematic risk mea-
sures coincide with the traditional beta, the slope from regressing asset returns on portfolio
returns. More generally, systematic risk is not a regression coe¢ cient. Our equilibrium
setting leads to the conclusion that systematic risk is simply the marginal contribution of
the asset to the risk of the portfolio of interest, scaled by the weighted average of all such
marginal contributions. An identical result is obtained in the axiomatic approach for homo-
geneous risk measures. When the risk measure is not homogeneous, the axiomatic approach
gives rise to an expression for systematic risk that involves averaging marginal contributions
of the asset along a diagonal from the origin to the portfolio of interest.
Our axiomatic approach applies to a wide variety of risk measures, requiring of them only
smoothness and zero risk for zero investment. The equilibrium framework imposes additional
conditions in the form of scaling independence, convexity, and the risk-free property. Nev-
ertheless, even in the equilibrium framework we are still left with an extensive class of risk
measures. Indeed, this class is su¢ ciently broad to potentially account for high distribution
moments, downside risk, rare disasters, and other aspects of risk. A limitation of our frame-
work is that we restrict all investors to use the same risk measure. Future research may direct
at developing weaker conditions on the risk measures and introducing more heterogeneity to
investor risk preferences.
Finally, our approach is agnostic regarding the choice of a particular risk measure. Indeed,
which risk measures better capture the risk preferences of investors is ultimately an empirical
question. Our framework therefore provides foundations for testing the appropriateness of
risk measures and consequently selecting those that are supported by the data.
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Chapter 3
Recovering Conditional Return
Distributions by Regression:
Estimation and Applications
This chapter proposes a regression approach to recovering the return distribution of an
individual asset conditional on the return of an aggregate index based on their marginal
distributions. This approach relies on the identifying assumption that the conditional return
distribution of the asset given the index return does not vary over time. I show how to
empirically implement this approach using option price data. I then apply this approach
to examine the cross-sectional equity risk premium associated with systematic disaster risk,
to estimate the exposure of banks to systemic shocks, and to extend the Ross (Journal of
Finance, 2015) recovery theorem to individual assets.
3.1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has witnessed dramatic declines in the prices of most securities,
which suggests strong return comovement between various assets. It is desirable to under-
stand how the returns of di¤erent securities move along with each other. In this paper, I
propose a regression approach to recovering the return distribution of an individual asset
conditional on the return of an aggregate index based on their marginal distributions. I show
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how this approach can be implemented empirically using option prices. I then demonstrate
the usefulness of this approach in testing the cross-sectional equity premium associated with
systematic disaster risk, in estimating the exposure of banks to systemic shocks, and in an
extension of the Ross (2015) recovery theorem.
The simplest and most widely used approach to describing the joint return behavior be-
tween two securities is to run a linear regression based on their historical returns. Indeed,
this is what we are used to doing when estimating the CAPM beta by regressing excess
returns of an asset on those of the market portfolio. This approach, however, has a number
of drawbacks. First, it estimates the mean return of one security conditional on the return of
the other, but it fails to capture high-moment properties. For example, Figure 3.1 plots the
returns of two pairs of hypothetical securities, both of which predict the same conditional
mean return of one security given the return of the other. However, the second-moment
patterns of the two pairs are clearly distinct in the sense that the rst pair has increasing
correlation when the returns become lower, whereas the second pair has symmetric correla-
tion over the entire region of returns. Second, running a linear regression between the two
securities focuses on the linear relation only, neglecting other aspects of their joint behavior.
To illustrate this point, Figure 3.2 depicts the returns of two hypothetical assets against the
return of the market portfolio. The returns of both assets t the same linear relation with
the market return. Nevertheless, the nonlinear patterns show that asset 1 is more sensi-
tive to the market disaster risk than asset 2 in the sense that the former tends to deliver
lower returns when the market return becomes disastrously low. Third, estimation based
on historical returns is backward-looking, which does not necessarily represent future return
distributions. Finally, using historical returns makes it di¢ cult to capture the e¤ects of rare
events, especially when the sample size is not large enough.
Alternative approaches used in the literature resolve some of the above issues. One
such approach is the quantile regression, which predicts the conditional return quantiles of
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Figure 3.1: Second Moment Properties in Joint Return Behavior
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Figure 3.2: Nonlinearity in Joint Return Behavior
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one security given the return of the other. (See Koenker (2005) for detailed discussions
on quantile regression.) This approach generates the entire conditional distributions, thus
capturing high-moment properties as well as nonlinear aspects in the joint return behavior.
Nevertheless, given that the quantile regression is also implemented using historical returns,
it is backward-looking and does not adequately reect the e¤ects of rare events.
Another alternative relies on option prices. We learn from the results of Ross (1976a) and
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) that one can estimate the risk-neutral probability distrib-
ution of security returns using prices of options written on the security under consideration.
The advantage of using option prices is that it is forward-looking and accounts for rare
events even if such events do not occur within sample. However, the risk-neutral distribu-
tions obtained from option prices typically di¤er from the physical distributions due to the
adjustment for risk aversion. In addition, if we are interested in the joint return distribution
of two securities, we would need options written on the joint values of these two securities.
Given that most traded options are written on a single security, this method generally allows
one to estimate the risk-neutral marginal return distribution of each single security, but not
their joint distribution.
A question that follows naturally is whether we can recover the joint return distribution
of two securities, assuming that the associated marginal distributions are known or can be
estimated. This is indeed straightforward in the special cases in which the returns of the
two securities are perfectly correlated or independent of each other. For more general cases,
a well-known tool for this purpose is the copula, which can be used to map the marginal
return distributions of multiple securities to their joint distribution. (See Nelsen (1999) for
a general overview of the copula method.) However, a drawback of this approach is that it
is parametric in the sense that it typically relies on specifying a particular class of copulas.
When the copula class is misspecied, the accuracy of estimation might be a¤ected.
In light of all the problems discussed above, it is desirable to have a better approach to
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evaluating the joint return behavior of two di¤erent securities. The term betterincludes
the following aspects. First, it should capture all moment properties of the joint return dis-
tribution. Second, it should capture linear as well as nonlinear relations in the returns of the
two securities. Third, it should reect forward-looking information. Fourth, it should natu-
rally account for rare events, whose ex-ante probabilities of occurrence are extremely small.
Finally, it should not depend on any parametric assumptions on the return distributions of
the securities.
I propose a novel approach of recovering the conditional return distribution of an indi-
vidual asset given the return of an aggregate index from their marginal distributions. The
index return can be viewed as a factor that determines the state of the economy. Examples
of the aggregate index include the market portfolio or a sector portfolio, etc. According
to the total probability formula, the marginal return distributions of the two securities are
linked to each other through the conditional return distribution of the asset given the index
return. I assume that the conditional return distribution of the asset given any particular
value of the index return remains xed over time, meaning that the time variation in the
return distribution of the asset is solely driven by that of the index. This allows me to esti-
mate the time-invariant conditional return probabilities of the asset as the coe¢ cients from
a constrained linear regression of the marginal return distribution of the asset on that of the
index over time. I show that under the standard OLS assumptions, the estimates from this
constrained regression are consistent, i.e., they converge to the true conditional probabilities
as the sample size becomes large enough.
I further assume that the variation in the index return is the only priced risk (systematic
risk) such that any variation left in the asset return is idiosyncratic and does not get priced.
This implies that the conditional return distribution of the asset given the index return is
the same under the physical and the risk-neutral probability measures. Since risk-neutral
marginal distributions of security returns can be extracted from option prices, my approach
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can be implemented under the risk-neutral measure using option pricing data. The resulting
conditional return distribution of the asset estimated this way coincides with the physical
conditional distribution.
The advantages of my approach include the following. First, it generates the entire con-
ditional return distribution of the asset given the index return, thus capturing all moment
properties and potential nonlinearity in their joint behavior. In addition, since this approach
can be implemented using option prices, it is forward-looking and accounts for the likelihood
of rare events perceived by investors even if such events do not truly occur within sample. Fi-
nally, this approach does not rely on any parametric assumptions on the return distributions
of the two securities.
I then study three important applications of my approach. In the rst application, I
examine the cross-sectional equity premium associated with the sensitivity of stock returns
to the market disaster risk. To capture this sensitivity, I construct a systematic disaster
riskmeasure based on the conditional return distribution of a stock given the return of the
market proxied by the S&P500 index. For both the market and the individual stocks, I dene
a normal state and a disaster state. Then, the systematic disaster risk of each stock
is dened as the di¤erence in the conditional disaster probabilities of the stock given that
the market is in the disaster versus the normal states, respectively. This measure captures
the extent to which an individual stock is more likely to be hit by a rare disaster when the
market moves from the normal state to the disaster state.
Intuitively, if a stock is more sensitive to the market disaster risk, then it should be
less desirable for investors to hold, especially during time periods when a market crash
is considered likely. As such, investors should require higher expected returns for holding
stocks with higher systematic disaster risk, and this e¤ect should be more pronounced when
the market disaster risk is high. To test this hypothesis, I apply the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) methodology. I nd that systematic disaster risk is not priced when the option implied
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market disaster risk is low. However, when I restrict attention to time periods during which a
market crash is perceived likely, then I nd strong evidence that stocks with higher systematic
disaster risk earn signicantly higher expected returns after controlling for well documented
risk factors. In fact, increasing the systematic disaster risk by one standard deviation raises
expected monthly stock returns by 63 basis points, which is equivalent to over 7% per year.
My second application turns to the banking sector. I ask the question of how to estimate
the exposure of banks to systemic shocks and what bank characteristics are related to banks
systemic exposure. To this end, I construct a systemic exposuremeasure based on the
conditional return distribution of a bank given the banking sector return, where the sector
portfolio is empirically proxied by the KBW Bank Index. For both the sector portfolio and
the individual banks, I dene a normalstate and a disasterstate. I then estimate the
systemic exposure of each bank as the di¤erence in the conditional disaster probabilities
of the bank given that the sector is in the disaster versus the normal states, respectively.
Intuitively, the systemic exposure measure captures by how much an individual bank is more
likely to experience a disaster when the whole banking sector falls from the normal state to
the disaster state.
My estimates show that the systemic exposure measure is typically positive, indicating
that banks are generally more likely to experience a disaster when the banking sector as a
whole is in the disaster state relative to when the sector performs normally. I also nd that
the systemic exposure of a bank increases with its equity beta and the total return volatility.
It is also increasing in the non-interest to interest income ratio, reecting that a banks
exposure to systemic shocks is largely driven by its non-traditional businesses. In addition,
there is some evidence that systemic exposure decreases with total market capitalization.
Finally, in the third application I explore an extension of the recent Ross (2015) recovery
theorem, which is aimed to recover the physical return distribution of the market portfolio
from the corresponding risk-neutral distribution. While the recovery theorem deals with
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the market portfolio only, I seek to extend it to recover the physical return distribution of
an individual asset. I show that this can be achieved through the risk-neutral joint return
distribution of the asset with the market portfolio, which is given by the product of the risk-
neutral marginal return distribution of the market and the conditional return distribution
of the asset given the market return. Since my approach generates an estimate for this
conditional return distribution, it lends itself naturally to the extension of the Ross recovery
theorem to individual assets.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section
3 introduces the setup, linking the return distribution of an individual asset to that of
an aggregate index. Section 4 discusses the estimation methodology and how it can be
implemented using option prices. Section 5 provides some discussions and extensions. Section
6 applies the framework to examine the cross-sectional systematic disaster risk premium.
Section 7 studies banksexposure to systemic shocks. Section 8 shows how my approach can
be used to extend the Ross recovery theorem to individual assets. Section 9 concludes. Proofs
of propositions are shown in Appendix A, and other technical discussions are delegated to
Appendix B.
3.2 Literature Review
The paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it adds to the study of
the joint return behavior of di¤erent securities. Roll (1988), Jorion (2000), and Longin and
Solnik (2001), among others, show that the return correlation between securities is not sym-
metric under all market conditions, but instead increases during market crashes. Ang and
Chen (2002), Hong, Tu and Zhou (2007), and Jiang, Wu and Zhou (2014) develop methods
to test this asymmetric dependence between security returns. Skinzi and Refenes (2004)
and Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2013) propose methods of inferring equity return cor-
relations from option prices. In this paper, I provide a novel approach of estimating the
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entire conditional return distribution of an asset given the return of an aggregate index, thus
accounting for potential asymmetries in their joint behavior. In addition, this approach cap-
tures all moment properties of their joint distribution, which is beyond the return correlation
alone.
The paper also adds to the extensive literature on estimating the risk-neutral distributions
of security returns using option pricing data. Ross (1976a) and Breeden and Litzenberger
(1978) rst show that one can extract the risk-neutral probability distributions of security
returns from option prices. Since option prices are available at discrete strike prices and
maturities only, some smoothing techniques are needed to estimate the full risk-neutral
distribution. (See Melick and Thomas (1997), Posner and Milevsky (1998), and Rubinstein
(1998) for parametric methods and Shimko (1993), Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996), Malz
(1997), and Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998) for non-parametric methods.) Jackwerth (1999)
provides a comprehensive review on various methods used to extract the risk-neutral return
distributions from option prices. Figlewski (2010) provides an empirical demonstration based
on the U.S. market portfolio. Overall, the literature has restricted attention to the return
distributions of single securities. My paper extends this literature by introducing an approach
of estimating the conditional return distribution of an asset given the return of an aggregate
index using option prices. Under the assumption that the variation in the index return is
the only priced risk, the risk-neutral conditional distribution estimated from option prices
coincides with the physical conditional distribution.
This paper is also related to research on equity premium associated with disaster risk.
A large body of theoretical research shows that investors are averse to rare disasters (e.g.,
Barro (2006, 2009), Gabaix (2008, 2012), Gourio (2012), Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012),
and Wachter (2013)). Consistent with this, a number of empirical papers have documented
a positive relation between disaster risk and expected market returns (e.g., Bali, Demir-
tas, and Levy (2009), Bollerslev and Todorov (2011), and Kelly and Jiang (2014)). Cross-
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sectionally, Siriwardane (2013) studies the relation between expected asset returns and the
option-implied disaster risk of assets, and nds a positive premium. Van Oordt and Zhou
(2012), Kelly and Jiang (2014), Ruenzi and Weigert (2013), on the other hand, focus on
the systematic portion of disaster risk by looking at the disaster risk of an asset in rela-
tion to that of the market. Given the challenge of estimating the joint disaster risk due to
the rare occurrence of disastrous events, all three papers use historical equity returns and
resort to either the power law distribution or parametric copulas to model the tails, which
unfortunately does not necessarily represent the true probability distributions. My paper
contributes to this literature by suggesting a measure of systematic disaster risk based on
the conditional return distribution of an asset given the market return. Since the measure
is estimated using option prices, it is forward-looking and naturally captures rare disasters.
This measure reects investorsperceived sensitivity of asset returns to the market disaster
risk, which can be conveniently used to test the cross-sectional disaster risk premium.
This paper also adds to the literature on bank systemic risk. By denition, systemic risk
focuses on risk associated with the collapse of the entire banking system. Hence, the main
challenge of estimating systemic risk comes from the rare occurrence of disastrous events.
Di¤erent methods have been proposed to tackle this problem. For example, Huang, Zhou,
and Zhu (2009) measure systemic risk by the price of insurance against nancial distress,
in which the default correlation between banks is proxied by the equity return correlation.
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2010) propose the systemic expected shortfall
(SES) measure, which estimates the propensity of a bank to be undercapitalized when the
system as a whole is undercapitalized. In particular, their method relies on the power law
distribution to model the tails. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) propose the CoV aR
measure as the di¤erence between the value-at-risk of the banking system conditional on
an individual bank being in distress and the value-at-risk of the banking system conditional
on the bank being solvent. Empirical estimation of CoV aR uses quantile regression to
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capture the tail distributions. The contribution of my paper is that it provides a measure of
banksexposure to systemic shocks based on the conditional return distribution of a bank
given the banking sector return. Since this measure is estimated using option prices, it is
forward-looking and naturally captures investorsperceived exposure of a bank to sector-wide
disastrous shocks even if such shocks do not occur within sample.
Finally, the paper also contributes to the literature on Ross (2015) recovery theorem,
which recovers the physical probability distribution of the market return from the associated
risk-neutral distribution. Subsequent research has been done to further explore this problem.
Carr and Yu (2012) provide alternative assumptions that allow for recovery for di¤usions on
a bounded state space. Huang and Shaliastovich (2013) develop a recursive-utility framework
to separately identify physical probabilities and risk adjustments. Martin and Ross (2013)
show that recovery can indeed be e¤ected by observing the behavior of the long end of
the yield curve. Walden (2013) extends the Ross recovery result to unbounded di¤usion
processes. See also Dubynskiy and Goldstein (2013) and Boroviµcka, Hansen and Scheinkman
(2014) for criticism of the Ross recovery theorem. This literature primarily focuses on the
market portfolio. My approach contributes to this literature by extending the recovery results
to any individual asset through its risk-neutral joint return distribution with the market.
3.3 Setup
In this section, I introduce a simple setup that links the return distribution of an individual
asset with that of an aggregate index through the total probability formula. The return of
the aggregate index can be viewed as a factor that determines the state of the economy.
Examples of the index include the market portfolio or a sector portfolio, etc. The next
section will discuss how this setup allows me to estimate the conditional return distribution
of the asset given the index return by a regression approach.
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There are T discrete time points t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Tg. At any time t; I consider security
returns over one period ahead, that is, from t to t+ 1:
Consider an aggregate index I; whose return over any one period can take N values
 
rI (1) ; rI (2) ; : : : ; rI (N)

:
Denote by ~rIt;t+1 the random return of the index over the period from t to t + 1: Evaluated
at time t; the probability distribution of ~rIt;t+1 is given by the vector
pIt;t+1 =
 
pIt;t+1 (1) ; p
I
t;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; p
I
t;t+1 (N)

;
where pIt;t+1 (n) represents the probability of ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n) for any n 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng :
Consider an asset, whose return over any one period can take K distinct values
(r (1) ; r (2) ; : : : ; r (K)) :
Denote by ~rt;t+1 the random return of the asset over the period from t to t + 1: Evaluated
at t; the probability distribution of ~rt;t+1 is given by the vector
pt;t+1 = (pt;t+1 (1) ; pt;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; pt;t+1 (K)) ;
where pt;t+1 (k) represents the probability of ~rt;t+1 = r (k) for any k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Kg :
Assumption 50 (Identifying) The conditional probability distribution of the asset return
given any value of the contemporaneous index return does not vary over time.
This assumption may be understood in relation to the one we make when empirically
estimating the CAPM beta that the conditional mean return of an asset given any value of
the market return is xed over time. My assumption is stronger in the sense that it requires
not only the conditional mean but indeed the entire conditional distribution to be time-
invariant. It implies that the time variation in the return distribution of the asset (pt;t+1) is
solely driven by the time variation in the return distribution of the index (pIt;t+1).
95
Denote the time-invariant conditional distribution of the asset return given the index
return by the matrix
 =
0B@  (1j1)     (Kj1)... . . . ...
 (1jN)     (KjN)
1CA ;
where  (kjn) stands for the conditional probability of ~rt;t+1 = r (k) given ~rIt;t+1 = rI (n)
evaluated at the beginning of the period for any n 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng and k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Kg :
By Assumption 50,  does not depend on time. According to the properties of conditional
probabilities, it must be that given any value of the index return, the conditional probabilities
of the asset return sum up to one, i.e.,
KX
k=1
 (kjn) = 1; 8n: (3.1)
At any t; the marginal return distribution of the asset is related to that of the index by
the total probability formula. Specically, for any k;
pt;t+1 (k) =
NX
n=1
pIt;t+1 (n)  (kjn) :
That is, the marginal distribution of the asset return is equal to the weighted average of
its conditional distribution given the index return, with the weights given by the marginal
return distribution of the index. This can be conveniently rewritten in matrix form as
pt;t+1 = p
I
t;t+1  : (3.2)
The discussion so far is based on the physical probability measure. I now make an
additional assumption to link the physical measure with the risk-neutral measure.
Assumption 51 The variation in the index return is the only priced (systematic) risk.
Formally, Assumption 51 is satised if there exists a stochastic discount factor, whose
value related to future payo¤s depends on the future value of the index return only. This
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assumption can be understood in relation to the CAPM framework, which implies that the
stochastic discount factor is a linear function of the market return. Assumption 51 is weaker
in the sense that it requires the stochastic discount factor to be a function of the index return
only, but it does not impose any restriction on the functional form of this relation. This
assumption implies that conditional on a particular value of the index return, any variation
left in the asset return is purely idiosyncratic and hence is risk-neutrally priced. It is then
straightforward to show that the conditional distribution of the asset return given any value
of the index return is the same under both the physical and the risk-neutral probability
measures. This is formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 52 At any time t; the risk-neutral conditional probability of ~rt;t+1 = r (k) given
~rIt;t+1 = r
I (n) is equal to  (kjn) for all n and k:
A conclusion of Proposition 52 is that the total probability formula (3.2) holds just as well
under the risk-neutral probability measure with respect to the same conditional probability
matrix . At time t; denote the risk-neutral distributions of ~rt;t+1 and ~rIt;t+1 by
qIt;t+1 =
 
qIt;t+1 (1) ; q
I
t;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; q
I
t;t+1 (N)

;
qt;t+1 = (qt;t+1 (1) ; qt;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; qt;t+1 (K)) :
Formally,
Corollary 53 At any time t;
qt;t+1 = q
I
t;t+1  : (3.3)
3.4 Estimation Methodology
The setup introduced in Section 3.3 can be used to estimate the conditional distribution
matrix  from the marginal return distributions of the two securities. Proposition 52 and
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Corollary 53 suggest that for this purpose one can work under either the physical measure
or the risk-neutral measure, and the conditional probabilities obtained under both measures
would be identical. In practice, there can be di¤erent ways of estimating the marginal return
distributions in either probability measure. In this paper, I choose to do so under the risk-
neutral measure using option prices based on the work of Ross (1976a) and Breeden and
Litzenberger (1978). My approach would work in the same manner if the marginal return
distributions are obtained using other methods.
I assume that both index I and the individual asset of interest are traded in the option
market. Examples of aggregate indices with traded options include the S&P500 index and
the KBW Bank Index, etc. The procedure of estimating  includes two steps. In the rst, I
extract the risk-neutral marginal return distributions of the index and the asset, qIt;t+1 and
qt;t+1; from option prices. Then in the second step, I perform a constrained regression of
qt;t+1 on qIt;t+1 over time to estimate the conditional distribution matrix . Below I discuss
each of the two steps separately.
3.4.1 Extracting Risk-Neutral Marginal Distributions from Op-
tion Prices
I rst discuss how the risk-neutral return distributions qIt;t+ and qt;t+ can be extracted
from option prices. The estimation procedures for qIt;t+1 and qt;t+1 are parallel, and hence
in this section I focus on qt;t+1 for brevity.
Ross (1976a) and Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) show that given a continuous range of
strike prices covering all possible values of the underlying asset at maturity, the entire risk-
neutral probability distribution of the assets future value can be estimated from European
option prices. Suppose that t is the current time point and consider an European put option
that matures at time t + 1: Let St represent the current price of the underlying asset, and
let ~St+1 be the random price of the asset in one period. Denote the strike price of the option
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by X and the risk-free rate by rf : The price of the put option can then be expressed as a
function of the strike price:
Put (X) = e rf
Z 1
0
(X   St+1)+ dF (St+1) (3.4)
= e rf
Z X
0
(X   St+1) dF (St+1) ;
where F () is the risk-neutral cumulative distribution function (CDF) of ~St+1 evaluated at
time t: Di¤erentiating (3.4) with respect to X obtains
@Put (X)
@X
= e rfF (X) :
Solving for F (X) leads to
F (X) = erf
@Put (X)
@X
: (3.5)
Evaluating F (X) at all possible values of X thus yields the entire risk-neutral distribution
of the asset price at maturity.1
Since I am interested in the risk-neutral distribution of the asset return from time t to
t + 1, I need to relate the return to the price at maturity. Assume that the dividend yield
paid by the asset from t to t+ 1 is equal to d: Then, the return of the asset ~rt;t+1 is related
to the future asset price ~St+1 according to the following approximation
~St+1 = St (1 + ~rt;t+1   d) : (3.6)
Therefore, the risk-neutral CDF of the asset return is given by 8r;
G (r) = F (St (1 + r   d)) :
Section 3.3 assumed that the asset return took a nite number (K) of values. This,
however, is a simplication of the real world in which asset returns have continuous ranges.
1One can alternatively estimate F () based on prices of European call options. By the call-put parity,
the results using call and put options are identical. For simplicity, I choose to work with put options.
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To be consistent with the setup, I discretize the continuous asset return by dividing its range
into K mutually disjoint intervals with K   1 thresholds. At each time t; the risk-neutral
probabilities that the one-period asset return lies in each of these K intervals are taken as
elements of the vector qt;t+1: In particular, let rr (1) ; rr (2) ; : : : ; rr (K   1) denote the K 1
thresholds separating the K intervals of the asset return. Then, the vector qt;t+1 can be
estimated as
qt;t+1 (1) = G (rr (1)) ;
qt;t+1 (k) = G (rr (k)) G (rr (k   1)) ; 8k = 2; 3; : : : ; K   1;
qt;t+1 (K) = 1 G (rr (K   1)) :
Two additional technical issues need to be dealt with for the empirical estimation of qt;t+1.
First, the estimation of the risk-neutral CDF (3.5) relies on di¤erentiating the option price
with respect to the strike price. Since it is generally very di¢ cult to obtain a close-form
expression for this derivative, I estimate it by linear approximation. A second empirical
challenge has to do with obtaining European option prices. Nearly all individual stock
options are American options. While indices are generally represented by European options,
the market option prices are only available at discrete values of the strike price and time
to maturity. To obtain the European option price for any security at any arbitrary point, I
adopt a simple and commonly used approach of rst tting the implied volatility surface by
kernel smoothing and then deriving the Black-Merton-Scholes (BMS) option price (Black and
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973)) using the tted volatility. I delegate detailed discussions
of these issues to Appendix B.
3.4.2 Estimating Conditional Distributions by Constrained Re-
gression
This section discusses how to estimate the conditional distribution matrix  based on the
marginal return distributions qIt;t+ and qt;t+ : Since q
I
t;t+ and qt;t+ are extracted from
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option prices, they are often subject to measurement errors. In particular, since options
written on individual assets are more thinly traded than index options, one would expect
qt;t+ to be much noisier than qIt;t+ : To reect the di¤erent degrees of noisiness in q
I
t;t+
and qt;t+ ; I assume that qIt;t+ can be accurately estimated and that qt;t+ contains noises,
which are captured by an error term
t;t+1 = (t;t+1 (1) ; t;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; t;t+1 (K)) :
Now the risk-neutral total probability formula (3.3) becomes
qt;t+1 = q
I
t;t+1   + t;t+1: (3.7)
I will estimate  from qIt;t+ and qt;t+ using a constrained linear regression based on
(3.7). Before discussing the detailed estimation procedures, I need to make some additional
assumptions, which are su¢ cient to maintain the consistency of my estimates. In particular,
I assume the following.
Assumption 54 The pair of vectors

qIt;t+1;qt;t+1
	
are jointly stationary and weakly de-
pendent over time.2
Assumption 55 At any time t; E

t;t+1 (k) jqIt;t+1

= 0 for all k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Kg ; where the
expectation is taken under the physical probability measure.
Assumption 56 The T N matrix
QI =
0BBB@
qI1;2
qI2;3
...
qIT;T+1
1CCCA
is of rank N:
2The pair of vectors

qIt;t+1;qt;t+1
	
are weakly dependent over time if for any t;

qIt;t+1;qt;t+1
	
and
qIt+t;t+t+1;qt+t;t+t+1
	
become approximately independent as t!1:
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To see how  can be estimated by linear regression, it is useful to rewrite (3.7) as
qt;t+1 (k) =
NX
n=1
qIt;t+1 (n)  (kjn) + t;t+1 (k) ; 8k:
This indicates that one can estimate ( (kj1) ;  (kj2) ; : : : ;  (kjN))0 (the kth column of the
conditional distribution matrix ) by running an OLS regression of qt;t+1 (k) on the vector
pIt;t+1 over time. Assumptions 5456 guarantee that the resulting OLS estimates are con-
sistent, i.e., they converge to the true parameter values when the sample size approaches
innity.
Then, to estimate the entire  matrix, a natural idea would be to run a total of K
regressions corresponding to each of the K values of the asset return. However, since 
represents the conditional probabilities, two implicit constraints must be satised. First is
that the conditional probabilities given any value of the index return must sum up to one
(as required by (3.1)), and the second constraint says that all elements of  must lie between
0 and 1, i.e., 0   (kjn)  1 for all k and n. Unfortunately, running K OLS regressions
independently does not guarantee that these constraints are satised.
A solution to this issue is to conduct the K regressions jointly subject to the above two
constraints. Formally, dene
Q =
0BBB@
q1;2
q2;3
...
qT;T+1
1CCCA ;
 =
0B@ 1;2 (1)    1;2 (K)... . . . ...
T;T+1 (1)    T;T+1 (K)
1CA ;
and let 1ab and 0ab denote the a  b matrices of ones and zeros for any positive integers
a and b, respectively. Then, the problem can be represented by the following constrained
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linear regression
Q = QI   + ; (3.8)
s:t:
  1K1 = 1N1;
0NK    1NK :
I denote the resulting estimates from problem (3.8) by ^T ; where the subscript T reects
dependence of the estimates on the sample size.
A priori, it is not clear whether imposing the constraints would a¤ect the consistency of
my estimation. The following proposition establishes that consistency is indeed preserved in
the presence of the constraints.
Proposition 57 Under Assumptions 54-56, ^T is a consistent estimator of , i.e.,
lim
T!1
^T = :
3.5 Discussions and Extensions
This section provides some discussions and extensions of the estimation framework intro-
duced above.
3.5.1 Elaboration on Key Assumptions
Assumptions 50 and 51 are key to my approach in that they point out two important roles
of the index return.
Assumption 50 states that the conditional return distribution of the asset given the index
return is time invariant. The intuition is that while the return distribution of the asset can
change over time, its variation is solely driven by the time variation in the distribution of
the index return. In particular, once the index return is xed, the conditional distribution
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of the asset return is also xed, regardless of the time point under consideration. This is
the identifying assumption of my approach in that it allows me to make use of the time
series information on the marginal return distributions of the two securities to determine the
time-invariant conditional probabilities. Without this assumption, my estimation model is
not identied.
Another important role of the index return is reected in Assumption 51, which states
that the variation in the index return is the only priced (systematic) risk. As such, xing a
certain value of the index return, any variation left of the asset return is purely idiosyncratic
and is thus risk-neutrally priced. This assumption implies that the conditional return distri-
bution of the asset given the index return is the same under the physical and the risk-neutral
probability measures. Since investors are averse to risk, security return distributions gener-
ally di¤er under the physical versus the risk neutral measures to reect the adjustment for
risk aversion. In fact, there is a recent literature on Ross (2015) recovery theorem that aims
to recover the physical return distributions from the associated risk-neutral distributions.
The benet of Assumption 51 is that it aligns the analyses under the two probability mea-
sures once I condition on a particular value of the index return. This allows me to perform
empirical estimation under the risk-neutral measure using option prices, and the resulting
conditional probabilities would be exactly the same as if I work under the physical measure.
However, the failure of this assumption does not necessarily invalidate my approach. Even
when this assumption is violated (e.g., when the Fama-French three-factor pricing model
holds), my approach can still be applied under either the physical or the risk-neutral mea-
sure, but the conditional distribution of the asset return would no longer be the same under
the two probability measures.
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3.5.2 Multi-Factor Framework
The baseline model discussed earlier is a one-factor framework, in which the index return
is the only factor that determines the asset return distributions. In practice, asset return
distributions can be a¤ected by more than one factor. Macroeconomic variables such as the
consumption growth rate, ination rate, or VIX may serve as additional factors. In this case,
I need to extend my model into a multi-factor framework.
Suppose that there exist M factors. Each factor m 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg takes Nm values.
Evaluated at time t; the joint distribution of the M factors at time t + 1 is given by the
joint distribution function pIt;t+1
 
n1; n2; : : : ; nM

; where nm 2 1; 2; : : : ; NM	 for every m:
Similar to Assumption 50, I assume that given any set of joint values of theseM factors, the
conditional return distribution of an asset does not vary over time, which is denoted by the
conditional distribution function 
 jn1; n2; : : : ; nM : Then, the total probability formula
links the marginal return distribution of the asset to the joint distribution of the M factors
through 
 jn1; n2; : : : ; nM, i.e.,
pt;t+1 (k) =
N1X
n1=1
N2X
n2=1
: : :
NMX
nM=1
pIt;t+1
 
n1; n2; : : : ; nM


 
kjn1; n2; : : : ; nM :
If I further assume that variations in theseM factors constitute the only priced (systematic)
risk (the multi-factor version of Assumption 51), then 
 jn1; n2; : : : ; nM is the same under
the physical and the risk-neutral measures. This allows me to write down the risk-neutral
total probability formula as
qt;t+1 (k) =
N1X
n1=1
N2X
n2=1
: : :
NMX
nM=1
qIt;t+1
 
n1; n2; : : : ; nM


 
kjn1; n2; : : : ; nM ;
where qIt;t+1
 
n1; n2; : : : ; nM

represents the risk-neutral joint distribution of the M factors
at t+ 1 evaluated at time t:
If I have the marginal return distribution of the asset and the joint distribution of the
factors under either the physical or the risk neutral measure, I can estimate the conditional
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distribution function 
 
kjn1; n2; : : : ; nM by regressing the former on the latter over time,
as in the baseline framework. Unfortunately, the risk-neutral joint distribution of the factors
can no longer be directly extracted from option prices, because options written on the joint
values of multiple factors are generally not available. As a result, one need to resort to other
approaches to obtain the joint distribution of the factors. Once this joint distribution is
obtained, I can estimate 
 
kjn1; n2; : : : ; nM in exactly the same manner as in the baseline
case.
3.5.3 Continuous Security Returns
Up till now, I have assumed that the returns of both the individual asset and the aggregate
index take a nite number of discrete values. This section considers the case of continuous
security returns. Given the analogy between the physical and risk-neutral analyses (as in
the baseline case), in this section I work directly with the risk-neutral measure.
At any time t; suppose that the one-period index return ~rIt;t+1 and the one-period asset
return ~rt;t+1 take continuous values from the interval [ 1;1): The marginal probability
distributions of ~rIt;t+1 and ~rt;t+1 are given by the density functions q
I
t;t+1 () and qt;t+1 () ;
respectively. By Assumption 50, given any value of ~rIt;t+1 the conditional distribution of
~rt;t+1 does not change over time. I denote this time-invariant conditional distribution by the
conditional density function  (j) ; which integrates to 1 given any ~rIt;t+1 = rI , i.e.,Z 1
 1

 
rjrI dr = 1; 8rI :
At any t; the marginal return distributions of the two securities are linked to each other by
the total probability formula
qt;t+1 (r) =
Z 1
 1
qIt;t+1
 
rI


 
rjrI drI :
Assume that qIt;t+1 () can be accurately measured, whereas qt;t+1 () is subject to noises,
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which are captured by the error term t;t+1 () : Then, the total probability formula becomes
qt;t+1 (r) =
Z 1
 1
qIt;t+1
 
rI


 
rjrI drI + t;t+1 (r) :
Since 
 
rjrI is innite-dimensional, its empirical estimation is di¢ cult without further
information on the structure of 
 
rjrI : While there are di¤erent ways of reducing dimen-
sionality, one of the simplest methods is to make parametric assumptions on the functional
form of 
 
rjrI : Specically, let

 
rjrI = g  r; rI ; ;
where g
 
r; rI ;

is the assumed functional form of 
 
rjrI and  represents the parameters
of choice. Then, one can estimate 
 
rjrI by choosing the values of  to solve the following
least square problem:
min

 
TX
t=1
Z 1
 1

qt;t+1 (r) 
Z 1
 1
qIt;t+1
 
rI

g
 
r; rI ;

drI
2
dr
!
;
s:t:Z 1
 1
g
 
r; rI ;

dr = 1; 8rI ;
g
 
r; rI ;
  0; 8rI ; r:
3.5.4 Alternative Econometric Models
In Section 3.4.2, I used a constrained linear regression to estimate the conditional distribution
matrix  from the marginal return distributions of the two securities. In fact, there are some
alternative econometric models (rather than the constrained linear regression) that may also
seem appealing for my purpose. I discuss the potentials and limitations of some alternatives
in this section.
Probit and Logit Models
The Probit and Logit models both can be used to predict the probability distribution
of an outcome variable based on the values of the independent variables. The two models
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di¤er in the assumed distribution of the error term. The benet of these models is that they
automatically guarantee that the estimated probabilities of the outcome variable lie between
zero and one. It may seem that the Probit and the Logit models are well suited for my
purpose. However, a key di¤erence is that in these two models, the dependent variable is a
discrete variable representing the outcome of an event. In contrast, in my case the dependent
variable itself is the probability distribution of the asset return. Therefore, the Probit and
the Logit models do not apply here. In additional, to obtain reasonable results I impose two
constraints on my estimates, requiring that each conditional probability lie between zero and
one and that they sum up to one given any particular value of the index return. It is not
trivial to incorporate these constraints into the Probit and Logit models. In fact, it is not
hard to see that once these constraints are met, the predicted marginal probabilities of the
asset return based on the current linear model are guaranteed to lie between zero and one
with no need for additional restrictions.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Another alternative econometric approach worth mentioning is the Maximum Likeli-
hood Estimation (MLE). Suppose that the joint distribution of the error terms t;t+1 =
(t;t+1 (1) ; t;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; t;t+1 (K)) is given by the joint density function  () : If t;t+1 is in-
dependent and identically distributed over time, then the conditional distribution matrix 
can be estimated by the following constrained MLE:
max
TY
t=1

 
qt;t+1   qIt;t+1  

;
s:t:
  1K1 = 1N1;
0NK    1NK :
The key here is the joint density function  (). It is not clear what the best assumption
would be for the joint distribution of t;t+1. The normal distribution, for instance, may not be
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a good choice. This is because both the true and the estimated marginal return distributions
of the asset (qt;t+1) have bounded values, and hence the associated measurement errors t;t+1
should also be bounded, which is clearly not the case for normally distribution variables. In
addition, it is also likely that the di¤erent elements of t;t+1 are correlated with each other,
rendering the assumption on  () even more complicated.
While the constrained linear regression model adopted in this paper seems simple, I will
provide evidence for the out-of-sample validity of my estimation in the applications to be
discussed in the following sections.
3.6 Application I: Systematic Disaster Risk Premium
Starting from the seminal work of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), independently
developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965a,b), and Mossin (1966), researchers have found
that the cross-sectional risk-return relation is driven by the comovement of individual asset
returns with the market return, which is usually termed systematic risk.Rubinstein (1973)
and Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) extend the CAPM framework, which focuses on the sec-
ond moment of security returns, to account for higher moments. More recently, Kadan, Liu,
and Liu (2015) propose a general framework of evaluating systematic risk for a broad class
of risk measures, potentially accounting for various risk attributes such as high distribution
moments, downside risk and rare disasters.
On the other hand, a large body of theoretical research shows that investors are averse
to rare disasters (e.g., Barro (2006, 2009), Gabaix (2008, 2012), Gourio (2012), Chen, Joslin,
and Tran (2012), and Wachter (2013)). Consistent with this, a number of empirical papers
have documented a positive relation between disaster risk and expected market returns (e.g.,
Bali, Demirtas, and Levy (2009), Bollerslev and Todorov (2011), and Kelly and Jiang (2014)).
Given that investors exhibit aversion to rare disasters and that they are concerned with
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the comovement of asset returns with the market, it is then natural to conjecture that
investors require higher compensation for holding assets that are more sensitive to the market
disaster risk. This idea is empirically tested in the literature by Van Oordt and Zhou (2012),
Kelly and Jiang (2014), and Ruenzi and Weigert (2013). All three papers show that stocks
with higher sensitivity to the market disaster risk earn higher expected returns, at least
during some time period. Given the challenge of estimating disaster risk due to the rare
occurrence of disastrous events, all of these papers use historical returns and model the tails
by either the power law distribution or parametric copulas.
In this section, I propose a systematic disaster riskmeasure, which captures the sen-
sitivity of asset returns to the market disaster risk. The measure is constructed based on
the conditional return distribution of an asset given the market return, which can be read-
ily estimated using my approach by taking the market portfolio as the related index. My
measure is estimated using option prices rather than historical security returns. Thus, it is
forward-looking and naturally accounts for investorsbeliefs on the likelihood of rare events
even if such events do not occur within sample. I empirically examine whether this measure
predicts the cross-section of expected stock returns.
3.6.1 Measure of Systematic Disaster Risk
I construct the systematic disaster risk measure of a stock based on its conditional return
distribution given the market return. For both the stocks and the market portfolio, I focus on
three-month returns, whose associated risk-neutral distributions can be extracted from prices
of options maturing in three months. The reason for using three-month returns is because
options with a maturity around three months are considered to have the most accurate
prices.
For both the market portfolio and the individual stocks, I dene two states (N = K = 2),
the normal state (H) and the disaster state (L): I choose the disaster thresholds for the
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three-month returns of the market and individual stocks to be -1/3 and -1/2, respectively.
In words, the market (a stock) experiences a disaster if it loses more than one third (one
half) of its original value within three months. The disaster threshold for individual stocks
is chosen to be lower than that for the market portfolio, because individual stock returns
are more volatile than the market return. I will later show that the choice of the disaster
thresholds is consistent with our notion of rare disasters.
For each stock, I dene the systematic disaster risk measure as
SysDis =  (LjL)   (LjH) ; (3.9)
where  (LjL) and  (LjH) stand for the disaster probabilities of the stock conditional on
the market being in the disaster and normal states, respectively. Intuitively, this measure
captures the extent to which an individual stock is more likely to experience a disaster when
the whole market moves from the normal state to the disaster state. In other words, it is a
measure of the sensitivity of individual stock returns to the market disaster risk.
Since  (LjL) and  (LjH) are conditional probabilities and take values from 0 to 1, it is
apparent that the systematic disaster risk measure SysDis ranges from -1 to 1. In particular,
a positive value means that a stock is more likely to have a disaster when the market as a
whole is in the disaster state relative to when the market performs normally. The higher the
value of SysDis, the more sensitive the stock is to the market disaster risk. On the other
hand, a negative SysDis implies that the stock is less likely to experience a disaster when
the market falls into the disaster state, and therefore can be viewed as a hedge against the
market disaster risk.
3.6.2 Data
My sample period is from January 1996 to December 2012. I start from year 1996 because
option pricing information is not available before then. I use the S&P500 index as a proxy for
the market portfolio. This index has actively traded call and put options that cover a wide
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range of moneyness and time to maturity levels. I focus on all rms traded on NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ with option prices available. My primary source of data is the OptionMetrics
database, which contains multiple data sets and provides me with the following information
for both the S&P500 index and the individual stocks.
 The option prices data set contains daily records of the implied volatility and option
vega for all available options with a variety of strike prices and expiration dates. I
use this information to t the implied volatility surface by kernel smoothing. (See
Appendix B for details.)
 The security prices data set has daily security prices and returns.
 The index dividend yield data set provides me with annualized dividend yield for the
S&P500 index.
 The dividend distribution history data set has the dates and amounts of dividend
payments for individual stocks. On each date t, I estimate the dividend yield for each
stock over the three-month period ahead as the ratio of the total dividend payments
during the period to the stock price on date t.
 The zero coupon yield curve data set contains continuously compounded zero-coupon
interest rates for various numbers of days to maturity. The zero-coupon rate is used as
a proxy for the risk-free rate in the calculation of the BMS option prices. Since I focus
on prices of options with a maturity of three months, I need the three-month interest
rate. When the interest rate with this maturity level is not directly given in the data
set, I estimate it by linear approximation using rates for adjacent numbers of days to
maturity available.
In addition to the above information from OptionMetrics, I also collect the following
data. First, I obtain monthly returns for all stocks during the sample period from the
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Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. These monthly returns are used
as the dependent variable in the cross-sectional test. In addition, to control for the CAPM
beta in my test, I obtain daily excess returns of the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio
from the Kenneth French online data library, which are useful for the estimation of beta.
Finally, to control for the valuee¤ect documented in Fama and French (1993), I include
the book-to-market ratio as a risk factor in the test. For this sake, I obtain the book value
of equity for all stocks from the Compustat database.
3.6.3 Empirical Strategy
My hypothesis states that stocks with higher systematic disaster risk earn higher expected
returns. In addition, I conjecture that this relation should be more pronounced when the
market disaster risk becomes higher, i.e., when a market crash is considered to be more likely
to happen. The intuition is as follows. Suppose that the market performs well and that the
probability of a market crash is very low. Then, even if a stock could be sensitive to the
market disaster risk, investors may not be much concerned given that a market disaster is
very unlikely to happen. On the other hand, when investors believe that the probability of
a market crash is considerably high, they may have strong incentives to avoid investing in
stocks with high systematic disaster risk. This is because it now becomes very likely that
investments in these stocks could incur large losses upon the occurrence of a market crash.
To test these hypotheses, I follow the standard approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973)
and Fama and French (1992). For each month within the sample period, I perform a cross-
sectional regression of monthly excess stock returns on the lagged values of various stock
characteristics. I then test the risk premium associated with a certain characteristic by
conducting a t-test on the corresponding coe¢ cient estimates across all months. To see how
the systematic disaster risk premium depends on the market condition, I dene a market
disaster risk variable DisM ; estimated annually as the average option-implied risk-neutral
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disaster probability of the market portfolio across all dates of the year. Apparently, a high
value of DisM indicates that investorsperceived likelihood of a market crash is high. I then
repeat the test using subsamples constructed based on the lagged value of DisM ; and see
how the relation between systematic disaster risk and expected stock returns changes across
di¤erent subsamples.
The main stock characteristic of interest is the systematic disaster risk SysDis dened in
Section 3.6.1. I estimate this variable for each stock on an annual basis in three steps. First,
on each date, I compute the option-implied risk-neutral probabilities of disaster for both the
S&P500 index and each individual stock. For stocks with a low level of option trading around
the disaster threshold, the limited availability of option prices can potentially a¤ect the
accuracy of estimation. To enhance accuracy, I compute the risk-neutral disaster probability
for a stock on a date only when (1) there are at least ten di¤erent options written on the
stock with pricing information available on that date, (2) the lowest moneyness level (ratio
of strike price to stock price) of available options for the stock on that date is no higher than
0.95, and (3) the shortest (longest) time to maturity of available options for the stock on that
date is lower (higher) than three months. In the second step, I run the constrained linear
regression (3.8) for each stock-year using all dates within the year to obtain the conditional
disaster probabilities of the stock given di¤erent states of the market. To improve accuracy,
I perform this step only for stocks with risk-neutral disaster probability available for no less
than 200 days during the year. Finally, I compute SysDis using the denition (3.9).
To disentangle the e¤ect of the systematic disaster risk on the expected stock return from
that of the unconditionalpropensity of a stock to experience a disastrous event, I control
for each stocks unconditional disaster risk (Dis) in the cross-sectional regressions. The
Dis variable is estimated annually for each stock as the average option-implied risk-neutral
disaster probability of the stock across all dates during the entire year.
To further control for other risk factors, I include the following stock characteristic vari-
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ables in the test:
 CAPM beta (Beta), estimated annually using daily equity returns. Following Amihud
(2002), I estimate beta by size portfolios. At the end of each year, I rank all stocks
into ten size portfolios based on NYSE breakpoints.3 For each size portfolio, I compute
the portfolio return as the equal-weighted average return of all stocks in the portfolio,
based on which I then estimate the portfolio beta. Finally, I assign the portfolio beta
to all stocks in the portfolio.
 Coskewness (Coskew); estimated annually using daily equity returns. Following Har-
vey and Siddique (2000), I measure coskewness as the covariance of stock excess returns
and the square of market excess returns.
 Firm size (Size), estimated monthly as the logarithm of the total market capitalization.
 Book-to-market ratio (B2M); estimated annually as the ratio of the end-of-year book
value of equity to the end-of-year market capitalization.
 Lagged stock return, proxied by the stock return (Ret) of the previous month. This is
to capture the momentum e¤ect documented in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
 Mean-adjusted illiquidity (IlliqMA); estimated annually for each stock according to
Amihud (2002) as the annual average of the ratio of absolute daily return to daily
dollar volume of trading, adjusted by the cross-sectional mean.
Notice that the variables SysDis; Dis; Beta; Coskew; B2M; and IlliqMA are all es-
timated on an annual basis. Therefore, in the cross-sectional regressions, I always regress
excess stock returns in a particular month on the values of these variables estimated from
the previous year. On the other hand, since Size and Ret are available monthly, I use the
3As pointed out in Fama and French (1992), the idea of using NYSE breakpoints is to avoid having most
size portfolios dominated by small stocks traded on NASDAQ.
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one-month lagged values of these two variables in the cross-sectional regressions to capture
the size and momentum e¤ects.
3.6.4 Results
To make sure that my estimation of SysDis generates reasonable results, I rst check the out-
of-sample validity by trying to predict future states of stocks using my conditional disaster
probability estimation. In particular, for each year I take the rst quarter and try to predict
the state of a stock over the quarter based on the realized state of the market during the
same quarter and the conditional disaster probabilities estimated from the previous year.
Year 2008 is a special year in my sample, because towards the end of the year the market
indeed experienced a rare disaster with the three-month S&P500 return lower than -1/3.
This turns out to be the only occurrence of a market crash throughout the entire sample
period according to my denition in Section 3.6.1. Hence, for this year instead of focusing on
the rst quarter, I try to predict the state of each stock over the 91-day period from August
22, 2008 to November 20, 2008, during which the S&P500 return was -41%.
For each quarter-length period mentioned above, I determine the states of each individual
stock and the S&P500 index (H or L) over the period based on their returns using the
denition of Section 3.6.1. Then, for each stock and each quarter-length period, I compare
two quantities: 1stock in state L, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the stock delivers
a disastrous return of over the period and 0 otherwise, and ^ (Ljrealized state of S&P500) ;
the conditional disaster probability of the stock estimated from the previous year given
the realized state of S&P500 over the period. I rst check the correlation between these two
quantities and nd that they exhibit a strong positive correlation of 0.52. This indicates that
the higher the predicted conditional disaster probability, the higher the actual occurrence of
a rm disaster.
116
I then compute the following di¤erence
 = 1stock in state L   ^ (Ljrealized state of S&P500) :
Since 1stock in state L is either zero or one depending on whether a rm disaster occurs, whereas
^ (Ljrealized state of S&P500) represents the conditional disaster probability, their di¤erence
 for any one occasion does not contain much information. However, when I take the
average across di¤erent stocks and periods, according the the law of large numbers these two
quantities should be close to each other if my estimations are meaningful. Motivated by this
idea, I compute the average of  for normal and disaster states of the market separately.
Conditional on a realized disaster market state (August 22, 2008 to November 20, 2008) and
a realized normal market state (all other quarter-length periods), the average values of  are
-0.01 and 0.13, respectively. These numbers are reasonably small in magnitude, providing
evidence for good out-of-sample validity.
Next I compute summary statistics for the disaster risk variables DisM ; Dis and SysDis.
The results are reported in Figure 3.3. The mean value of the market disaster risk DisM
across the sample period is around 0.013, implying that on average a market crash is believed
to occur with a risk-neutral probability of 0.013. In addition, the standard deviation, median,
minimum, and maximum of DisM are estimated as 0.010, 0.012, 0.002, and 0.033, respec-
tively. For the unconditional disaster risk (Dis) and the systematic disaster risk (SysDis)
of individual stocks, I compute the mean and standard deviation across all stocks for each
single year, and I report summary statistics of these annual cross-sectional means and stan-
dard deviations in the gure. In particular, the mean value of the annual cross-sectional
mean of Dis is equal to 0.031, indicating that on average individual stocks are believed to
experience a disastrous event with a risk-neutral probability of 0.031. The mean value of
the annual cross-sectional mean of SysDis is around 0.335, suggesting that the conditional
disaster probability of an individual stock given a market disaster is on average higher by
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Variable Mean of Mean of Median of Min of Max of
annual mean annual S.D. annual mean annual mean annual mean
SysDis 0.3346 0.3643 0.2886 0.1164 0.6910
Dis 0.0314 0.0377 0.0295 0.0112 0.0577
Variable Mean S.D. Median Min Max
DisM 0.0131 0.0100 0.0123 0.0015 0.0329
Figure 3.3: Summary Statistics of Disaster Risk Variables
SysDis Dis Beta Coskew B2M IlliqMA
SysDis 1
Dis 0.4048 1
Beta 0.1353 0.1104 1
Coskew -0.0604 -0.0323 0.0150 1
B2M 0.0123 0.0248 0.0050 -0.0112 1
IlliqMA -0.0236 0.1044 0.0227 -0.0210 0.0251 1
Figure 3.4: Pairwise Correlations of Stock Characteristics
0.335 than its conditional disaster probability given normal market conditions.
Figure 3.4 reports the correlation coe¢ cients of SysDis with other stock characteristics.4
The results show that SysDis has a strong positive correlation of 0.40 with the unconditional
disaster risk (Dis), meaning that stocks with a higher sensitivity to the market disaster risk
are also prone to rare disasters by themselves. In addition, SysDis also has a positive cor-
relation of 0.14 with the CAPM beta (Beta), indicating that stocks with a higher sensitivity
to the market disaster risk are also more sensitive to the overall market movement. Fur-
ther, SysDis has a small positive correlation with the book-to-market ratio (B2M); and is
negatively correlated with coskewness (Coskew) and illiquidity (IlliqMA).
I next perform the Fama-MacBeth test on the cross-sectional risk premium associated
with SysDis. The test period extends from January 1997 to December 2012, which covers
16 years (192 months). In each month, the number of stocks included in the cross-sectional
regression varies from 553 to 2270. The test results for the entire sample period are reported
4Since SysDis is estimated annually, I examine its correlation with other annually estimated stock char-
acteristics only.
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Variable (1) (2)
SysDist 1 0.0040 0.0017
(1.06) (0.84)
Dist 1 0.0261
(0.46)
Betat 1 -0.0107
(-1.41)
Coskewt 1 -2104.67
(-0.81)
Sizet 1 -0.0011
(-1.16)
B2Mt 1 -0.0001
(-0.80)
Rett 1 -0.0222
(-2.60)**
IlliqMAt 1 0.0308
(1.17)
Constant 0.0063 0.0333
(1.81)* (1.73)*
Figure 3.5: Systematic Disaster Risk Premium for Entire Sample
in Figure 3.5. I rst conduct the test with SysDis as the only regressor (column 1). The
result shows that SysDis has a positive coe¢ cient, but it is statistically insignicant. In fact,
it remain insignicant after controlling for other stock characteristics (column 2). Consistent
with existing evidence, beta has no signicant e¤ect on expected stock returns, and its
coe¢ cient is even negative. Further, Coskew has a negative coe¢ cient, as expected, but it
is also statistically insignicant. Perhaps due to the relatively short sample period and the
fact that I focus on the set of stocks with option trading only, some well-documented risk
factors including size, book-to-market, and illiquidity do not show a signicant e¤ect, either.
The one-month lagged return, on the other hand, has a signicantly negative e¤ect on future
expected stock returns, implying a reversal in the return process.
I then examine how the relation between systematic disaster risk and expected stock re-
turns changes with the market disaster risk. For this purpose, I rank all months in the sample
by the market disaster risk (DisM) of the previous year and divide the entire sample into
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four subsamples, each containing 48 months. I repeat the test for each of the four subsamples
separately. The results are reported in Figure 3.6 For the rst three subsamples for which
the lagged market disaster risk is below the rst quartile (Columns 1), between the rst and
the second quartiles (Column 2), and between the second and the third quartiles (Column
3), SysDis does not carry a positive premium. In fact, when the lagged market disaster
risk is between the rst and the second quartiles (Column 2), SysDis even has a negative
coe¢ cient signicant at the 10% level after controlling for other risk factors. However, if I
restrict the test to months for which the previous year market disaster risk is higher than the
third quartile (column 4), SysDis becomes signicant at the 1% level. Indeed, in this case
increasing SysDis by one standard deviation raises the expected monthly stock return by
63 basis points, which is equivalent to an increase of over 7% per year. Interestingly, when
restricted to this subsample, the unconditional disaster risk (Dis) also carries a signicantly
positive premium. This implies that investors also require compensation for holding stocks
with high unconditional disaster risk when a market crash is considered likely.
To sum up, the empirical study in this section shows no clear evidence that systematic
disaster risk is priced by investors under normal market conditions. However, it has a
strongly positive e¤ect on expected future stock returns when the market-wide disaster risk
is considerably high.
3.7 Application II: Bank Systemic Exposure
This section applies my approach to study the systemic risk of the banking sector. Systemic
risk is the risk of collapse of the entire banking system due to the interrelation and inter-
dependence of all banks. The study of systemic risk has recently attracted much attention,
especially following the nancial crisis of 20072009. Two aspects of systemic risk are of
particular interest to researchers, one looking at the contribution of individual banks to the
risk of the whole banking system, and the other focusing on the exposure of individual banks
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Variable Low DisMt 1 (2) (3) High Dis
M
t 1
SysDist 1 0.0013 -0.0060 -0.0056 0.0172
(0.48) (-1.73)* (-1.59) (3.18)***
Dist 1 -0.0674 0.0852 -0.1657 0.2523
(-0.76) (0.68) (-1.23) (2.77)***
Betat 1 -0.0080 -0.0113 -0.0139 -0.0098
(-1.16) (-0.61) (-0.90) (-0.55)
Coskewt 1 -1.0652.98 1321.01 -26.07 939.38
(-1.12) (0.37) (-0.01) (0.92)
Sizet 1 0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0034
(0.76) (-0.67) (-0.27) (-1.78)*
B2Mt 1 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0001
(0.59) (-0.58) (-2.56)** (0.55)
Rett 1 -0.0052 -0.0486 -0.0137 -0.0213
(-0.38) (-2.30)** (-0.72) (-1.62)
IlliqMAt 1 0.0628 0.0449 0.0367 -0.0210
(2.43)** (0.84) (0.71) (-0.29)
Constant 0.0030 0.0305 0.0272 0.0728
(0.13) (0.77) (0.65) (1.57)
Figure 3.6: Systematic Disaster Risk Premium and Market Disaster Risk
to systemic shocks.
Despite the general interests in learning about systemic risk, the empirical estimation
is challenging due to the small probability of disastrous events. Di¤erent methods have
been proposed in the literature to tackle this problem. For example, Huang, Zhou, and Zhu
(2009) measure systemic risk by the price of insurance against nancial distress, in which
the default correlation between banks is proxied by the equity return correlation. Acharya,
Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2010) propose the systemic expected shortfall (SES)
measure, which estimates the propensity of a bank to be undercapitalized when the system
as a whole is undercapitalized. Their approach relies on the power law distribution to model
the tails. In addition, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) dene the CoV aR measure as the
di¤erence between the value-at-risk of the banking system conditional on an individual bank
being in distress and the value-at-risk of the banking system conditional on the bank being
solvent. The empirical estimation of CoV aR uses quantile regression to capture the tails.
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One commonality of these papers is that they all measure systemic risk based on historical
equity returns.
In this section, I examine the exposure of banks to systemic shocks and ask what bank
characteristics are related to bankssystemic exposure. To this end, I propose a systemic
exposuremeasure based on the conditional return distribution of a bank given the return
of the banking sector portfolio, which can be estimated using my approach by taking the
sector portfolio as the related index. Since the measure is empirically estimated using option
prices as opposed to historical equity returns, it is forward-looking and naturally accounts
for investorsbeliefs on the likelihood of disastrous events even if such events do not occur
within sample.
3.7.1 Measure of Systemic Exposure
The systemic exposure measure resembles the systematic disaster risk measure introduced
in Section 3.6.1. The main di¤erence is that I now focus on the joint performance of a bank
and the whole banking system, and hence I use the banking sector portfolio (as opposed to
the market portfolio) as the related index.
As before, I look at equity returns over periods of three months. For both the banking
sector and individual banks, I dene two states (N = K = 2), the normal state (H) and the
disaster state (L): I choose the disaster thresholds for the three-month returns of both the
sector portfolio and individual banks to be -1/2. Intuitively, the sector (a bank) experiences
a disastrous event if it loses more than one half of its original value within three months.
Then, for each bank I dene the systemic exposure measure as
SysExp =  (LjL)   (LjH) ; (3.10)
where  (LjL) and  (LjH) stand for the disaster probability of the bank conditional on the
sector being in the disaster and the normal states, respectively. This measure captures the
extent to which a bank is more likely to experience a disaster when the whole sector falls
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from the normal state to the disaster state. Put di¤erently, it is a measure of the sensitivity
of individual bank returns to the sector-wide disaster risk.
The systemic exposure measure takes values from -1 to 1. A positive value means that
a bank is more likely to experience a disaster when the sector as a whole is in the disaster
state relative to when the sector performs normally. The higher the value of SysExp, the
more sensitive the bank is to sector-wide disaster risk. On the other hand, a negative value
of SysExp implies that the bank becomes safer when the sector is hit by a disastrous event.
3.7.2 Data and Estimation
I use the KBW Bank Index as a proxy for the banking sector portfolio, which consists of
24 banking companies and has options actively traded on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange.
I focus on computing the systemic exposure measure for each of the 24 current constituent
banks of the index.5 The current composition of the index is shown in Figure 3.6.
My sample period is from January 1996 to December 2012. For both the KBW Bank
Index and the 24 banks, I collect daily information on option prices, security prices and
dividend distributions from the OptionMetrics database. Notice that some of the 24 banks
were formed by mergers and acquisitions at some points during my sample, and some others
temporarily stopped trading on the option market for some periods. As a result, not all of
the 24 banks have full records throughout the entire sample period.
I estimate SysExp in three steps. First, on each date I compute the option-implied
risk-neutral probability of disaster for both the KBW Index and the individual banks. To
maintain the accuracy of estimation, I compute the risk-neutral disaster probability for a
bank on a date only when (1) there are at least ten di¤erent options with pricing information
available for the bank on that date, (2) the lowest moneyness level of available options for
5While I focus on the 24 current constituent banks of the KBW index in this application, there is nothing
preventing me from estimating SysExp for other banks. The 24 banks are among the largest banks in the
sector and are considered to have the most inuences upon the economy. Hence, results based on these banks
are of particular economic import.
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the bank on that date is no higher than 0.95, and (3) the shortest (longest) time to maturity
of available options for the bank on that date is lower (higher) than three months. The
average risk-neutral disaster probabilities for the KBW Bank Index and for the individual
banks throughout the sample period are estimated as 0.010 and 0.018, respectively. In the
second step, I run the constrained linear regression (3.8) for each bank over time to obtain
the conditional disaster probabilities of the bank given di¤erent states of the sector. Finally,
I compute SysExp using the denition (3.10).
I am also interested in what bank characteristics predict bankssystemic exposure. To ex-
amine this issue, I construct the following bank characteristics. The rst three are computed
using daily security pricing information taken from the OptionMetrics database, whereas
the rest are constructed from quarterly bank fundamentals obtained from the Compustat
database.
 Market beta (Beta), estimated with respect to the market portfolio using daily equity
returns over the most recent 90 business days. The market excess returns and the
risk-free rates needed for the estimation are taken from the Kenneth French online
data library.
 Sector beta (BetaS), estimated with respect to the banking sector portfolio using daily
equity returns over the most recent 90 business days. The banking sector portfolio is
proxied by the KBW Bank Index.
 Equity return volatility (V ol), estimated over the most recent 90 business days as the
standard deviation of the daily equity returns.
 Bank size (Size), computed as the logarithm of the total market capitalization.
 Leverage (Lever), estimated as the ratio of the total book value of assets to the total
book value of equity.
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 Market-to-book ratio (M2B), computed as the ratio of the total market capitalization
to the total book value of equity.
 Non-interest to interest income ratio (N2I), estimated as the ratio of total non-interest
income to the total interest income. The inclusion of this variable is motivated by
Brunnermeier, Dong and Palia (2012), who show that the N2I ratio contributes to
bankssystemic risk.
 Maturity mismatch. I construct two proxies for maturity mismatch. First is the
ratio of total demand deposits to the total book value of assets (MatMis1), and the
second is the ratio of total interest-bearing deposits to the total book value of assets
(MatMis2). Since interest-bearing deposits generally have longer maturities and are
less often withdrawn than demand deposits, the extent of maturity mismatch of a bank
is positively related to the rst proxy and negatively related to the second.
3.7.3 Results
I rst estimate the systemic exposure of each bank using the entire sample period. That is,
I run the constrained linear regression (3.8) based on the risk-neutral disaster probabilities
of both the KBW Index and the bank of interest throughout the whole sample. Notice that
due to missing option prices for some banks during some periods of the sample, the e¤ective
estimation period may di¤er from bank to bank. Figure 3.7 reports the estimation results. A
rst observation is that the systemic exposure is positive for all banks, indicating that banks
are generally more likely to experience a disastrous event when the banking sector as a whole
is hit by a disaster relative to when the sector operates in the normal state. For example,
the systemic exposure of JPMorgan Chase & Co. is 0.686, meaning that when the banking
sector moves from the normal state to the disaster state, the conditional disaster probability
of the bank increases by 0.686. In addition, it can be seen that the systemic exposure varies
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Bank Name SysExp
BB&T Corporation 0.7636
Bank of America Corp 0.9881
Capital One Financial Corp 0.9789
JPMorgan Chase & Co 0.6860
Citigroup 0.9880
Comerica Inc 0.9925
Commerce Bancshares Inc 0.1164
Cullen/Frost Bankers Inc 0.2079
Fifth Third Bancorp 0.9865
First Niagara Financial Group 0.2534
U.S. Bancorp 0.8038
Huntington Bancshares Inc 0.9907
KeyCorp 0.9883
M&T Bank Corporation 0.7331
Bank of New York Mellon 0.7632
New York Community Bank 0.5715
Northern Trust Corp 0.4948
PNC Financial Services Group 0.7805
Peoples United Financial Inc 0.1553
Regions Financial Corporation 0.9852
State Street Corporation 0.8056
SunTrust Banks Inc 0.9919
Wells Fargo & Company 0.9912
Zions Bancorporation 0.9831
Figure 3.7: Systemic Exposure of Banks
much across di¤erent banks, from a minimum of 0.116 for Commerce Bancshares Inc. to a
maximum of 0.993 for Comerica Inc.
I next ask the question of what bank characteristics predict systemic exposure. To address
this question, I estimate SysExp for each bank at the end of each month based on option
prices of the most recent 90 business days. To improve accuracy, I perform estimation only
if the risk-neutral disaster probability is available for the bank for at least 60 days in the
90-business-day window. This yields a panel for the SysExp measure across di¤erent banks
over time.
To make sure that my estimation of SysExp generates reasonable results, I check the out-
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of-sample validity by trying to predict future states of banks using my conditional disaster
probability estimation. As in the previous application, I take the rst quarter of each year
and try to predict the state of a bank over the quarter based on the realized state of the
sector during the same quarter and the conditional disaster probabilities estimated from the
most recent 90-business-day window. From late 2008 to early 2009, the banking sector was
hit by a disastrous shock, during which the three-month KBW return dropped below -1/2.
This turns out to be the only occurrence of a sector-wide disaster throughout the entire
sample period according to my denition in Section 3.7.1. Hence, instead of looking at the
rst quarter of 2009, I try to predict the state of each bank over the 91-day period from
November 5, 2008 to February 3, 2009, during which the return of the KBW Index was
-56%.
For each quarter-length period mentioned above, I determine the states of each bank
and the KBW Index (H or L) over the period based on their returns using the denition of
Section 3.7.1. Then, for each bank and each quarter-length period, I compare two quantities:
1bank in state L, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bank delivers a disastrous
return of over the period and 0 otherwise, and ^ (Ljrealized state of KBW), the conditional
disaster probability of the bank estimated from the most recent 90-business-day window given
the realized state of KBW over the period. I rst check the correlation between these two
quantities and nd that they exhibit a strong positive correlation of 0.75. This indicates that
the higher the predicted conditional disaster probability, the higher the actual occurrence of
a bank disaster.
I then compute the following di¤erence
 = 1bank in state L   ^ (Ljrealized state of KBW) ;
and take the average of  across all banks and across di¤erent periods. My results show that
conditional on a realized disaster state of KBW (November 5, 2008 to February 3, 2009) and
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a realized normal state of KBW (all other quarter-length periods), the average values of 
are -0.01 and 0.0006, respectively. This serves as evidence for good out-of-sample validity of
my estimation.
I then regress SysExp on lagged values of the bank characteristics discussed in Section
3.7.2. Since some characteristics have low frequency (quarterly available), I take as regres-
sors the most recent value of each bank characteristic computed prior to the 90-business-day
window used to estimate SysExp: Figure 3.8 reports the regression results. I rst run the
regression without any xed e¤ects (column 1). The results show that the total return
volatility, the market-to-book ratio, and the bank size have positive and statistically signif-
icant coe¢ cients. On the other hand, the market beta, the leverage ratio, the non-interest
to interest income ratio, and the maturity mismatch proxies do not seem to be related to
bankssystemic exposure.
I then rerun the regression controlling for the bank-xed e¤ects (column 2). The return
volatility and the market-to-book ratio remain positive and signicant. However, the size
variable loses its signicance, and now it even switches to a negative sign. This implies that
the positive correlation between size and systemic exposure is completely absorbed by the
bank-xed e¤ects. In addition, the non-interest to interest income ratio becomes signicant
at the 10% level. Its positive coe¢ cient indicates that the systemic exposure of a bank
increases with its noncore activities (e.g., investment banking, venture capital, and trading
activities) relative to the traditional banking businesses.
Next, I perform the regression with both bank- and year-xed e¤ects. The market beta
now has a signicantly positive coe¢ cient, indicating that a banks sensitivity to the overall
market movement positively predicts its systemic exposure. The return volatility continues
to have a positive and signicant coe¢ cient, reinforcing the result that systemic exposure is
increasing in the total return volatility. The market-to-book ratio loses its signicance after
controlling for the year-xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient of the size variable remains negative, and
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Betat 1 -0.0023 0.0112 0.0587
(-0.07) (0.32) (2.54)**
BetaSt 1 0.2196
(4.35)***
V olt 1 6.5414 5.4125 4.1575 3.1228
(6.20)*** (6.10)*** (2.97)*** (2.29)**
Levert 1 0.0054 -0.0003 -0.0077 -0.0088
(0.93) (-0.04) (-0.89) (-1.12)
M2Bt 1 0.0395 0.0547 0.0258 0.0270
(2.99)*** (3.55)*** (0.81) (0.90)
Sizet 1 0.0349 -0.0581 -0.0739 -0.0574
(2.25)** (-1.73) (-1.81)* (-1.45)
N2It 1 0.0199 0.0480 0.0974 0.1019
(0.79) (1.84)* (3.02)*** (3.29)***
MatMis1t 1 -0.1616 -0.3353 0.5214 0.4235
(-0.71) (-1.10) (1.25) (1.13)
MatMis2t 1 -0.2059 0.1767 0.0183 0.0421
(-0.88) (0.60) (0.07) (0.16)
Constant -0.4852 0.9277 1.1158 0.7549
(-1.16) (1.47) (1.54) (1.07)
Bank-xed e¤ects N Y Y Y
Year-xed e¤ects N N Y Y
Number of observations 3123 3123 3123 3123
R-squared 0.1092 0.1371 0.2141 0.2205
Figure 3.8: Systemic Exposure and Bank Characteristics
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it now becomes signicant at the 10% level, suggesting weak evidence for decreasing systemic
exposure with size. Interestingly, the non-interest to interest income ratio continues to have a
positive and even more signicant e¤ect on systemic exposure. This conrms the result that a
banks exposure to systemic shocks is driven by its non-traditional businesses. Finally, notice
that after controlling for the bank- and year-xed e¤ects, the R-squared almost doubles, from
0.109 to 0.214, meaning that a large portion of the variation in the systemic exposure can
be explained by bank- and year-specic factors.
Finally, I replace the market beta by the sector beta, controlling for all other bank
characteristics and xed e¤ects. The sector beta has a positive coe¢ cient and is signicant at
the 1% level, implying that banks that are more sensitive to the overall sector movement also
tend to be more sensitive to the sector disaster risk. Results concerning other characteristics
remain mostly unchanged, but the size variable now becomes insignicant with a t-statistic
of -1.45. Overall, the results suggest that the systemic exposure cannot be fully predicted
by the linear relation between individual bank returns and the sector returns (as captured
by the sector beta) alone. Other bank characteristics such as the total return volatility and
the non-interest to interest income ratio are also important predictors.
To sum up, I nd that a bank exhibits higher exposure to systemic shocks when it is more
sensitive to the overall market and sector movement, when its equity return becomes more
volatile, and when it puts a larger weight on non-traditional businesses. I also nd weak
evidence that bank size negatively predicts the exposure to systemic shocks. In addition,
bankssystemic exposure is also considerably driven by bank- and time-specic e¤ects.
3.8 Application III: Ross Recovery for Individual As-
sets
The distributions of security returns generally di¤er under the physical versus the risk-neutral
measures to reect the adjustment for risk aversion. Ross (1976a) and Breeden and Litzen-
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berger (1978) show that option prices reveal information on the risk-neutral distributions of
security returns (see Section 3.4.1). Unfortunately, it is a priori not clear how the physical
return distributions can be estimated. Ross (2015) proposes a novel idea called the recov-
ery theorem that enables us to separate physical return distributions from risk adjustments
based on the risk-neutral distributions alone. Subsequent research further explores exten-
sions and alternative approaches to tackle this problem (e.g., Carr and Yu (2012), Huang
and Shaliastovich (2013), Martin and Ross (2013), Walden (2013), Dubynskiy and Goldstein
(2013), and Boroviµcka, Hansen and Scheinkman (2014)). All of these papers primarily focus
on the market portfolio, and the recovery results do not directly apply to individual assets.
In this section, I extend the recovery results from the market portfolio to individual
assets. I show that this can be accomplished through the risk-neutral joint distribution of
the asset return with the market return, which can be conveniently estimated using my
approach by taking the market portfolio as the related index. While I base my discussion
on the original Ross (2015) recovery theorem, it is worth noticing that my extension is not
restricted to Rosss original result but rather can be applied to any recovery result developed
for the market portfolio. I start by reviewing the Ross recovery theorem.
3.8.1 Ross Recovery Theorem
Consider a one-period economy with two time points 1 and 2. Suppose that there is an
aggregate market portfolio whose value denes N states indexed by f1; 2; :::; Ng.6 For any
n1; n2 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng ; let  (n1; n2) denote the physical transition probability of moving from
state n1 at time 1 to state n2 at time 2. In addition, let  (n1; n2) denote the price at time
1 of an asset that pays one dollar at time 2 if the market is in state n1 at time 1 and in
state n2 at time 2. Notice that  (n1; n2) is typically referred to as the state price, and it is
equal to the risk-neutral transition probability from state n1 to state n2 discounted at the
6In Rosss model, it is the value of the market portfolio, instead of the return, that determines the state
of nature.
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risk-free rate. The recovery theorem works directly with the state prices rather than the
corresponding risk-neutral probabilities.
The Ross recovery theorem is motivated by the following model. Assume that a represen-
tative agent exists, who has an additively time-separable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function U () with U 0 () > 0 and U 00 () < 0: Also assume that the representative agent has
initial wealth W and a subjective time discount factor  2 (0; 1). The agent chooses the
optimal consumptions at time 1 and 2 subject to the budget constraint. Assume that the
optimal consumption level depends on the state of the market only, and is in particular time
independent. Denote the optimal consumption in state n by c (n). Then, at time 1 the agent
solves the following utility optimization problem:
max
fc(1); ;c(N)g
U (c (n1)) + 
NX
n2=1
U (c (n2)) (n1; n2)
s:t:
c (n1) +
NX
n2=1
c (n2) (n1; n2) = W:
The solution to the above optimization problem is given by the rst order condition
U 0 (c (n1)) (n1; n2) = U 0 (c (n2)) (n1; n2) :
Rewriting the rst order condition in matrix form, we obtain
D  =  D;
where
D =
0BBB@
U 0 (c (1)) 0 : : : 0
0 U 0 (c (2)) : : : 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 : : : U 0 (c (N))
1CCCA ;
 =
0B@  (1; 1) : : :  (1; N)... . . . ...
 (N; 1) : : :  (N;N)
1CA ;
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and
 =
0B@  (1; 1) : : :  (1; N)... . . . ...
 (N; 1) : : :  (N;N)
1CA :
Since U 0 () > 0; the matrix D is invertible. Then, solving for  yields
 =
1

D  D 1: (3.11)
Since  is a transition probability matrix, we must have that starting from any state,
the transition probabilities to all states sum up to 1, i.e.,
  1N1 = 1N1:
This condition and (3.11) together imply
  1N1 = 1

D  D 1  1N1 = 1N1;
which can be rewritten as
   =   ;
where  = D 1  1N1: In particular, U 0 () > 0 implies   0; where  means strictly
greater than in each and every element. That is,  is a strictly positive eigenvector of 
with a corresponding positive eigenvalue :
The Perron-Frobenius theorem (see Meyer (2000)) shows that all nonnegative irreducible
matrices have a unique positive eigenvalue associated with a unique positive eigenvector up
to scaling. If we assume no arbitrage, then the matrix of state prices  is non-negative,
with zero elements if and only if the corresponding physical probabilities are zero. If  is
also irreducible, one can uniquely identify the subjective discount factor  and the vector 
(or equivalently the diagonal matrix D) up to scaling. Finally, plugging  and D into (3.11)
allows one to recover the physical transition matrix : Notice that while the matrix D has
an undetermined scaling parameter, the same parameter in D and D 1 exactly cancels out,
rendering the physical transition matrix  uniquely identied.
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To apply the recovery theorem empirically, an essential step is to estimate the state
price matrix  from data. As discussed in Section 3.4.1, we can extract the risk-neutral
probabilities and equivalently the corresponding state prices from option prices. One main
challenge, however, is that this method only allows us to obtain the state prices starting
from the realized initial state at time 1. Without loss of generality, assume that the realized
state of the market is n1 = 1 at time 1. Then, one can estimate from option prices  (1; n2)
for all n2 (the rst row of ) but not  (n1; n2) for n1 6= 1:
To resolve this problem, Ross (2015) comes up with a brilliant idea. Let
l =
 
l (1; 1) ; l (1; 2) ; : : : ; l (1; N)

denote the vector of the l-period state prices starting from state 1. Specically, l (1; n)
equals the price of an asset that pays one dollar in l periods if the market is in state 1 today
and in state n after l periods. Notice that 1 coincides with ( (1; 1) ;  (1; 2) ; : : : ;  (1; N))
from the above one-period setting. Further assume that the state of the market portfolio
follows a Markov process. Then for any l = 1; 2; :::; N   1; we have the following recursive
forward equations
l+1 = l : (3.12)
This forms a linear system of the state price matrix ; where the ls can be estimated from
option prices with di¤erent maturities. Then, solving this linear system yields ; which can
then be used to recover the physical transition matrix :
The recovery theorem deals with the entire transition matrix, which in particular in-
cludes transition probabilities starting from the realized initial state as well as from all other
hypothetical initial states. Often times, however, we are mostly interested in the transition
probabilities starting from the realized initial state ( (1; 1) ;  (1; 2) ; : : : ;  (1; N)) : Having
the initial state xed, we then have a 11 mapping between the market return and the
future market value (given by (3.6)). Using the notations of my framework in Section 3.3
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and focusing on transition probabilities starting from the realized initial state, (3.11) can be
readily rewritten as
pIt;t+1 (n) =
1

e rf qIt;t+1 (n)
U 0 (c (1))
U 0 (c (n))
; (3.13)
where index I is chosen as the market portfolio, pIt;t+1 (n) is the physical probability of moving
from the current market state to state n in one period, e rf qIt;t+1 (n) is the state price, and
 as well as U
0(c(1))
U 0(c(n)) are uniquely determined from the Ross recovery result.
3.8.2 Extension to Individual Assets
To see how the recovery result can be applied to individual assets, it is useful to consider
(3.13) for the market portfolio. This formula shows that the physical distribution of the
market return can be decomposed into three parts. The rst part is the reciprocal of the
subjective discount factor 1

, which is a constant and in particular does not depend on the
future market state. The second component is the state price e rf qIt;t+1 (n), which can be
estimated from option prices. Finally, the third part is the pricing kernel U
0(c(1))
U 0(c(n)) ; representing
the adjustment for risk aversion in di¤erent states of the market.
One cannot directly apply (3.13) to recover the physical return distribution of an individ-
ual asset from the associated risk-neutral distribution. The reason is that the same value of
the asset return can appear in di¤erent states of the market unless there is perfect correlation
between the asset return and the market return. Given that the pricing kernel U
0(c(1))
U 0(c(n)) is a
function of the market return (xing the initial market value), there is in general no single
U 0(c(1))
U 0(c(n)) that can be used for any particular value of the asset return.
Fortunately, this problem can be resolved through the risk-neutral joint return distribu-
tion of the asset with the market. In particular, one can express the risk-neutral marginal
distribution of the asset return as the sum of its risk-neutral joint probabilities with the
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market return, i.e.,
qt;t+1 (k) =
NX
n=1
q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n)

; 8k:
Then, each of the risk-neutral joint probabilities q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n)

can be ad-
justed for risk aversion by the appropriate value of U
0(c(1))
U 0(c(n)) ; which allows one to recover the
physical joint probabilities. Finally, summing up the physical joint probabilities across all
states of the market yields the physical marginal return distribution of the asset. This is
formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 58 At any time t, the physical distribution of the asset return over one period
head can be recovered as
pt;t+1 (k) =
1

e rf
NX
n=1
q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+ = r
I (n)
 U 0 (c (1))
U 0 (c (n))
; 8k; (3.14)
where  and U
0(c(1))
U 0(c(n)) are uniquely determined from the Ross recovery theorem.
It is clear from Proposition 58 that the key to recovering the physical return distribution
of an individual asset is the risk-neutral joint return distribution of this asset with the market
portfolio. We know from the probability theory that this risk-neutral joint distribution equals
the product of the risk-neutral marginal return distribution of the market and the conditional
return distribution of the asset given the market return, i.e.,
q
 
~rIt;t+1 = r
I (n) ; ~rt;t+1 = r (k)

= qIt;t+1 (n)  (kjn) ; 8n; k: (3.15)
While the former can be obtained from option prices, my approach allows me to estimate
the latter by taking the market portfolio as the related index. Hence, my framework lends
itself naturally to the extension of the Ross recovery theorem to individual assets.
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3.9 Conclusion
In this paper I propose a novel approach to recovering the conditional return distribution of
an individual asset given the return of an aggregate index by regressing the marginal return
distribution of the asset on that of the index. The identifying assumption that underlies this
approach states that the conditional return distribution of the asset given any value of the
index return does not vary over time. Intuitively, this means that the time variation in the
return distribution of the asset is solely driven by the time variation in the return distrib-
ution of the index. This assumption allows me to make use of the time series information
on the marginal return distributions of both securities to pin-down the time-invariant con-
ditional distribution of the asset return given the index return. Empirically, I show how this
approach can be implemented using option prices. I also discuss a variety of applications of
this approach to the cross-sectional test of equity risk premium associated with systematic
disaster risk, to the estimation of banksexposure to systemic shocks, and to the extension
the Ross (2015) recovery theorem to individual assets.
The advantage of my approach is that it generates the entire conditional return distrib-
ution of the asset given the index return, thus accounting for high moment properties and
potential nonlinear patterns of the joint behavior of the two securities. In addition, since the
estimation relies on option prices rather than historical equity returns, it is forward-looking
and reects the e¤ects of rare events even if they do not truly occur within sample. Further,
compared to the copula approach, which is widely used to back out the joint distribution
of multiple random variables from the associated marginals, my approach does not rely on
any parametric assumptions on the security returns, thus allowing for greater exibility.
Yet, unlike some non-parametric procedures which are computationally very expensive, my
approach can be easily implemented by a constrained linear regression.
Future work can be conducted in di¤erent directions. On the methodology side, research
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needs to be done on extending the framework to estimate the joint behavior of potentially
more than two arbitrary economic variables (besides the returns of an asset and an aggregate
index). In terms of applications, this approach can be used to address other important
questions related to risk management and rm cyclicality, etc.
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Appendix A: Proofs for Chapter 1
As a preparation for the formal proof of Theorem 9, we now review the concept of Wronkian,
which is rst introduced by Józef Hoene-Wronski (1812) and named by Thomas Muir (1882).
Let  () = (1 () ; 2 () ;    ; K ()) denote a vector of functions with the k ()s
dened over a real interval   R with at least K   1 nite continuous derivatives. Then
the Wronskian of  at  is dened as
W [] () =

1 () 2 ()    K ()
01 () 
0
2 ()    0K ()

(K 1)
1 () 
(K 1)
2 ()    (K 1)K ()
 :
It is apparent that if  is linearly dependent on ; we have W [] () = 0 for all  2 :
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the reverse does not hold generally. That is, the identical
vanishing of the Wronskian does not imply linear dependence. Bôcher (1900) shows that if
each of the k ()s is a globally analytic function on ; then the vanishing of the Wronskian
implies that  is linearly dependent on . We now extend this result and show in the
following proposition that local analyticity is actually su¢ cient for the vanishing of the
Wronskian to imply linear dependence.
Proposition 59 (Slight generalization of Bôcher (1900)) Suppose that each of the k ()s is
locally analytic. IfW [] () = 0 holds identically on ; then  () = (1 () ; 2 () ;    ; K ())
is linear dependent on .
Proof of Proposition 59: We follow Wolsson (1989) in dening a critical point  of the
set of functions  as a point at which W [] () = 0; and the order of a critical point 
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as the largest positive integer r such that some r  r sub-Wronskian of  is not zero at
: If all sub-Wronskians vanish at  (i.e., k () = 0 8k); the order is dened to be zero.
Apparently, if the maximum order on  is zero, then the k ()s are identically zero, and
it trivially follows that  is linearly dependent. If the maximum order is r0 > 0; which
occurs at 0; then this implies that there is some r0 r0 sub-Wronskian of  that is not equal
to zero at 0: By continuity, the same r0  r0 sub-Wronskian must be non-zero in an open
neighborhood of 0 as well, which we denote by 0. Given that r0 is the maximum order, we
obtain that every point on 0 is of order r0: Theorem 3 of Wolsson (1989) shows that on any
open interval consisting only of critical points of the same order r > 0, the space spanned
by  has dimension r and hence  is linearly dependent. Thus we know that  is linearly
dependent on 0: Namely, there exist c1; c2;    ; cK such that 8 2 0;
g () 
KX
k=1
ckk () = 0: (3.16)
Suppose that  is a maximum open interval containing 0 on which (3.16) holds. If
 = int; then we are done. Suppose not. Then  is a proper subset of int, so there
exists p 2 intn that is a boundary point of : Since each k is locally analytic at p
and there are a nite number of them, we can nd an open interval ~ around p on which
all of the ks are analytic. This in turn implies that g () is analytic on ~: We know that
a non-zero analytic function can only be zero at isolated points. Since g () equals zero on
 \ ~; f () must be identically zero on ~: This contradicts the condition that  is the
maximum open interval on which (3.16) holds. Therefore, we must have  = int; implying
that (3.16) holds on int; and by continuity, on the entire  as well. Hence, we establish
that  is linearly dependent on :
Proof of Theorem 9: (K-fund separation implies (1.3)) The sketch of the proof in the text
shows that when M0 () given by (1.10) is invertible for some value of , a utility function
exhibiting K-fund separation must satisfy (1.3). To prove that (1.3) is necessary, we only
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need to show that (1.3) can be obtained even when M0 () is not invertible for any value of
.
For this purpose, consider multiplying (1.2) by l for l = 0; 1;    ; K; and obtain
lI () =
KX
k=1
lk () fk () ;
where l = 0 corresponds to the basic case explored in the sketch of the proof. Taking
derivatives with respect to  yields0BB@
@[lI()]
@
...
@K[lI()]
@K
1CCA = Ml ()
0B@ f1 ()...
fK ()
1CA ;
where Ml () =
0BB@
@[l1()]
@
   @[
lK()]
@
...
...
@K[l1()]
@K
   @
K[lK()]
@K
1CCA. If any one of the Ml ()s is invertible,
we can follow the same procedures as we did in the sketch of the proof. Specically, we
solve for the fk ()s as functions of I () and its derivatives, and plug them back into (1.2).
Rearranging the terms and evaluating at  = 1 (or any positive value) give us a di¤erential
equation of the form (1.13). Then, solving (1.13) yields I (), which is again given by (1.3).
Suppose that for all l = 0; 1;    ; K; Ml () is not invertible. Notice that Ml () is
the Wronskian of
@[l1()]
@
;
@[l2()]
@
;    ; @[
lK()]
@
: Since the k ()s are locally analytic
functions, we know that the
@[lk()]
@
s are also locally analytic. By Proposition 59, we have
that the
@[lk()]
@
s are linearly dependent. In other words, there exist tl1; t
l
2;    ; tlK not all
equal to zero such that
KX
k=1
tlk
@

lk ()

@
= 0:
Integrating once and dividing by l yield
KX
k=1
tlkk () =
tl0
l
; (3.17)
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for some constant tl0: This gives us K + 1 equations corresponding to l = 0; 1;    ; K: Since
for each of these K + 1 equations, we have the same K factors fk ()gKk=1 on the left hand
side, there must exist p0; p1;    ; pK not all equal to zero such that
KX
l=0
pl
KX
k=1
tlkk () = 0:
By (3.17), this implies that
KX
l=0
pl
tl0
l
= 0:
Since 1; 1

;    ; 1
K
are linearly independent, their linear combination vanishes only if all the
coe¢ cients are equal to zero, i.e., pltl0 = 0 for all l: Since the p
ls are not all equal to zero,
there must be some l for which tl0 = 0: We will show that this cannot happen.
If tl0 were zero, by (3.17) we have
KX
k=1
tlkk () = 0:
Since the tlks are not all equal to zero, take any k
0 2 f1; 2;    ; Kg such that t0k0 6= 0; and we
have
k0 () =  
X
k 6=k0
tlk
tlk0
k () :
Plugging this into (1.2) produces
I () =
X
k 6=k0
k () fk () 
X
k 6=k0
tlk
tlk0
k () fk0 ()
=
X
k 6=k0
k ()

fk ()  t
l
k
tlk0
fk0 ()

:
Thus, we have (no more than) (K   1)-fund separation, with the separating funds being
fk ()   t
l
k
tl
k0
fk0 () for k 6= k0: This contradicts K-fund separation, therefore contradicting
t00 = 0. Hence, we know that t
0
0 6= 0.
Hence, we have proved that we can always nd l 2 f0; 1;    ; Kg such that Ml () is
invertible and consequently (1.3) can be obtained.
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((1.3) impliesK-fund separation) To establish su¢ ciency we need to show that any utility
function u satisfying (1.3) indeed exhibits K-fund separation. In other words, the optimal
consumption portfolio I () can be expressed in the form of (1.2). To this end, we have
I () =
JX
k=1
()k cos (bk log ())Pk;1 (log ()) +
JX
k=1
()k sin (bk log ())Pk;2 (log ())
=
JX
k=1
()k cos (bk log ())
dk;1X
j=0
Ck;1;j (log ())
j
+
JX
k=1
()k sin (bk log ())
dk;2X
j=0
Ck;2;j (log ())
j
=
JX
k=1
()k

cos (bk log ) cos (bk log )
  sin (bk log ) sin (bk log )
 dk;1X
l=0
(log )l
dk;1X
j=l
Ck;1;j

j
l

(log )j l
+
JX
k=1
()k

sin (bk log ) cos (bk log )
+ cos (bk log ) sin (bk log )
 dk;2X
l=0
(log )l
dk;2X
j=l
Ck;2;j

j
l

(log )j l
=
X
fk:bk=0g
dkX
l=0
k;l () fk;l () +
X
fk:bk 6=0g
dkX
l=0


k;1;l
() f
k;1;l
() + 
k;2;l
() f
k;2;l
()

;
where dk = maxi=1;2 (dk;i) and fk;l () ; fk;1;l () ; fk;2;l () ; k;l () ; k;1;l () ; k;2;l () are
given by (1.4)(1.9). Notice that when bk = 0; dk;2 is set to be 0, and hence dk = dk;1:
Proof of Theorem 13: This proof relies on the strict concavity requirement. See Section
1.6 for a detailed discussion.
(1) When K = 1, the class of one-fund separating preferences has
I () = C:
If  > 0; then we need C < 0 to guarantee strict concavity. In this case, I () 2 ( 1; 0) :
Similarly, if  < 0; we need C > 0, in which case we have I () 2 (0;+1) :
(2) When K  2; since I () is a continuous function and  2 (0;+1) is open and
connected, we know that fI () :  > 0g must also be open and connected. This implies that
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fI () :  > 0g is an open interval.
On the other hand, fI () :  > 0g is bounded only if
I () = C;
or
I () =
X
k
[Ck;1 cos (bk log ) + Ck;2 cos (bk log )] ;
where C; fCk;1gk and fCk;2gk are constants. However, strict concavity implies that neither
form is possible (see Proposition 23). Therefore, fI () :  > 0g must be unbounded.
Finally, we need to show that fI () :  > 0g can be any open unbounded interval. To
this end, let us consider a simple case in which K = 2 and
I () = C1
1 + C2
2 ;
for 1 6= 2: Without loss of generality, suppose 1 < 2: Then we have the following three
cases.
Case 1: If 1 = 0 and 2 > 0; then strict concavity implies C2 < 0; and hence, I () 2
( 1; C1) : We can change the value of C1 to obtain any open interval that is bounded from
above but unbounded from below.
Case 2: If 1 < 0 and 2 = 0; then strict concavity implies C1 > 0; and hence, I () 2
(C2;+1) : We can change the value of C2 to obtain any open interval that is bounded from
below but unbounded from above.
Case 3: If 1 < 0 and 2 > 0; then strict concavity implies that C1 > 0 and C2 < 0: In this
case, I () 2 ( 1;+1) :
Proof of Proposition 22: Di¤erentiating (1.36) yields
I 0 () =
KX
k=1
kCk
k 1: (3.18)
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Parts 1 and 2: If 1 6= 0; we can rewrite (3.18) as
I 0 () = 1 1
 
1C1 +
KX
k=2
kCk
k 1
!
:
Since 1 1 > 0, strict concavity requires 8 > 0;
1C1 +
KX
k=2
kCk
k 1 < 0:
As  approaches 0, we obtain
lim
!0
1C1 +
KX
k=2
kCk
k 1 = 1C1:
Hence, we must have 1C1 < 0:
Similarly, if 1 = 0; strict concavity implies 2C2 < 0:
Parts 3 and 4: If K 6= 0; we can rewrite (3.18) as
I 0 () = K 1
 
K 1X
k=1
kCk
k K + KCK
!
;
and strict concavity requires 8 > 0;
K 1X
k=1
kCk
k K + KCK < 0:
As  approaches innity, we obtain
lim
!+1
K 1X
k=1
kCk
k K + KCK = KCK ;
which indicates KCK < 0:
Similarly, if K = 0; strict concavity implies K 1CK 1 < 0:
Proof of Proposition 23: Our goal is to show that in each case we can nd  > 0 such
that I 0 ()  0:
Case 1. This case can be rewritten as
I () =
dX
k=0
Ck (log )
k ;
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where Cd 6= 0 and d  2 is an even number. Taking derivative yields
I 0 () =
dX
k=1
kCk
(log )k 1

:
For all  6= 1, this is equivalent to
I 0 () =
(log )d 2

dX
k=1
kCk (log )
k d+1 :
Since d is even, we have (log )
d 2

> 0: On the other hand, it is easy to verify that if Cd < 0;
lim
!0
dX
k=1
kCk (log )
k d+1 = +1;
and that if Cd > 0;
lim
!+1
dX
k=1
kCk (log )
k d+1 = +1:
This suggests that we can always nd  small or large enough such that I 0 ()  0:
Case 2. This case can be rewritten as
I () =
dX
k=0
Ck
 (log )k ;
where Cd 6= 0,  6= 0; and d is an odd positive integer. Taking derivative yields
I 0 () =  1
 
d 1X
k=0
(Ck + Ck+1 (k + 1)) (log )
k + Cd (log )
d
!
:
For all  6= 1, this is equivalent to
I 0 () =  1 (log )d 1
 
d 1X
k=0
(Ck + Ck+1 (k + 1)) (log )
k d+1 + Cd log 
!
:
Since d is odd, we know  1 (log )d 1 > 0: On the other hand, it is easy to verify that if
Cd < 0;
lim
!0
d 1X
k=0
(Ck + Ck+1 (k + 1)) (log )
k d+1 + Cd log  = +1;
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and that if Cd > 0;
lim
!0
d 1X
k=0
(Ck + Ck+1 (k + 1)) (log )
k d+1 + Cd log  = +1:
Hence, we can always nd  small or large enough such that I 0 ()  0:
Case 3. This case can be rewritten as
I () =
JX
k=1
dkX
l=0
[Ck;1;l cos (bk log ) + Ck;2;l sin (bk log )] 
k (log )l ;
where for any k we have bk 6= 0 and at least one of Ck;1;dk and Ck;2;dk is not zero.
Without loss of generality, we assume 1 < 2 <    < J : Taking derivative yields
I 0 () =
JX
k=1
k 18>>><>>>:
dk 1X
l=0

(Ck;1;lk + Ck;2;lbk + Ck;1;l+1 (l + 1)) cos (bk log )
  (Ck;1;lbk   Ck;2;lk   Ck;2;l+1 (l + 1)) sin (bk log )

(log )l
+

(Ck;1;dkk + Ck;2;dkbk) cos (bk log )
  (Ck;1;dkbk   Ck;2;dkk) sin (bk log )

(log )dk
9>>>=>>>; :
For all  6= 1, this is equivalent to
I 0 () = J 1
JX
k=1
k J (log )dk8>>><>>>:
dk 1X
l=0

(Ck;1;lk + Ck;2;lbk + Ck;1;l+1 (l + 1)) cos (bk log )
  (Ck;1;lbk   Ck;2;lk   Ck;2;l+1 (l + 1)) sin (bk log )

(log )l dk
+

(Ck;1;dkk + Ck;2;dkbk) cos (bk log )
  (Ck;1;dkbk   Ck;2;dkk) sin (bk log )

9>>>=>>>; :
It is easy to verify that
lim
!+1
I 0 () = lim
!+1
J 1 (log )dJ

(CJ;1;dJJ + CJ;2;dJ bJ) cos (bJ log )
  (CJ;1;dJ bJ   CJ;2;dJJ) sin (bJ log )

;
which apparently does not converge due to the cyclicality of cos () and sin () : In fact, I 0 ()
switches between positive and negative values as  approaches innity. Therefore, we can
always nd  such that I 0 ()  0:
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Appendix B: Proofs, Derivations and
Discussions for Chapter 2
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 30: We need to show that for any random returns ~z1 and ~z2; and
any 0 <  < 1,
wk (~z1 + (1  ) ~z2)  wk (~z1) + (1  )wk (~z2) : (3.19)
Letting z^1 = ~z1   E (~z1) and z^2 = ~z2   E (~z2) ; (3.19) can be rewritten as
E
h
(z^1 + (1  ) z^2)k
i 1
k    E z^k1 1k + (1  )  E z^k2 1k : (3.20)
Applying the binomial formula to the LHS of (3.20) implies that we need to show 
kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i E  z^k i1 z^i2
! 1
k
   E z^k1 1k + (1  )  E z^k2 1k :
Since k is even, replacing each z^1 and z^2 with jz^1j and jz^2j will not a¤ect the RHS, but it
might increase the LHS. So, it is su¢ cient to show that 
kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i E  z^k i1 z^i2
! 1
k
 

E
h
jz^1jk
i 1
k
+ (1  )

E
h
jz^2jk
i 1
k
:
Since both sides are positive we can raise both sides to the kth power, maintaining the
inequality. Thus, it would be su¢ cient to show
kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i E  z^k i1 z^i2  E hjz^1jki 1k + (1  )E hjz^2jki 1kk :
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Applying the binomial formula to the RHS implies that it would be su¢ cient to show
kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i E  z^k i1 z^i2  kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i

E
h
jz^1jk
i k i
k

E
h
jz^2jk
i i
k
:
To establish this inequality we will show that it actually holds term by term. That is, it
is su¢ cient to show that for each i = 0; :::; k;
E
 z^k i1 z^i2  E hjz^1jki k ik E hjz^2jki ik :
To see this, note that it is equivalent to show that
E
 z^k i1 z^i2  E hz^k i1  kk ii k ik E hz^i2 ki i ik :
But, this is immediate from Hölders inequality, and we are done.
Proof of Proposition 33: For any integer k  2; we can rewrite the downside risk measure
as
DRk (~z) = ( 1)k

E
 
[~z   E (~z)] k 1k = E  [E (~z)  ~z]+k 1k ;
where [t]+ = max (t; 0) for t 2 R:
Consider any two random returns ~z1 and ~z2; and let z^1 = [E (~z1)  ~z1]+ and z^2 =
[E (~z2)  ~z2]+ : Obviously, we have z^1  0 and z^2  0: What we need to show is that for any
0 <  < 1,
E
 
[E (~z1 + (1  ) ~z2)  ~z1   (1  ) ~z2]+
k 1k    E  z^k1 1k + (1  )  E  z^k2 1k :
Now,
[E (~z1 + (1  ) ~z2)  ~z1   (1  ) ~z2]+ = [ (E (~z1)  ~z1) + (1  ) (E (~z2)  ~z2)]+
  [E (~z1)  ~z1]+ + (1  ) [E (~z2)  ~z2]+
= z^1 + (1  ) z^2;
where the inequality follows from Jensens inequality using that []+ is a convex function.
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Therefore, it is su¢ cient to show that
E (z^1 + (1  ) z^2)k
 1
k    E  z^k1 1k + (1  )  E  z^k2 1k :
The rest of the proof follows closely the proof of Proposition 30. Indeed, since z^1 and z^2 are
non-negative here, the arguments in the proof of Proposition 30 apply in this case to any
positive k (odd or even).
Proof of Proposition 36: In the denition of expected shortfall we assumed the existence
of a cumulative distribution function F () applied to realizations of random variables. For
the sake of this proof it will be more useful to work directly with the state space 
 and with
the underlying probability measure P () : We rst prove that ES(~z) is subadditive. That
is, for any two random returns ~z1 and ~z2;
ES(~z1 + ~z2)  ES(~z1) + ES(~z2): (3.21)
If either ~z1 or ~z2 is equal to a constant with probability 1, then the result is immediate. We
shall thus only consider the case in which both of them are not equal to a constant. By
(2.3), for any random return ~z (which is not constant), ES (~z) can be expressed as
ES (~z) =  1

Z
f!:~z VaR(~z)g
~zdP (!) :
Let ~z1 and ~z2 be random returns and dene ~z3 = ~z1 + ~z2: Let 
i = f! 2 
 : ~zi   VaR (~zi)g
for i = 1; 2; 3: Then, (3.21) is equivalent toZ

3
~z3dP (!) 
Z

1
~z1dP (!) +
Z

2
~z2dP (!) ;
which can be rewritten asZ

3
~z1dP (!) +
Z

3
~z2dP (!) 
Z

1
~z1dP (!) +
Z

2
~z2dP (!) :
It is su¢ cient to show that Z

3
~z1dP (!) 
Z

1
~z1dP (!) ; (3.22)
158
and Z

3
~z2dP (!) 
Z

2
~z2dP (!) : (3.23)
For brevity, we will only prove (3.22). The proof of (3.23) is parallel.
Dene

4 = f! 2 
 : ~z1   VaR (~z1) ; ~z3   VaR (~z3)g ;

5 = f! 2 
 : ~z1   VaR (~z1) ; ~z3 >  VaR (~z3)g ; and

6 = f! 2 
 : ~z1 >  VaR (~z1) ; ~z3   VaR (~z3)g :
Clearly, 
4 \ 
5 = ?; 
4 [ 
5 = 
1; 
4 \ 
6 = ?; and 
4 [ 
6 = 
3: Thus,Z

1
dP (!) =
Z

4
dP (!) +
Z

5
dP (!) ;
and Z

3
dP (!) =
Z

4
dP (!) +
Z

6
dP (!) :
By the denition of VaR, we knowZ

1
dP (!) =
Z

3
dP (!) = :
Thus, we obtain Z

5
dP (!) =
Z

6
dP (!) : (3.24)
Similarly, we have Z

1
~z1dP (!) =
Z

4
~z1dP (!) +
Z

5
~z1dP (!) ;
and Z

3
~z1dP (!) =
Z

4
~z1dP (!) +
Z

6
~z1dP (!) :
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Hence, Z

1
~z1dP (!) 
Z

3
~z1dP (!)
=
Z

5
~z1dP (!) 
Z

6
~z1dP (!)

Z

5
[ VaR (~z1)] dP (!) 
Z

6
[ VaR (~z1)] dP (!)
=  VaR (~z1)
Z

5
dP (!) 
Z

6
dP (!)

= 0;
where the inequality follows from ~z1   VaR (~z1) when ! 2 
5 and ~z1 >  VaR (~z1) when
! 2 
6; and where the last equality follows from (3.24). Therefore, (3.22) is obtained, and
hence ES(~z) is subadditive. Since DES(~z) = ES(~z) + E(~z) we have that DES is also
subadditive.
Convexity now follows immediately from homogeneity of degree 1 and subadditivity.
Proof of Theorem 39: Our setting is a special case of the setting in Nielsen (1989).
To show the existence of equilibrium Nielsen requires that preferences satisfy the following
three conditions: (i) each investors choice set is closed and convex, and contains her initial
endowment; (ii) The set of f 2 Rn+1 : U j ()  U j ( 0)g is closed for all  0 2 Rn+1 and for
all j = f1; :::; `g; (iii) If ;  0 2 Rn+1 and U j ( 0) > U j () ; then U j(t 0 + (1  t)) > U j()
for all t in (0; 1).
Condition (i) is satised in our setting since the choice set of each investor is Rn+1, which
is closed and convex, and contains ej for all j. Condition (ii) holds since V is assumed
continuous and R is assumed smooth, and so their composition is continuous. Condition
(iii) follows since V () is quasi-concave, strictly increasing in its rst argument and strictly
decreasing in its second argument, and R () is a convex risk measure.
Given these properties of the preferences, Nielsen (1989) establishes two conditions as
su¢ cient for the existence of a quasi-equilibrium: (i) positive semi-independence of directions
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of improvement, and (ii) non-satiation at Pareto attainable portfolios. Condition (i) follows
in our setting as in Nielsen (1990, Proposition 1) since in our setting all investors agree on
all parameters of the problem (in particular on the expected returns), and due to the non-
redundancy of risky assets assumption. To see why condition (ii) holds in our setting note
that we assume the existence of a risk-free asset paying a non-zero payo¤ with probability
1. Since R () satises the risk-free property, we have that R (~z1 + ~z2)  R (~z1) whenever ~z2
is risk-free with P (f~z2 > 0g) = 1. Thus, adding a positive risk-free asset can only (weakly)
reduce risk. It follows that we can always add this positive risk-free asset to any bundle
, strictly increasing the expected return while weakly decreasing risk. This implies that
in our model there is no satiation globally. Thus, a quasi-equilibrium exists in our setting.
Moreover, any quasi-equilibrium is, in fact, an equilibrium in our setting. This follows from
the conditions in Nielsen (1989 p. 469). Indeed, in our setting each investors choice set
is convex and unbounded, and the set f 2 Rn+1 : U j () > U j ( 0)g is open for all j and
 0 2 Rn+1:
Proof of Theorem 40: Suppose that the equilibrium bundle of investor j is j: Let xj =Pn
i=0 x
j
i = p  j be the total dollar amount of investment of investor j: Then,
U j
 
j

= V j
 
E
 
nX
i=0
ji ~yi
!
; R
 
nX
i=0
ji ~yi
!!
(3.25)
= V j
 
xjE
 
nX
i=0
ji
xj
~yi
!
; R
 
xj
nX
i=0
ji
xj
~yi
!!
= V j
 
xjE
 
nX
i=0
jipi
xj
~yi
pi
!
; R
 
xj
nX
i=0
jipi
xj
~yi
pi
!!
= V j
 
xjE
 
nX
i=0
xji
xj
~zi
!
; R
 
xj
nX
i=0
xji
xj
~zi
!!
= V j
 
xjE
 
nX
i=0
ji ~zi
!
; R
 
xj
nX
i=0
ji ~zi
!!
= V j
 
xjE
 
j  ez ; R  xj  j  ez :
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From the denition of equilibrium, each investor chooses j to maximize U j
 
j

subject to
xj  p ej; where by the positivity of prices xj = p ej > 0 (using that ej 2 Rn+1+ is not zero
by assumption). From (3.25) and since V j is strictly increasing in the rst argument and
strictly decreasing in the second argument, we have that for any positive xj; U j
 
j

is strictly
increasing in E (j  ez) and strictly decreasing in R (xj (j  ez)) : Therefore, in equilibrium,
j must minimize R (xj (  ez)) for a given level of expected return E (j  ez) : By scaling
independence, this is equivalent to minimizing R (  ez) for a given level of expected return,
and thus, to solving Problem (2.7). The solution is unique since we assumed that R () is a
convex risk measure, and so R (  ez) is convex as a function of :
Proof of Theorem 44: By the smoothness of R () and by Theorem 39, the solution to
Problem (2.7) for some j =  is determined by the rst order conditions. To solve this
program, form the Lagrangian
L () = R ()  
 
nX
i=1
iE (~zi) +
 
1 
nX
i=1
i
!
rf   
!
;
where  is a Lagrange multiplier. Equivalently,
L () = R
 
1 
nX
i=1
i; 1; :::; n
!
  
 
nX
i=1
iE (~zi) +
 
1 
nX
i=1
i
!
rf   
!
:
The rst order condition states that for all i = 1; :::; n;
 R0 () +Ri ()   (E (~zi)  rf ) = 0; (3.26)
where  is any e¢ cient portfolio (the market portfolio being a special case). By the risk-free
property, R0 () = 0: Hence,
Ri (
) =  (E (~zi)  rf ) : (3.27)
It follows that
nX
i=1
iRi (
) = 
nX
i=1
i (E (~zi)  rf ) (3.28)
=  (E (ez )  rf ) :
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From (3.27) and (3.28) we obtain
Ri (
)Pn
h=1 

hRh (
)
=
E (~zi)  rf
E (ez )  rf ;
as required. If R is homogeneous of degree k, then by Eulers homogeneous function theorem
and using the risk-free property this is also equivalent to
Ri (
)
kR ()
=
E (~zi)  rf
E (ez )  rf :
Proof of Theorem 49: The proof relies on a mapping between risk allocation problems as
dened in Section 2.5.1 and cost allocation problems as dened in Billera and Heath (1982,
hereafter BH). Specically, BH dene a cost allocation problem of order n as a pair (h;x)
where h : Rn+ ! R is continuously di¤erentiable and h (0) = 0: Since R is smooth and
satises R (0) = 0 we can view any risk allocation problem, (R;x) ; of order n; as a cost
allocation problem as dened in BH by setting h (x) = R (x  ez) : Given this mapping we will
use (R;x) to denote both the risk allocation problem and its corresponding cost allocation
problem. BH dene a cost allocation procedure as a function assigning each cost allocation
problem (R;x) of order n a vector c (R;x) 2 Rn: That is, c (R;x) should be interpreted as
the cost allocated to each of the n goods or services.
We can then consider a natural mapping between systematic risk measures as dened in
Section 2.5.1 and the BH cost allocation procedures as follows. If BR (x) is a systematic risk
measure of the risk allocation problem (R;x) ; then
c (R;x) =
BR (x)R (x  ez)
x
(3.29)
is a cost allocation procedure for the corresponding cost allocation problem (R;x) : Namely,
risk allocation measures can be viewed as scaled versions of cost allocation procedures for
the corresponding problems.
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Lemma 60 If a systematic risk measure BR (x) satises Axioms 1-4, then the corresponding
cost allocation procedure c (R;x) satises Conditions (2.1)-(2.4) in BH.
It is important to note that Axioms 1-4 and Conditions (2.1)-(2.4) in BH are not equiv-
alent to each other either as a group or individually. Rather, our four axioms as a set are
stronger than their four conditions as a set. The proof of this lemma follows from the next
four steps.
Step 1. Axiom 1 is satised if and only if Condition (2.1) in BH holds. Indeed,
Pn
i=1 iBRi (x) =
1 is equivalent to
Pn
i=1
xiR(x)BRi (x)
x
= R (x) ; which using (3.29) is equivalent to
Pn
i=1 xici (R;x) =
R (x) : This is Condition (2.1).
Step 2. Axiom 2 is satised if and only if Condition (2.2) in BH holds. Indeed, suppose
R () = R1 () +R2 () and
BRi (x) =
R1 (x)
R (x)
BR1i (x) +
R2 (x)
R (x)
BR2i (x) :
Then
BRi (x)R (x)
x
=
R1 (x)BR1i (x)
x
+
R2 (x)BR2i (x)
x
:
That is,
ci (R;x) = ci
 
R1;x

+ ci
 
R2;x

;
which is Condition (2.2).
Step 3. Axioms 1 and 3 jointly imply Condition (2.3).
Assume that both Axioms 1 and 3 are satised and assume that for all  2 Rn+;
R (  ez) = g (  q) (3.30)
for some function g () and a non-zero vector q 2 Rn+: Then, (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-perfectly
correlated.
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By Axiom 3 for all i; j = 1; :::; n;
qjBRi (x) = qiBRj (x) ; (3.31)
and hence
iqjBRi (x) = iqiBRj (x) :
Summing over i = 1; :::; n gives
qj
nX
i=1
iBRi (x) = (  q)BRj (x) : (3.32)
By Axiom 1 we know that
Pn
i=1 iBRi (x) = 1: Plugging this into (3.32) we have
qj = (  q)BRj (x) for j = 1; :::; n:
By (3.29), and recalling that R (x) 6= 0;
qj = (  q) cj (R;x) x
R (x)
= (x  q) cj (R;x)
R (x)
for j = 1; :::; n: (3.33)
If x q = 0 this implies that qj = 0 for all j; contradicting that q is a non-zero vector. Hence,
x  q is not zero. We then have
cj (R;x) =
qjR (x)
(x  q) for all j = 1; ::; n: (3.34)
Consider an asset with return ~w = xez
xq : Namely, investing x q dollars in this asset yields
the same return as of the portfolio x: Then,
R ((x  q) ~w) = R (x  ez) = g (x  q) :
Consider now the risk allocation problem of order 1 with the single asset ~w held at the
amount x  q: By Axiom 1 the systematic risk measure of this asset must satisfy
BR (x  q) = 1;
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or equivalently using (3.29),
c (g;x  q) = R ((x  q) ~w)
x  q =
g (x  q)
x  q :
Plugging back into (3.34) and using that R (x) = g (x  q) we have
cj (R;x) = c (g;x  q) qj:
This is exactly what Condition (2.3) in BH requires, restricting attention to the case that q
is a non-zero vector of non-negative integers.
Step 4. Axiom 4 is satised if and only if Condition (2.4) holds. This follows directly from
(3.29) and the denition of R-positive correlation.
Having established Lemma 60 we now turn to completing the proof of the theorem.
First, existence has been proved in the text by showing that (2.19) satises Axioms 1-4.
To show uniqueness note that Lemma 60 implies that Axioms 1-4 are jointly stronger than
Conditions (2.1)-(2.4) in BH. From BHs main result we know that there is a unique cost
allocation procedure c (R;x) satisfying Conditions (2.1)-(2.4). It follows (using the mapping
(3.29)) that there is a unique systematic risk measure satisfying Axioms 1-4. Thus, the
unique systematic risk measure is given by (2.19).
Finally, to see that (2.19) and (2.20) are equivalent when R is homogeneous of degree k;
note rst that in this caseZ 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt = Ri (x1; :::; xn)
Z 1
0
tk 1dt
=
Ri (x1; :::; xn)
k
;
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where the rst equality follows since Ri is homogeneous of degree k   1: It follows that
BRi (x) =
x
R 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
=
xRi (x1; :::; xn)
kR (x1; :::; xn)
=
xRi (x1; :::; xn)
kR (x1; :::; xn)
=
Ri (1; :::; n)
kR (1; :::; n)
=
Ri (1; :::; n)Pn
h=1 hRh (1; :::; n)
;
where the penultimate equality follows from the homogeneity of degrees k and k 1 of R and
Ri respectively, and the last equality follows from Eulers homogeneous function theorem.
This completes the proof of Theorem 49.
Derivations of Systematic Risk for Applications IV
Here we provide derivations of the systematic risk associated with di¤erent risk measures
discussed in Section 2.4.3.
Application I: This is a special case of Application II.
Application II: Consider the risk measure R (~z) = mk (~z) for even k  2: The risk of the
market portfolio is
R
 
M  ez = mk  M  ez = E  M  ez  E  M  ezk :
Di¤erentiating with respect to the weight of asset i yields
@mk
 
M  ez
@Mi
= kE
h
(~zi   E (~zi))
 
M  ez  E  M  ezk 1i
= kCov

~zi;

M  ez M  E (ez)k 1 :
167
By Theorem 44, and since mk () is homogeneous of degree k; the systematic risk is then
given by
BRi =
@mk(M ez)
@Mi
kmk (M  ez) =
Cov

~zi;

M  ez M  E (ez)k 1
mk (M  ez) ; (3.35)
as required.
Now suppose alternatively that R (~z) = wk (~z) : The market portfolio risk is
R
 
M  ez = wk  M  ez =  mk  M  ez 1k :
Di¤erentiating with respect to the weight of asset i gives
@wk
 
M  ez
@Mi
=
1
k
 
mk
 
M  ez 1k 1 @mk  M  ez
@Mi
:
By Theorem 44, and since wk () is homogeneous of degree 1, the systematic risk is
BRi =
1
k
 
mk
 
M  ez 1k 1 @mk(M ez)
@Mi
(mk (M  ez)) 1k =
@mk(M ez)
@Mi
kmk (M  ez) ;
which is identical to (3.35).
Application III: Assume R (~z) = DRk (~z) for k  2: The risk of the market portfolio M
is given by
DRk
 
M  ez = ( 1)k EM  ez  E  M  ez k 1k :
Di¤erentiating with respect to Mi gives
7
@DRk
 
M  ez
@Mi
= ( 1)k

E

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1k 1 E (~zi   E (~zi))M  ez  E  M  ez k 1
= ( 1)k

E

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1k 1 Cov ~zi;M  ez  E  M  ez k 1 :
7Note that we are essentially relying here on Leibnizs rule for di¤erentiation under the integral. While
M  z  E  M  ez k is not everywhere di¤erentiable, it is continuous and di¤erentiable almost every-
where. This guarantees that Leibnizs rule applies.
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By Theorem 44, and since DRk () is homogeneous of degree 1, the systematic risk is given
by
BRi =
@DRk(M ez)
@Mi
DRk (M  ez)
=
Cov

~zi;

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1
E
 
[M  ez  E (M  ez)] k
= ( 1)k
Cov

~zi;

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1
(DRk (M  ez))k :
Application IV: Assume R (~z) = DES (~z) for some condence level 0 <  < 1: Let
f(z1; :::; zn) denote the joint density function of ez: Since all risky assets have positive net
supply and since asset prices are positive, we have M1 > 0: Hence, the risk of the market
portfolio M can be written as follows
DES(
M  ez)
= ES(
M  ez) + E  M  ez
=  1

Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
 
nX
j=1
Mj zj   E
 
M  ez! f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn:
Di¤erentiating DES(M  ez) using Leibnizs rule with respect to Mi yields
@DES(
M  ez)
@Mi
(3.36)
=  1

Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
(zi   E (~zi)) f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn
+
VaR(
M  ez) + E  M  ez

@
@Mi

0@Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn
1A :
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Notice that by the denition of VaR(M  ez);
Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn = ;
which is a constant, implying that the second term in (3.36) is zero. Thus,
@DES(
M  ez)
@Mi
=  1

Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
(zi   E (~zi)) f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn
=  1

E

1M ez VaR(M ez) (zi   E (~zi))
=  E ~zi   E (~zi) jM  ez   VaR(M  ez) :
By Theorem 44, and since DES(M ez) is homogeneous of degree 1, the systematic risk
is given by
BRi =
@DES(
M ez)
@Mi
DES(M  ez) =  E

~zi   E (~zi) jM  ez   VaR(M  ez)
DES(M  ez) :
Application V: Consider the following family of risk measures
R (~z) = 1w2 (~z) + 2DR3 (~z) + 3w4 (~z) + 4DES (~z)
for some condence level  and non-negative weights 1; :::; 4. From Lemma 28, this family
of risk measures satises all of the conditions in Theorem 44. Moreover, it is easy to verify
that when
R (~z) =
sX
j=1
Rj (~z) ;
the expression for BRi given in (2.10) implies
BRi =
sX
j=1
Rj
 
M  ez
R (M  ez) BRji :
That is, the systematic risk takes the form of the risk-weighted average of the systematic risk
associated with each of the risk components. (See also Section 2.5.1 for further discussion of
this issue as it relates to Axiom 2 in that section.)
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Discussions
Mean-Risk Preferences and Expected Utility
Background
One would wonder how the mean-risk preferences considered in Section 2.4 are related to
the commonly assumed von Neumann-Morgenstern utility. It is widely known that a von
Neumann-Morgenstern investor with a quadratic utility function only cares about the mean
and the variance of his investments in the sense that he prefers a high expected wealth and
a low variance. In this sense, the mean-risk preference is consistent with the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility when variance is used as the risk measure. Alternatively, when returns
are distributed according to a two-parameter elliptical distribution (normal being a special
case), mean-variance preferences can also be supported by expected utility. These instances,
however, are quite restrictive. First, the quadratic utility is not very intuitive since it implies
increasing absolute risk aversion. Second, elliptical distributions, being determined by the
rst two moments only, limit our ability to describe the dependence of risk on high distribu-
tion moments and other risk characteristics. Thus, in general, mean-variance preferences are
not consistent with expect utility. The approach taken in this paper is much more general,
allowing for a variety of risk measures. Whether a particular risk measure is consistent with
expected utility depends on the actual choice of the risk measure. For example, risk measures
that are simple linear combinations of raw moments up to the kth degree can be represented
by a kth degree polynomial (Müller and Machina (1987)), generalizing the mean-variance
result.
While in general the preferences dened in (2.6) cannot be supported by expected utility,
they are often consistent with expected utility locally. The idea is based on Machinas
(1982) Local Utility Function.To facilitate this approach we rst restrict attention to risk
measures that depend on the distribution of the random variables only. Thus, we consider
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risk measures that are functions from the distribution of realizations to the reals rather than
functions from the random variables themselves. Practically, this does not present a binding
restriction since all the examples in this paper and all standard risk measures only rely on
the distribution of realizations anyway. In this case the preferences in (2.6) can be written
as
U () = V (E (Fey) ; R (Fey)) ;
where Fey is the cumulative distribution of the random variable   ey: When the random
variable of interest is clear, we will omit it from the notation and write the utility as U (F ) =
V (E (F ) ; R (F )) :
According to Machina (1982), if the realizations of all random variables are contained
in some bounded and closed interval I and U (F ) is Fréchet di¤erentiable with respect to
the L1 norm,8 then for any two distributions F1; F2 on I there exists u (;F1) di¤erentiable
almost everywhere on I such that
U (F2)  U (F1) =
Z
I
u (y;F1) dF2 (y) 
Z
I
u (y;F1) dF1 (y) + o (kF2   F1k) ; (3.37)
where kk denotes the L1 norm. That is, starting from a wealth distribution F1; if an
investor moves to another closedistribution F2, then he compares the utility from these
two distributions as if he is maximizing his expected utility with a local utility function
u (;F1) :
The key to applying Machinas result is to nd su¢ cient conditions on the risk measure
which guarantee that U (F ) is Fréchet di¤erentiable. This can be done in many ways. Next
we provide one simple but e¤ective approach which is su¢ cient to validate many popular
risk measures as consistent with local expected utility.
8Fréchet di¤erentiability is an innite dimensional version of di¤erentiability. The idea here is that U (F )
changes smoothly with F; where changes in F are topologized using the L1 norm. See Luenberger (1969, p.
171).
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Risk Measures as Functions of Moments
Let Fk =
R
ykdF (y) be the kth rawmoment given distribution F; andmFk =
R  
y   F1
k
dF (y)
be the kth central moment given distribution F: Consider risk measures which are a func-
tion of a nite number of (raw or central) moments. We denote such risk measures by
R
 
Fj1 ; :::; 
F
jl
;mFk1 ; :::;m
F
kn

. We assume that R is di¤erentiable in all arguments. The utility
function in (2.6) then takes the form
U (F ) = V
 
F1 ; R
 
Fj1 ; :::; 
F
jl
;mFk1 ; :::;m
F
kn

; (3.38)
where V is di¤erentiable in both mean and risk. This class of utility functions is quite general
and it allows the risk measure to depend on a large number of high distribution moments.
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 61 If U (F ) takes the form (3.38) then for any two distributions F1; F2 on I
there exists u (;F1) di¤erentiable almost everywhere on I such that (3.37) holds.
Proof: We need to show that U (F ) is Fréchet di¤erentiable. By the chain rule for Fréchet
di¤erentiability (Luenberger (1969, p. 176)), we know that if both Fk and m
F
k are Fréchet
di¤erentiable for any k; then so is U () : The Fréchet di¤erentiability of Fk is obvious, since
F2k   F1k =
Z
I
ykdF2 (y) 
Z
I
ykdF1 (y) =  k
Z
I
(F2 (y)  F1 (y)) yk 1dy:
Now we show that mFk is Fréchet di¤erentiable. We have
mFk =
Z  
y   F1
k
dF (y)
=
Z kX
i=0
k!
i! (k   i)!y
i
 
F1
k i
dF (y)
=
kX
i=0
k!
i! (k   i)!
 
F1
k i Z
yidF (y)
=
kX
i=0
k!
i! (k   i)!
 
F1
k i
Fi ;
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which is a di¤erentiable function of the Fi s. By the chain rule, it follows immediately that
mFk is also Fréchet di¤erentiable. This completes the proof.
Su¢ cient Conditions for Positive Prices
Here we provide a su¢ cient condition for the positivity of equilibrium prices following the
approach of Nielsen (1992). Let  2 Rn+1 be a bundle. Denote the gradient of investor
js utility function at  by rUj () = (U j0 () ; :::; U jn ()), where a subscript designates a
partial derivative in the direction of the ith asset. Also, let j () =  V j2 (E(ey);R(ey))
V j1 (E(ey);R(ey)) > 0
be the marginal rate of substitution of the expected payo¤ of the bundle for the risk of the
bundle. This is the slope of investor j0s indi¤erence curve in the expected payo¤-risk space.
For brevity we often omit the arguments of this expression and use j () =  V j2
V j1
:
Proposition 62 Assume that for each asset i there is some investor j such that E(~yi) >
j ()Ri (  ey) for all . Then, prices of all assets are positive in all equilibria.
Proof: At an equilibrium, all investorsgradients point in the direction of the price vector.
So the price of asset i must be positive in any equilibrium if there is some investor j such
that U ji () > 0 for all : Recall that
U j () = V j (E (  ey) ; R (  ey)) :
Thus,
U ji () = V
j
1 E(~yi) + V
j
2 Ri (  ey)
= V j1 [E(~yi)  j ()Ri (  ey)];
where Ri (  ey) denotes the partial derivative of R (  ey) with respect to  i:
Since V j1 > 0, U
j
i () > 0 corresponds to
E(~yi)  j ()Ri (  ey) > 0;
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as required.
Note that j () can serve as a measure of risk aversion for investor j. We can thus
interpret this proposition as follows. If each assets expected return is su¢ ciently high
relative to some investors risk aversion and the marginal contribution of the asset to total
risk, then this asset will always be desirable by some investor, and so, its price will be positive
in any equilibrium.
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Appendix C: Proofs and Discussions
for Chapter 3
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 52: At time t; the risk-neutral conditional probability of ~rt;t+1 = r (k)
given ~rIt;t+1 = r
I (n) is
q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) j~rIt;t+1 = rI (n)

=
q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n)

qIt;t+1 (n)
: (3.39)
By Assumption 51, the variation in the index return is the only priced risk. Thus, there
exists a stochastic discount factor, whose value related to future payo¤s depends on the
future value of the index return only. Let
 
t;t+1 (1) ; t;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; t;t+1 (N)

denote the
stochastic discount factor evaluated at time t related to payo¤s to be received in di¤erent
states of the index return at time t+ 1: This allows one to convert risk-neutral probabilities
to physical probabilities. In particular, we have
q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n)

= erf t;t+1 (n) p
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n)

; (3.40)
and
qIt;t+1 (n) = e
rf t;t+1 (n) p
I
t;t+1 (n) : (3.41)
Plugging (3.40) and (3.41) into (3.39) yields
q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) j~rIt;t+1 = rI (n)

=
p
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n)

pIt;t+1 (n)
=  (kjn) ;
as claimed.
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Proof of Proposition 57: This proof relies on Theorem 2 of Liew (1976), which speaks
about the estimates from a inequality-constrained least squares regression. The theorem
says that when the inequality constraints are not binding with respect to the true parameter
values, the estimates from the original inequality-constrained regression are equal to the
estimates from the same regression without the inequality constraints when the sample size
becomes large enough.
To prove the consistency of ^T ; I consider two possible cases.
Case 1 : Suppose that 0 <  (kjn) < 1 for all n and k:
According to Theorem 2 of Liew (1976), when the sample size T is large enough, ^T is
equal to the coe¢ cient estimates obtained from the following least squares linear regression
problem with the equality constraint only
Q = QI   + ; (3.42)
s:t:
  1K1 = 1N1:
The exact formula for the equality-constrained least squares estimator can be found in
Amemiya (1985) page 21. Since the equality constraint holds with respect to the true
parameter values, it is standard to prove that under Assumptions 54 to 56, the equality-
constrained least squares estimator is consistent. (The proof is similar to the proof for the
consistency of the OLS estimator, and hence I omit it here for brevity.) Since ^T is equal to
a consistent estimator when the sample size is large enough, ^T itself is also consistent.
Case 2 : Suppose that the inequality constraint 0   (kjn)  1 is binding at one end with
respect to the true parameter values for some n and k. Without loss of generality, consider
a simplest case in which  (1j1) = 0 and 0 <  (kjn) < 1 for all other pairs of n and k: The
proofs for other cases are parallel.
Let ^T (1j1) denote the estimate of  (1j1) obtained from the least squares regression
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problem (3.8) corresponding to a sample with size T: The inequality constraint implies
^T (1j1)  0: Then, for each T > 0 I have the following two subcases.
Subcase 2.1 : Suppose that ^T (1j1) > 0: In this scenario, ^T is equal to the coe¢ cient
estimates obtained from the following constrained least squares regression
Q = QI   + ;
s:t:
  1K1 = 1N1;
  1NK ;
 (kjn)  0; 8n; k unless n = k = 1:
Notice that the inequality constraint  (1j1)  0 can be dropped because it is not binding
(^T (1j1) > 0) and because I have a convex problem (convex objective function and compact
domain). Theorem 2 of Liew (1976) indicates that when T is large enough, ^T is equal to
the equality-constrained least squares estimator obtained from (3.42), which converges to
the true parameter values  when the sample size approaches innity.
Subcase 2.2 : Suppose that ^T (1; 1) = 0: In this scenario, ^T is equal to the coe¢ cient
estimates obtained from the following constrained least squares regression
Q = QI   + ;
s:t:
  1K1 = 1N1;
 (1j1) = 0;
  1NK ;
 (kjn)  0; 8n; k unless n = k = 1:
According to Theorem 2 of Liew (1976), when T is large enough, ^T is equal to the coef-
cient estimates obtained from conducting the following regression problem with equality
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constraints only
Q = QI   + ;
s:t:
  1K1 = 1N1;
 (1j1) = 0:
As in Case 1, since the equality constraints hold with respect to the true parameter values,
the estimator from this equality-constrained problem converges to  when the sample size
approaches innity.
The analyses of the above two subcases show that in Case 2, the sequence of estimatorsn
^T
o
T
can be viewed as consisting of two subsequences (each corresponding to one of the
two subcases), both of which converge to the same true parameter values  as the sample
size approaches innity. Therefore, the sequence
n
^T
o
T
as a whole must also converge to :
Cases 1 and 2 together complete the proof.
Discussions
As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, two technical issues need to be dealt with for the empirical
estimation of the asset return distribution qt;t+1.
First, the estimation of the risk-neutral CDF (3.5) relies on di¤erentiating the option price
with respect to the strike price. Unfortunately, we are generally not able to obtain a close-
form expression for this derivative. To resolve this issue, I resort to a linear approximation
based on two points X  and X+ around the strike price X of interest, i.e.,
F (X)  erf Put (X
+)  Put (X )
X+  X  :
For all empirical applications in the paper, I choose X  and X+ to be $0.01 to the left and
right of X:
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A second empirical challenge has to do with obtaining European option prices. Nearly
all individual stock options are American options. While indices are typically represented
by European options, the market option prices are only available at discrete values of the
strike price and time to maturity. Thus, reasonable estimates are needed for European
option prices at any arbitrary point of interest. In the empirical applications, I adopt a
simple and commonly used approach in the literature (e.g., Shimko (1993), Malz (1997),
and Figlewski (2010)) of rst tting the implied volatility surface and then deriving the
option prices using the tted volatility. Specically, I start with the implied volatility of
all available options written on the asset on the date of estimation. Information on the
implied volatility is provided by the OptionMetrics database, which is computed by the
BMS model for European options and by the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) model (Cox, Ross
and Rubinstein (1979)) for American options. I then t the implied volatility surface for a
range of strike prices and maturities of interest based on the implied volatility of available
options. Finally, I plug the tted volatility at any particular point back into the BMS pricing
model to obtain an estimation of the European option price.
I t the implied volatility surface by kernel smoothing using a procedure similar to that
adopted by the OptionMetrics database. On each date of estimation, I collect market pricing
information of all options written on the same underlying asset indexed by h = 1; 2; : : : ; H:
For each option h, let h represent the implied volatility, and let V h be the vega of the option
(which measures the sensitivity of option price to the volatility). Denote bymnh = Xh=St the
moneyness of the option, by mth the time to maturity in years, and by cph a dummy variable
that equals 0 for call options and 1 for put options. Then at any point with moneyness mo
(within the range of moneyness of available options), time to maturityma (within the range
of time to maturity of available options), and call-put indicator cp; the estimated volatility
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^ takes the form
^ (mn;mt; cp) =
PH
h=1 V
hh	
 
mn  mnh;mt  mth; cp   cphPH
h=1 V
h	 (mn  mnh;mt  mth; cp   cph) ; (3.43)
where the kernel function 	 is given by
	 (x; y; z) =
1p
2
exp

  x
2
2c1
  y
2
2c2
  z
2
2c3

:
I naively choose c1 = c2 = c3 = 0:001: These parameter values have been checked to generate
reasonable tting.
The idea of the kernel smoothing procedure is intuitive. At any point of interest, I
estimate volatility as the weighted average of the implied volatility of all observed options,
where observations close to the point of interest in terms of moneyness, time to maturity, and
the call-put indicator are assigned higher weights than observations far away. In addition,
since I am eventually interested in estimating the option prices, I would also want to assign
higher weights to observed options whose prices have higher sensitivity to the volatility. To
this end, I also include the option vega into the weights.
The kernel smoothing formula (3.43) works for moneyness and time to maturity levels
within the range of available options. In my empirical applications, I mostly focus on rare
disasters. To estimate the risk-neutral probabilities of rare disasters, I need European option
prices (and hence the volatility) around the disaster thresholds, which feature very low
moneyness levels, sometime even outside the range of moneyness for available options. When
the moneyness at the disaster threshold is lower than the lowest observed moneyness of
available options, I estimate volatility at the lowest observed moneyness level by (3.43) and
use it as a proxy for the volatility around the disaster threshold.
Finally, notice from (3.43) that to perform kernel smoothing, besides the moneyness and
time to maturity of interest, I also need to specify the call-put indicator cp. Theoretically,
the implied volatility should be identical for a call option and a put option with the same
moneyness and time to maturity. However, this is rarely the case in reality. A priori, it
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is not clear whether I should use the call or the put value for the estimation. In practice,
most options trade at-the-money (ATM) or out-of-the-money (OTM), rendering the prices
more accurate for ATM and OTM options. I thus adopt the following rule of thumb. When
the moneyness of interest is lower than one (mn < 1), I estimate volatility for the put
option (cp = 1); which trades OTM. When the moneyness of interest is higher than one
(mn > 1), I estimate volatility for the call option (cp = 0); which again trades OTM.
When the moneyness of interest is equal to one (mn = 1); both the call and the put options
are exactly ATM. I then estimate volatilities for both the call and the put options and take
the average.
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